PC: Alt-Congress of Vienna (failure of Prussia)

[OxSpace]

That's Austria's problem exactly - focusing on too many things. As long as Russia gives Austria freedom of sailing down the Danube and through the straits, I don't see vital Austrian interests in the area. Creation of new nation states at the Balkans was exaggerated as a dagner - they and Austria did co-exist for years and conflict with Serbia wasn't the only cause of war (and comes partially from Austrians' mistake of taking Bosnia).

Which cannot be guaranteed. Plus Austro-Russian relations have been at an all-time low during the Congress (see Alexander challenging Metternich to a duel twice). So looking further ahead via hindsight doesn't address the present problems.

Okay about Venice/Belgium. But it Venice is compensation for Belgium, then where's compensation for lost Polish lands (3rd partition) or Further Austria? Could Belgium be such a compensation?

Venice, really.

The Austrians A Thousand-Year Odyssey

Why?

The Habsburg Empire 1700-1918

Prussia's territory pretty much doubled compared to 1812, Austria's didn't.

Prussia was just restored to a similar population it had in 1805.

I may be wrong but likely Austria had the highest debt

There is no debt in the Austrian Empire /s

 

[TrickyApe]

There is no debt in the Austrian Empire /s
View attachment 905331
View attachment 905332

That particular debt wasn't settled until 1824, when Austria agreed to pay a much smaller sum than Britain had claimed, with the additional provision that payment could be made through trade of timber and quicksilver rather than in cash. Metternich was a good negotiator.

Austria of course had many other debts and had ruined its paper currency during the wars. That wasn't at all unique though. Prussia's debt situation was equally desperate and Russia, while having less of a debt hangover, had also ruined its currency. Even Britain was worried and unhappy about the size of its national debt by 1815.

 

[Diego]

Not every king of Bavaria is Charles Theodore though. Other king might love his country too much to trade it so I'm not convinced.

What can the king of Bavaria do if he loves his country too much? If he denies the deal Austria could just take Bavaria and give nothing in return...

 

[vn6]

What can the king of Bavaria do if he loves his country too much? If he denies the deal Austria could just take Bavaria and give nothing in return...

Austria tried to act as champion of smaller German states which is why it didn't let Saxony be annexed. Annexing Bavaria seems out of question.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Considering they backed down and agreed to the limited terms for Saxony when faced with a (farce) coalition after they threaten war if they couldn't annex all of it. I'd come to the conclusion that legitimacy was everything. If legitimacy was ultimately a non-issue, there wouldn't have been a Saxony after 1815.

If Prussia was to annex all of saxony against the other's wishes then it would've gained less territories elsewhere. You can see how legitimacy was not a problem when your interests are stronger when Metternich offered Saxony and the Rhineland to Prussia in exchange for opposing the Russian annexation of Poland.

The courts in Vienna did not know that.

Metternich quite certainly knew that Italy would be in the Austrian sphere after the Congress.

But Austria did care, because they do not want to set a precedent.

If you look at it is annexing another nation because you don't want to take back your territory logical? No, but nobody has a problem with that.

 

[vn6]

Which cannot be guaranteed. Plus Austro-Russian relations have been at an all-time low during the Congress (see Alexander challenging Metternich to a duel twice). So looking further ahead via hindsight doesn't address the present problems.


Venice, really.
View attachment 905326
The Austrians A Thousand-Year Odyssey

Why?
View attachment 905329
The Habsburg Empire 1700-1918

Prussia was just restored to a similar population it had in 1805.


There is no debt in the Austrian Empire /s
View attachment 905331
View attachment 905332

Russia would almost certainly be friendly to Austria that doesn't interfere in its sphere of influence. The relations were at all-time low because Austria didn't want to move out of Poland like I propose.

Your own source states that Metternich "denied it any territorial gains" as it reached optimum extent. What about situation in which Metternich or.other foreign affairs minister doesn't consider these borders optimum?

As for debt, I have data for 1837 where it amounted to 1253 million florins and payments of interest, etc. covered 45 % of the revenues . From where did this debt come from if not the wars? Also in 1860s Austria's debt was 5 times higher than Prussia's.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Also in 1860s Austria's debt was 5 times higher than Prussia's

There's 1848 and 1861 before 1866, so they had the time to accumulate debt.

