1950s "Limited" Nuclear War

I should be able to get a more detailed analysis out next week, but I should point out that those figures are largely for the late-40s, not the early-mid 50s. SACs abilities evolved rapidly once the Korean War pushed the US into rearmament and by the end of the Korean War its deficiencies were more than made good on. The OP largely seems to be looking at the 1953-55 timeframe, by which time American capabilities were more than enough to overwhelm Soviet air defense efforts even though those too had developed themselves with the introduction of new systems.
B-47s and B-50s can penetrate Soviet air defenses then? Also in 1954, the H-bomb was introduced so the SAC would definitely use that.
 
B-47s and B-50s can penetrate Soviet air defenses then?
In a strategic sense, by their sheer numbers, yes. The B-50 was just as vulnerable to the MiG-15 as the B-29 (or B-36) and the Soviets would also be employing the MiG-17 and -19 by the mid-50s, the latter of which was just as dangerous to the B-47 as the -15 was to the B-29/50*. But fundamentally, SAC had a lot more aircraft, bombs, prepared bases, combat readiness, and just about everything else relative to the opposition compared to the late-1940s.

*In fact, it was the fielding of the MiG-19 directly led to some rather high-profile shootdowns of RB-47 deep penetration flights into the USSR that forced the USAF to hand off the mission over to the CIA and their ultra-specialized U-2.
 
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In a strategic sense, by their sheer numbers, yes. The B-50 was just as vulnerable to the MiG-15 as the B-29 (or B-36) and the Soviets would also be employing the MiG-17 and -19 by the mid-50s, the latter of which was just as dangerous to the B-47 as the -15 was to the B-29/50*. But fundamentally, SAC had a lot more aircraft, bombs, prepared bases, combat readiness, and just about everything else relative to the opposition compared to the late-1940s.

*In fact, it was the fielding of the MiG-19 directly led to some rather high-profile shootdowns of RB-47 deep penetration flights into the USSR that forced the USAF to hand off the mission over to the CIA and their ultra-specialized U-2.
While I don't have the numbers how many nuclear-capable Tu-4s the USSR had as of mid-50s (1954-56), here's the atomic stockpiles per country:
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Source:
Norris, R. S., & Kristensen, H. M. (2010). Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945–2010. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66(4), 77-83. https://doi.org/10.2968/066004008
 
The OP largely seems to be looking at the 1953-55 timeframe, by which time American capabilities were more than enough to overwhelm Soviet air defense efforts even though those too had developed themselves with the introduction of new systems.
That's a really dangerous timeframe for the USSR, from what I recall - the US nuclear warfare apparatus had developed to the point where a USSR first strike might have been literally impossible. There was a reasonably high degree of confidence that the US intelligence apparatus could identify signs that the USSR was preparing a first strike, and shift onto a war footing quickly enough to destroy the Soviet nuclear striking forces before they could launch it.

This would have been slow for both parties - at one point, IIRC, the USSR needed six weeks to launch a nuclear attack - and the US only needed four.
 
That's a really dangerous timeframe for the USSR, from what I recall - the US nuclear warfare apparatus had developed to the point where a USSR first strike might have been literally impossible. There was a reasonably high degree of confidence that the US intelligence apparatus could identify signs that the USSR was preparing a first strike, and shift onto a war footing quickly enough to destroy the Soviet nuclear striking forces before they could launch it.

This would have been slow for both parties - at one point, IIRC, the USSR needed six weeks to launch a nuclear attack - and the US only needed four.
The downside though is that the U.S. early warning systems were crap at this period. The Pinetree Line was bad and the Mid-Canada Line only became operational by 1956. So if the scenario the OP presented happens before the Mid-Canada Line was operational, it would mean any bombers detected by the Pinetree Line would have passed significant areas within North America before it could be intercepted by either the RCAF or the USAF.

Expect some Tu-4s to strike Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, and Vancouver for Canada and Chicago, Detroit, New York, Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco for the United States. If the Soviet air forces already mastered mid-flight refueling, expect the bombers to reach as far as Los Angeles, San Diego, and even Washington, D.C. just like how The Hot War trilogy of Harry Turtledove presented.
 
You do know that A) the Mig 15 had rela short range for intercept missions and B) they didn’t have a Mig 15 behind every tree…
So you add short range, (relatively) slow spreed (compared to later dedicated interceptors) limited number of radar stations and limit ated ability of siad radar and you get a much much weaker chance of intercepting anything In 1954.
Yes if a mig gets to a B-36 the bomber is in trouble but this is not like Korea. The area of Korea mad an ideal intercept mission, You had limited target area, limited routes and relatively few intercept targets.
The US hitting Russia is sending in hundreds of aircraft on seperate vectors that all need separate intercept missions, they attacking from several directions and over a HUGE area. Making this the absolute worst case scenario for interceptions,
So a lot more B-36 are going to make it simply because they are not within intercept range of a fighter if they are seen at all.
Look at how hard it was for the US to intercept the infamous “attacks” by the RAF later on. And by the time those missions were flown the US had a much better Radar system and better interceptors then Russia had in the Mid 50s.

Also the USSR does not have enough bombers and or bombs to get all the bases with all the US medium range bombers on them so these bombers will be heading in as well.

No a 1954 nuclear war is going yo see the USSR blown to bits. With Europe looking like a mess and odds are the US is all but untouched.

Frankly 1954 is probably the absolute worse time for WW3 as far as the USSR is concerned, The US was bring in new tech and weapons and had learned lessons in Korea. The US had a LOT more Nukes the the USSR. The US had the only Intercontinental Bombers. The US had more nuckear bombers period. And the USSR had not completed enough of its air defenses to be able to cover/intercept everything that the US could toss at it.
So frankly I don’t think there is a chance in the world that the USSR does a first strike at that point. As it knew it didn’t have a snowballs chance in hell of surviving.
A few years later with more and better radar and better interceptors and SAMs and its own IC Bombers and then with ICBMs and what have you… maybe. But 1954 is just about the worst date you could pick.
 
While I don't have the numbers how many nuclear-capable Tu-4s the USSR had as of mid-50s (1954-56), here's the atomic stockpiles per country:
Numbers I've found are a bit contradictory: some suggest dozens, others suggest hundreds. Though by 1954 period we're also looking at the Tu-16 and by '56 the very first production Tu-95s are entering service. There's also the Il-28N which - while a total non-factor in striking the US - could service targets in Western Europe. I guess if they felt they were pressed, they could shove the prototype Tu-95s (which had first flown in 1952) and pair of Tu-85s they had into service, but in addition to the problem of flying prototypes as combat aircraft... there are just not enough of them to do much. Maybe if we were talking something pre-planned ahead of time by some years, they could've shoved the Tu-85 into production instead of deciding to wait until the Tu-95 and but the OP seems to be envisioning this as a much more rushed affair.

All that said, I haven't seen much to suggest they planned on the sort of one-way flights that some have claimed. In fact, the only data point I've seen suggests otherwise: when Khruschev was shown a strike plan which involved they do just that, he said it was a stupid idea and ordered it scrapped.
You do know that A) the Mig 15 had rela short range for intercept missions and B) they didn’t have a Mig 15 behind every tree…
You see, stuff like this tells me you didn't do any research on the Soviet air defense force at all. Because if you did, you'd know that by 1954 the MiG-15 was a bit old hat. By then the Soviets are fielding the MiG-17 and even the supersonic MiG-19.
Yes if a mig gets to a B-36 the bomber is in trouble but this is not like Korea. The area of Korea mad an ideal intercept mission, You had limited target area, limited routes and relatively few intercept targets.
It was actually very unideal. Soviet radar posts and fighter bases were all stuck north of the Yalu, which both limited the area they could see and fly at all as well as hamstrung early warning since incoming flights that were picked up would come very late in the day, leaving them very little time to intercept. Given those limitations, it's remarkable they performed as well as they did and speaks to Soviet air defense capabilities being in quite a advanced stage.
The US hitting Russia is sending in hundreds of aircraft on seperate vectors that all need separate intercept missions, they attacking from several directions and over a HUGE area. Making this the absolute worst case scenario for interceptions,
I mean, yeah, the huge mass of aircraft the USA can throw at the issue will overwhelm the air defense forces by raw numbers, but relatively few of those are gonna be B-36s. They were fantastically expensive aircraft (384 produced over 8 years, an average of 48 aircraft per year) even compared to the later B-52 (744 in 10, an average of 74.4 aircraft each year). Most will still be B-29s/B-50s supplemented by the B-47s. I expect the USAAF to suffer it's worse losses in the first raids, since obviously the later raids will benefit from the earlier bombings curtailing Soviet capabilities.