 

[vn6]

There's 1848 and 1861 before 1866, so they had the time to accumulate debt.

They didn't fought many wars in the period though. I don't understand why so much debt accumulated later up to 1837. As for later times, I know that military spending and budget deficits in 1850s were record high so maybe that's why but it might not be the only reason. As I've said, even in 1837 the debt is super high.

 

[OxSpace]

If Prussia was to annex all of saxony against the other's wishes then it would've gained less territories elsewhere.

It would not gain territories elsewhere and not have their annexation of Saxony recognized. There's no way to spin that as a logical diplomatic move that Prussia would take at the end of the day. It's diplomatic suicide.

You can see how legitimacy was not a problem when your interests are stronger when Metternich offered Saxony and the Rhineland to Prussia in exchange for opposing the Russian annexation of Poland.

So...legitimize it. I fail to see you point.

If you look at it is annexing another nation because you don't want to take back your territory logical? No, but nobody has a problem with that.

This is incredbily nuanced and a case-by-case bases that making an overarching statement that "no one has a problem with it" is not productive.

 

[OxSpace]

Russia would almost certainly be friendly to Austria that doesn't interfere in its sphere of influence. The relations were at all-time low because Austria didn't want to move out of Poland like I propose.

You're insisting that Vienna kowtows to Russia which is never going to happen.

Your own source states that Metternich "denied it any territorial gains" as it reached optimum extent. What about situation in which Metternich or.other foreign affairs minister doesn't consider these borders optimum?

What would make Metternich believe it was not optimum? It was obvious that the multiple exclaves were not optimum and more of an hindrance. The other territories in questions were detached from Austria like Further Austria. Trying to establish a direct line there was difficult to say the least.

 

[vn6]

You're insisting that Vienna kowtows to Russia which is never going to happen.


What would make Metternich believe it was not optimum? It was obvious that the multiple exclaves were not optimum and more of an hindrance. The other territories in questions were detached from Austria like Further Austria. Trying to establish a direct line there was difficult to say the least.

You call it kowtowing to Russia, I call it focusing on more important areas of influence.

The borders of Austria were not optimum IMO as the country got to little rich provinces (could have gotten Belgium at least) compared to its debt and too little German territory.

 

[OxSpace]

You call it kowtowing to Russia, I call it focusing on more important areas of influence.

At this point you're just hand waving the general prerogative of the Austrian state without recognizing why Metternich did what he did. What makes these areas "more important"? Because you said so despite the contrary? Focusing on Germany doesn't mean gaining more territory in Germany. If you want to push Prussia out of Germany then literally do that: have them take more Polish land, have them get a larger border along France via Belgium.

The borders of Austria were not optimum IMO as the country got to little rich provinces (could have gotten Belgium at least) compared to its debt and too little German territory.

Again, you're too focus on the debt. Rounding off borders was more logical and optimal.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

So...legitimize it. I fail to see you point.

Metternich recognizing it doesn't make it any more legitimate, it's still an annexation against the will of Saxony on the base of nothing. It shows that legitimacy is only a problem when somebody in a position to do so complains and in the case of Venice being annexed by Austria nobody will.

This is incredbily nuanced and a case-by-case bases that making an overarching statement that "no one has a problem with it" is not productive.

Who opposed it? Why would they oppose it ITTL?

 

[TrickyApe]

You call it kowtowing to Russia, I call it focusing on more important areas of influence.

I think there's something to both of these interpretations.

Austria came out of 1815 in a very complicated position. Of the other four Great Powers, three were direct rivals to Austria in different areas. Prussia was the traditional rival in Germany. France had interests in Italy and western Germany. Russia had clashing interests to Austria in the Balkans and to some extent in Poland, though the latter was generally settled at Vienna. Of the three Powers, France and Russia were both stronger than Austria and generally seen as so. Prussia was smaller and weaker on paper but had been punching well above its weight ever since 1740.