So a lot more B-36 are going to make it simply because they are not within intercept range of a fighter if they are seen at all.

Unless they never intend to strike any target in the Soviet Union to begin with - or perhaps limit themselves to striking targets right on the coast or southern border - they're gonna have a very high chance of getting detected and have fighters vectored in on them during the early missions. Some will survive that, some won't.
 
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The Mig 17 was only in service about a year or so by the OPs date of 54. (depending on which version) and the Mig 19 was not in use at that point. And considering that the US which in general had more money and better tech was having issues Building a continues Radar screen and building enough Interceptors to protect the US I am having trouble believing that The USSR was invulnerable in 54.


And my point that the USSR didnt have enough Mig-15s in 54 goes double for the basically brand new Mig-17.
The truth is that in the early 1950s the USSR was probably going to intercept less then Half the B-36s. As the decade goes on and they continue building Radar Stations and interceptors it will get worse for the B-36s but eventually they are phased out as the B-52 arrives.
But 1954 is a bad time for the USSR.

Would it suck to be crew of a B-36. Sure. But it is far from sure death. And considering that the USSR cant hit the US this is not going yo go well for the USSR. Now as the decade goes on things will get better for the USSR in that it will be aboe yo do more and more damage to the US but the USSR was never in a position that it could attack the US and survive, But the early 1950s the US WAS in such a position.
 
The 1950s are a TERRIBLE time for the Soviets to launch a first strike. 1954 would be an ideal time for the Americans to launch a first strike (if the goal was to destroy the Soviet Union and commit mass atrocity).

Let's go with 1951 (same year as "The Hot War"). The B-47 is not yet deployed, so your SAC force comprises:

98 B-36
219 B-50
349 B-29

Now, many of your B-29s are based in the Far East for operations in Korea, but the other planes are specifically earmarked for nuclear tasks. Fighter escort is provided by F-84Es (later F-84Gs).

Bombers would be based in the US, Algeria, and the UK.

The Soviets would have 500-900 Tu-4s (B-29 copies) depending on when in the year the war happened.

Depending on when in the year the war happens, the US has from 400-800 nukes. The Soviets have 25-50.

There are enough MiG 15s (thousands) that I imagine good air defense could rip apart a concerted B-36/B-50 strike. Provided it happened in the daytime. If it happens at night, I don't think there's anything the Soviets can do. And even in the day time, a thousand MiGs won't find all, and maybe not even most of the 300 bombers attacking the country...

The US has a few hundred F-94s and 40 F-89Bs. They probably can't stop all the Soviet bombers, but probably most of them. If the Soviets use their bombers on the US, which they probably wouldn't.

(I can do other years, too, but that's the first one I pulled out my source materials for).
 
The Mig 17 was only in service about a year or so by the OPs date of 54.
Two years, in fact.
(depending on which version) and the Mig 19 was not in use at that point.
Serial production had begun in early-1954.
And considering that the US which in general had more money and better tech was having issues Building a continues Radar screen and building enough Interceptors to protect the US
Meanwhile, in reality we can see that the far more capable RB-47s were being routinely intercepted in their deep penetration runs by MiG-15s and -17s. If unladened reconnaissance versions of jet bombers that had performance characteristics approaching period fighters were frequently coming back with holes punched in their wings from a MiG-15's guns from the very first flight, then the far slower, far less maneuverable, and far more visible B-36s weighed down by lugging around nukes certainly are going to find a lot of such 'craft bearing down on them.
I am having trouble believing that The USSR was invulnerable in 54.
And if I ever argued it was invulnerable, you'd have a point. But that's a strawman you've constructed ignoring that I’ve frankly admitted that 1954 is probably the worst year for the Soviets to try any of this, so nice try.
And my point that the USSR didnt have enough Mig-15s in 54 goes double for the basically brand new Mig-17.
It's an unsubstantiated claim on your part that the Soviet Union didn't have "enough" MiG-15s, when in reality it's dedicated combat models had gone through their full production run of nearly 10,000 manufactured in 1949-1953 and another 2,733 trainers. I can't find annual MiG-17 production figures, but assuming it followed a similar trajectory as MiG-15 production, then about ~25% of the production run would have been in the first two years. At ~9,000 aircraft manufactured in the USSR, that works out to ~2,250.

Provided it happened in the daytime. If it happens at night, I don't think there's anything the Soviets can do.

Your post is correct save for this part. Experience in Korea suggests the Soviets would use Wild Boar tactics for any night fighters lacking their own radar.
 
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In October 1951, Collier's Magazine released a hypothetical World War III scenario breaking out in May 1952 called Preview of the War We Do Not Want.

1.jpeg


The premise is the Soviets invaded non-aligned communist Yugoslavia. However, just like the Finns in 1939 and the Ukrainians in 2022, the Yugoslavians do not yield to a greater opponent as they have been preparing for that inevitability and years of guerilla warfare against the Nazis embolden their resolve. Tito wins support from the U.S. and NATO, in which Truman announces his administration's support for the Yugoslavians.

The scenario turns into a typical 1950s WWIII scenario involving nukes in which the U.S., Britain, and Western Europe chug Soviet nukes while the American retaliation on the USSR is much greater. The war ends in 1960 when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is overthrown and a UN peacekeeping force monitors the transition of democracy in the new Russia.

You can read it here for free:

In addition, here are some U.S. nuclear war plans against the USSR in 1956:

B-29 and B-36 coverage:
1024px-August_1945_Coverage_of_USSR_by_B-29s_and_B-36s.jpg
 
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The downside though is that the U.S. early warning systems were crap at this period. The Pinetree Line was bad and the Mid-Canada Line only became operational by 1956. So if the scenario the OP presented happens before the Mid-Canada Line was operational, it would mean any bombers detected by the Pinetree Line would have passed significant areas within North America before it could be intercepted by either the RCAF or the USAF.

Expect some Tu-4s to strike Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, and Vancouver for Canada and Chicago, Detroit, New York, Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco for the United States. If the Soviet air forces already mastered mid-flight refueling, expect the bombers to reach as far as Los Angeles, San Diego, and even Washington, D.C. just like how The Hot War trilogy of Harry Turtledove presented.
Except when Soviet plans for the period became apparent it seems weirdly enough that in the period before the M4 got built in even handfuls that the Soviet gov never apparently even seriously considered sending nuclear armed TU4s over the poles on one way missions to nuke CONUS. Despite it being pretty much their only way at all of reaching virtually any of their main adversarities major territories and the game being one of possible utter annilation the Soviets weren't planning on using literally the only asset they had that could even theoretically nuke CONUS while they definitely knew that the US not only had a very major advantage in terms of nukes but also had major early advantages in terms of nuclear armed cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, piston engined bombers that while slow were available in numbers and had the range to hit the Soviet Heartland. And that the US also had a fuckton of newer much more capable jet powered aircraft capable of carrying nukes in the hundred kiloton range to deep soviet targets from the numerous US or US allied bases or potential air operation centers or from the USN carrier force which first used modified PV2s in a Kamikaze role and then had planes capable of more normally carrying large nuke warheads in any of thousands of potential naval delivery platforms in terms of the new generation of largely jet naval aircraft and from any one of like 20 large or very large USN carriers capable of reaching deep into the waters of Europe or the West Pacific and potentially launch attacks where a single carrier could launch dozens of capable fighters/bombers at roughly the same time either to have conventionally armed planes support the nuke bombers or have single carrier try to strike a couple dozen major Soviet targets.