Austria should have tried to get out of this triangle by settling with either Russia over the Balkans or France over Italy. Instead, Metternich's grand plan was to ally with the weakest Power and hope that would balance the two stronger. I think a part of that was an expectation that he could make Prussia do the kowtowing, to him and his Emperor. Metternich knew that Prussia wasn't actually a Russian satellite and thought he could instead make it an Austrian client. Metternich was, among his other traits, a man of great ego and self confidence and being the junior partner in an alliance with Russia was not to his taste at all.

With the benefit of hindsight we can see that this didn't work out at all. Once the postwar era of good feelings had faded the traditional Austro-Prussian rivalry in German resumed. Prussia was willing to cooperate on repressive anti-liberal measures like the Carlsbad Decrees and to prevent French moves in Germany itself, but as early as 1830 was conspiring with the South German states to prevent being drawn into a war with France over Austrian interests in Italy. Prussia was also no help in Austria's diplomatic fencing with Russia over Greece and the Balkans in the 1820's. When 1848 came around it was the supposed Russian menace of 1815 that came to Austria's aid, while Prussia made the predictable move for position within Germany and had to be, just barely, contained.

Fast forward sixty years from the Congress of Vienna and we see an Austria that's been pushed out of Germany, pushed out of Italy, and now has to kowtow to Berlin just to protect its remaining Balkan interests. Fast forward another forty years and we can see that these Balkan entanglements, far from being valuable, result in the end of the House of Habsburg, with only the cold consolation of having also ended the Romanovs and Hohenzollerns.

 

[vn6]

I think there's something to both of these interpretations.

Austria came out of 1815 in a very complicated position. Of the other four Great Powers, three were direct rivals to Austria in different areas. Prussia was the traditional rival in Germany. France had interests in Italy and western Germany. Russia had clashing interests to Austria in the Balkans and to some extent in Poland, though the latter was generally settled at Vienna. Of the three Powers, France and Russia were both stronger than Austria and generally seen as so. Prussia was smaller and weaker on paper but had been punching well above its weight ever since 1740.

Austria should have tried to get out of this triangle by settling with either Russia over the Balkans or France over Italy. Instead, Metternich's grand plan was to ally with the weakest Power and hope that would balance the two stronger. I think a part of that was an expectation that he could make Prussia do the kowtowing, to him and his Emperor. Metternich knew that Prussia wasn't actually a Russian satellite and thought he could instead make it an Austrian client. Metternich was, among his other traits, a man of great ego and self confidence and being the junior partner in an alliance with Russia was not to his taste at all.

With the benefit of hindsight we can see that this didn't work out at all. Once the postwar era of good feelings had faded the traditional Austro-Prussian rivalry in German resumed. Prussia was willing to cooperate on repressive anti-liberal measures like the Carlsbad Decrees and to prevent French moves in Germany itself, but as early as 1830 was conspiring with the South German states to prevent being drawn into a war with France over Austrian interests in Italy. Prussia was also no help in Austria's diplomatic fencing with Russia over Greece and the Balkans in the 1820's. When 1848 came around it was the supposed Russian menace of 1815 that came to Austria's aid, while Prussia made the predictable move for position within Germany and had to be, just barely, contained.

Fast forward sixty years from the Congress of Vienna and we see an Austria that's been pushed out of Germany, pushed out of Italy, and now has to kowtow to Berlin just to protect its remaining Balkan interests. Fast forward another forty years and we can see that these Balkan entanglements, far from being valuable, result in the end of the House of Habsburg, with only the cold consolation of having also ended the Romanovs and Hohenzollerns.

I agree with all that.

However, I'm unsure if it was the weakest power of three. I've read that in 1830 Austria's GDP (PPP) was estimated at 7210 million of 1960 dollars minus its Italian parts which gave like 1/4 of Austria's revenue. France was 8582 million, Russia 10550 million plus Finland IIRC. I think adding Italian territories puts Austria between France and Russia in economic power.

 

[OxSpace]

Metternich recognizing it doesn't make it any more legitimate, it's still an annexation against the will of Saxony on the base of nothing. It shows that legitimacy is only a problem when somebody in a position to do so complains and in the case of Venice being annexed by Austria nobody will.