The Soviets didn't have the long range bombers, ground based cruise or ballistic missiles, air delivered standoff nukes, air tanker capability, aircraft carrier capability, subs capable of carrying and launching nuclear armed missiles or the sort of large and capable air bases available for use in large numbers across a wide area the US did with it's network of either active bases or allied bases or just major airports that could be used to launch strikes from around the Soviet perimiter via missiles, planes and so on via US military aircraft that were shorter ranged but could reach target if say launched from Turkey. Neither did the Soviets ever have anywhere near the US air tanker capability with its hundreds of large long range land based air tankers capable of operating from any airstrip that could fly a modern commercial plane and could individually say something like a medium bomber like the B47 or a tactical bomber like the B57 when launched from origin points that normally couldn't even reach Soviet borders without needing to land. Instead said converted B50s could each equip a large bomber like that with fuel to allow said nuke platform to not just reach potential targets but actually potentially deliver the bomb and then turn around and at least hypothetically reach a friendly bases. While USN tankers allowed most carrier planes to be modified to allow say a nuclear strike bomber to launch with a fuel payload, fuel up before they were about to hit the Soviets and then potentially survive returning to shore base or carrier.

In this period they just didn't really have way to even Tolkien nuke CONUS while they definitely knew the US had the capacity to nuke the Soviets into the stone age. Sure it would cost the US a lot of lives in their armed forces, allies, bases abroad, distant US posessions like Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa, Alaska and the like. Basically they couldn't directly harm 99% of the US populace with their nukes while they knew the US could probably kill 99% of their population and still have bombs left over and without the US even having it's population/industrial capabilities/ agricultural resources and the like scratched. At most you might see the US CONUS economic standard of living drop to the 1920s or maybe 1930s for a couple decades but that's pretty much it. Seems like kind of a bad arguement for fighting a nuclear war at the point for the Soviets "We have no ability to even damage a US civilian major city with one of our nukes while most definitely the capitalist opponent could hit the vast majority of our cities with weapons in the hundreds of kilotons range sometimes repeatedly. The enemy bombers might take terrible losses but the Americans may lose thousands of bomber crewmen while we will be lucky to be left with a town of as much as 100K people left untouched directly by nuclear weapon. And after that wave of destruction where the Americans will be left in a state of complete and total lack of damage compared to us we will have no nukes left, no methods of delivering them or any methods of building them left. While the Americans would likely have enough to drop at least a hundred more city killer warheads in a second wave. And the Americans infrastructure for building new warheads and new delivery methods would be completely untouched. So the last few starving Million soviets might if very lucky survive as much as perhaps another two years before our opponent has built up the weapons and the delivery systems to utterly destroy anything left untouched by the first wave. Right before the first wave we would perhaps have the option of surrendering and losing our independence and being conquered by capitalists. But perhaps most of our people would live. After that first strike wave our options would be "Accept that inevitably it's a matter of months before our enemy rearms to the point they can one by one remove every trace of our existence. In that same waiting period we would be lucky to say manage to minimize fatalities from communicable aid and famine to say less then quarter of the surviving Soviet People. The idea that in such a period in such a state we could manufacture as much as a single nuclear warhead of any type or any delivery platform capable of even potentially reaching targets even vaguely near CONUS. So in either scenario we lack any means to actually win or survive any confrontation or conflict."

Saying all that it's almost insane that the Russians were as bellicose/confrontative as they were in this period. They knew they couldn't destroy the US but the US could destroy them and almost definitely without the lower 48 even getting hit once. Yeah US polar air warning systems and CONUS air defenses sucked but it really doesn't matter much if the areas air defenses/air warning systems are the worst if the enemy has no ability or will to even try to potentially hit said potential targets. Since they never had plans to send their only asset capable of even going over the Poles to drop a nuke on the type of Kamikaze mission required we're not even really talking about a potential war. It would be like the confrontation between a MBT converted with a flame thrower and a small ant hive.

Why were the Soviets so relatively confrontation in that period which they obviously knew was in effect but would eventually fade. Seems like it would have made more sense to pretend to be interested in peace and such and maybe say negotiate the loss of one of the members of the Warsaw pact in some fashion that would take at least a few years, cost major US political figures a major investment and get the Soviets something. Trade I dunno hungary into a state of neutrality while making the whole thing take a fucking time while finding ways to get as much possible from the US/NATO. Make any US president involved too invested to risk starting a war. Make it last a few years so you finally at least have a small capability to nuke at least part of CONUS. Lay the seeds beforehand to make sure that the previous deal regarding Hungary or whatever is a wasted piece of paper with a "democratic popular revolution for socialism" with the Soviets having milked both the time and everything material they could while in the end giving nothing and buying guaranteed period where you'll finally get a capability to at least make a minimal deterrence.

I wonder what the Soviets might have been able to get if they tried such a prolonged diplomatic scheme regarding ceding one of the warsaw pact members. Both in time/limited western disarmament and in material terms in terms of what would effectively be bribes.
 
Unless they never intend to strike any target in the Soviet Union to begin with - or perhaps limit themselves to striking targets right on the coast or southern border - they're gonna have a very high chance of getting detected and have fighters vectored in on them during the early missions. Some will survive that, some won't.
No evidence for this and completely random but maybe their was some unofficial intention of using the B36s as magnets to absorb Soviet defensive attention (and potentially sucker the Soviets into sending disproportionate numbers of their best air defense assets against real or imagined B36s movements. Which might both make said air defense assets more vulnerable then they otherwise might be (allowing say strikes to destroy or weaken their air defense fighter assets or just sucker them into focusing on the wrong vectors when the more practical delivery methods are actually in a serious play for striking the targets. I mean if the Soviets are willing to risk disproportionate quantities of their best air defense aircraft into more borderlike air space and airbases closer to international borders smaller/more capable tactical to intermediate assets might be able to severely weaken Soviet air defenses by nuking aircraft being refueled and rearmed on the ground, killing or even just wearing down Soviet pilots and ground crews, gradual targeting of logistic depots/radar stations and such leaving more Soviet pilots trapped on the ground with planes that have no fuel and with crews that haven't slept in a week while chugging amphetamines and Vodka to deal with the lack of sleep/paranoia/feeling of doom at any second. In that type of situation the Soviet border air defenses would gradually crumble with planes destroyed in air or on ground, crashing from lack of repairs or fuel or the like. Meanwhile US bases closer to the Soviets and assets there will have suffered from the soviets using what assets they can throw. While ironically potentially American air assets either originally based and operating from CONUS or re positioned there (with the B36s and such being able to strike on their own while the lesser range vehicles would require air refueling) are going to be mentally worn down but unless the B36 force has actually made a real play to launch major strikes they won't have been vulnerable to Soviet air defenses. US shorter range delivery methods would have dwindled considerably but the longer ranged methods would be comparatively untouched in such a period as the bombing goes on. Meaning with the Soviet air defenses in a jumble you could actually use the B36s based from CONUS to finish off the Soviet Union.
 
What percentage of the warheads would have likely been duds at that point in time? You're forgetting to assume a certain failure rate for your arsenal splitting math. Also China was a giant North Korea back in the 1950's, so even if they are fully supporting the Soviets you'd only really need to neuter them with nukes preventing them trying to invade South Korea or mess with Hong Kong or something along the lines of decapitating the government.
 