Legitimacy is achieved through recognition. If the great powers are in accordance, then it is legitimate. The means might be crude from the perspective of the victim, but there wouldn't be much they can do. Even if there is no foreign opposition, having the annexation recognized is much better in accordance to the standard of diplomacy than merely doing what you please; Vienna knew this, which is why they pushed for recognition:

If legitimacy was a nothingburger, then Austria would not go to such lengths to get other countries on board:

Who opposed it? Why would they oppose it ITTL?

I already answered this.

Aside from that, it wouldn't completely out of the ordinary for Britain to take more interest in Venice. After all, they were sowing ideas into the Venetians themselves.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Legitimacy is achieved through recognition. If the great powers are in accordance, then it is legitimate. The means might be crude from the perspective of the victim, but there wouldn't be much they can do. Even if there is no foreign opposition, having the annexation recognized is much better in accordance to the standard of diplomacy than merely doing what you please; Vienna knew this, which is why they pushed for recognition:

If legitimacy was a nothingburger, then Austria would not go to such lengths to get other countries on board:

I don't see why Britain, Prussia or Russia would oppose the Austrian annexation of Venice any more than IOTL if they also have the Austrian Netherlands.

I already answered this.

I don't consider sympathies in Parliament a serious opposition to the question since Britain in the end didn't do much about it.

Aside from that, it wouldn't completely out of the ordinary for Britain to take more interest in Venice. After all, they were sowing ideas into the Venetians themselves.

The Foreign Minister at the Vienna Congress didn't seem to have the same ideas.

 

[Nuraghe]

I agree with all that.

However, I'm unsure if it was the weakest power of three. I've read that in 1830 Austria's GDP (PPP) was estimated at 7210 million of 1960 dollars minus its Italian parts which gave like 1/4 of Austria's revenue. France was 8582 million, Russia 10550 million plus Finland IIRC. I think adding Italian territories puts Austria between France and Russia in economic power.

In reality from what I know, the revenues coming from Lombardy Veneto reached 1/3 of the entire annual earnings of the imperial treasury, this remembering that said provinces were also 1/5 of the population of the empire, now we can certainly be d the agreement that Austria should try to expand their presence in Germany over the centuries ( there were attempts to do so, see Wurttemberg in the 16th century, the various exchange attempts for Bavaria in the 18th century and the reform projects imperial forces who had among their objectives also the mediatization of the minor territories in Swabia, so as to strengthen control over Further Austria ) but it should be remembered that Vienna also had further fronts of interest ( especially in the Italian peninsula ) which were more in line with his policy of imperium and defender of the church ( in the medieval sense of the word ) , so if it were possible to make a Habsburg emperor choose what he would prefer to hold between a possession in Northern Germany or Italy, it is highly probable that 9/10 would say the second option

 

[TrickyApe]

The Foreign Minister at the Vienna Congress didn't seem to have the same ideas.

Bentinck was a loose cannon but Austria should have considered his idea of keeping the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy together, especially after he conceded that a Habsburg might be the appropriate sovereign of such an entity. Instead Francis proclaimed that Lombardy and Venetia were his by right of conquest. Amusingly, Metternich is on record corresponding with Palmerston thirty years later in the lead up to 1848 insisting that Austria just took over those provinces out of a sense of duty and not for its own benefit at all.

 

[vn6]

In reality from what I know, the revenues coming from Lombardy Veneto reached 1/3 of the entire annual earnings of the imperial treasury, this remembering that said provinces were also 1/5 of the population of the empire, now we can certainly be d the agreement that Austria should try to expand their presence in Germany over the centuries ( there were attempts to do so, see Wurttemberg in the 16th century, the various exchange attempts for Bavaria in the 18th century and the reform projects imperial forces who had among their objectives also the mediatization of the minor territories in Swabia, so as to strengthen control over Further Austria ) but it should be remembered that Vienna also had further fronts of interest ( especially in the Italian peninsula ) which were more in line with his policy of imperium and defender of the church ( in the medieval sense of the word ) , so if it were possible to make a Habsburg emperor choose what he would prefer to hold between a possession in Northern Germany or Italy, it is highly probable that 9/10 would say the second option

Even 1/3? I don't remember where I've heard about this being 1/4 of the revenues. Out of curiosity, do you remember the source which says it was 1/3?