Except when Soviet plans for the period became apparent it seems weirdly enough that in the period before the M4 got built in even handfuls that the Soviet gov never apparently even seriously considered sending nuclear armed TU4s over the poles on one way missions to nuke CONUS. Despite it being pretty much their only way at all of reaching virtually any of their main adversarities major territories and the game being one of possible utter annilation the Soviets weren't planning on using literally the only asset they had that could even theoretically nuke CONUS while they definitely knew that the US not only had a very major advantage in terms of nukes but also had major early advantages in terms of nuclear armed cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, piston engined bombers that while slow were available in numbers and had the range to hit the Soviet Heartland. And that the US also had a fuckton of newer much more capable jet powered aircraft capable of carrying nukes in the hundred kiloton range to deep soviet targets from the numerous US or US allied bases or potential air operation centers or from the USN carrier force which first used modified PV2s in a Kamikaze role and then had planes capable of more normally carrying large nuke warheads in any of thousands of potential naval delivery platforms in terms of the new generation of largely jet naval aircraft and from any one of like 20 large or very large USN carriers capable of reaching deep into the waters of Europe or the West Pacific and potentially launch attacks where a single carrier could launch dozens of capable fighters/bombers at roughly the same time either to have conventionally armed planes support the nuke bombers or have single carrier try to strike a couple dozen major Soviet targets.

The Soviets didn't have the long range bombers, ground based cruise or ballistic missiles, air delivered standoff nukes, air tanker capability, aircraft carrier capability, subs capable of carrying and launching nuclear armed missiles or the sort of large and capable air bases available for use in large numbers across a wide area the US did with it's network of either active bases or allied bases or just major airports that could be used to launch strikes from around the Soviet perimiter via missiles, planes and so on via US military aircraft that were shorter ranged but could reach target if say launched from Turkey. Neither did the Soviets ever have anywhere near the US air tanker capability with its hundreds of large long range land based air tankers capable of operating from any airstrip that could fly a modern commercial plane and could individually say something like a medium bomber like the B47 or a tactical bomber like the B57 when launched from origin points that normally couldn't even reach Soviet borders without needing to land. Instead said converted B50s could each equip a large bomber like that with fuel to allow said nuke platform to not just reach potential targets but actually potentially deliver the bomb and then turn around and at least hypothetically reach a friendly bases. While USN tankers allowed most carrier planes to be modified to allow say a nuclear strike bomber to launch with a fuel payload, fuel up before they were about to hit the Soviets and then potentially survive returning to shore base or carrier.

In this period they just didn't really have way to even Tolkien nuke CONUS while they definitely knew the US had the capacity to nuke the Soviets into the stone age. Sure it would cost the US a lot of lives in their armed forces, allies, bases abroad, distant US posessions like Guam, Hawaii, Okinawa, Alaska and the like. Basically they couldn't directly harm 99% of the US populace with their nukes while they knew the US could probably kill 99% of their population and still have bombs left over and without the US even having it's population/industrial capabilities/ agricultural resources and the like scratched. At most you might see the US CONUS economic standard of living drop to the 1920s or maybe 1930s for a couple decades but that's pretty much it. Seems like kind of a bad arguement for fighting a nuclear war at the point for the Soviets "We have no ability to even damage a US civilian major city with one of our nukes while most definitely the capitalist opponent could hit the vast majority of our cities with weapons in the hundreds of kilotons range sometimes repeatedly. The enemy bombers might take terrible losses but the Americans may lose thousands of bomber crewmen while we will be lucky to be left with a town of as much as 100K people left untouched directly by nuclear weapon. And after that wave of destruction where the Americans will be left in a state of complete and total lack of damage compared to us we will have no nukes left, no methods of delivering them or any methods of building them left. While the Americans would likely have enough to drop at least a hundred more city killer warheads in a second wave. And the Americans infrastructure for building new warheads and new delivery methods would be completely untouched. So the last few starving Million soviets might if very lucky survive as much as perhaps another two years before our opponent has built up the weapons and the delivery systems to utterly destroy anything left untouched by the first wave. Right before the first wave we would perhaps have the option of surrendering and losing our independence and being conquered by capitalists. But perhaps most of our people would live. After that first strike wave our options would be "Accept that inevitably it's a matter of months before our enemy rearms to the point they can one by one remove every trace of our existence. In that same waiting period we would be lucky to say manage to minimize fatalities from communicable aid and famine to say less then quarter of the surviving Soviet People. The idea that in such a period in such a state we could manufacture as much as a single nuclear warhead of any type or any delivery platform capable of even potentially reaching targets even vaguely near CONUS. So in either scenario we lack any means to actually win or survive any confrontation or conflict."

Saying all that it's almost insane that the Russians were as bellicose/confrontative as they were in this period. They knew they couldn't destroy the US but the US could destroy them and almost definitely without the lower 48 even getting hit once. Yeah US polar air warning systems and CONUS air defenses sucked but it really doesn't matter much if the areas air defenses/air warning systems are the worst if the enemy has no ability or will to even try to potentially hit said potential targets. Since they never had plans to send their only asset capable of even going over the Poles to drop a nuke on the type of Kamikaze mission required we're not even really talking about a potential war. It would be like the confrontation between a MBT converted with a flame thrower and a small ant hive.

Why were the Soviets so relatively confrontation in that period which they obviously knew was in effect but would eventually fade. Seems like it would have made more sense to pretend to be interested in peace and such and maybe say negotiate the loss of one of the members of the Warsaw pact in some fashion that would take at least a few years, cost major US political figures a major investment and get the Soviets something. Trade I dunno hungary into a state of neutrality while making the whole thing take a fucking time while finding ways to get as much possible from the US/NATO. Make any US president involved too invested to risk starting a war. Make it last a few years so you finally at least have a small capability to nuke at least part of CONUS. Lay the seeds beforehand to make sure that the previous deal regarding Hungary or whatever is a wasted piece of paper with a "democratic popular revolution for socialism" with the Soviets having milked both the time and everything material they could while in the end giving nothing and buying guaranteed period where you'll finally get a capability to at least make a minimal deterrence.

I wonder what the Soviets might have been able to get if they tried such a prolonged diplomatic scheme regarding ceding one of the warsaw pact members. Both in time/limited western disarmament and in material terms in terms of what would effectively be bribes.
Nobody has ever (technically) actually wanted to fight a nuclear war, that's why they acted like they did. Russians (excluding myself) like to gamble and all things considered have been relatively successful in doing so (and they did it best when pretending that they were not capitalist anymore oddly enough).
 
Thanks to all for the detailed responses- this is a huge help in terms of source material and just general knowledge. I'll post some questions tomorrow regarding Biological and Chemical Weapons and how they might factor into any strike package as well as respond to some points- all excellent and for which I am grateful- made here.
 
Hi all
I am considering writing a timeline on the subject of a "Limited" Nuclear War erupting in the 1950s, stemming from a Soviet first strike against perceived NATO aggression and ending in an Allied victory, due less to battlefield triumphs than to the collapse of the Soviet Union under the weight of nuclear strikes. If anyone has any ideas about how to better the scenario I describe below, or finds some glaring error/omission, I'd be grateful for any feedback. Without more ado...

-Soviet First Strike? In the absence of ICBMs or even SLBMs, long range bombers would have been the only delivery mechanism here, and this places severe restrictions on the ability of both sides to launch nuclear strikes at each other, albiet in different ways. For the Americans- the B-47 had a combat range of around 2000 miles, meaning it was reliant on European bases to hit targets in the USSR/Eastern Europe, as only the B-52 could go from America to the USSR in one straight shot. Is it thus fair to say that a successful Soviet first strike which destroyed SAC bases in Europe could, at minimum, delay the American nuclear response long enough for the Soviets to make a serious conventional advance? What percentage of SAC's bomber force and the American nuclear arsenal could the Soviets have destroyed on the ground?

-Soviet advance and how long it would take to drive them back. If, say, the Americans do not launch their nuclear strike until day three of the war (as the Soviet first strike has destroyed much of what they have in Europe, forcing them to bring reserves over from the CONUS), how far can the Soviet Army advance in that time? To the Weser? The Rhine? And once the Americans do launch their nukes at the USSR, how long until they can start pushing back in Europe?

-Destruction of conventional forces and erosion of fighting ability: In the 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet military planners envisioned dropping hundreds of nuclear weapons on Western forces in Germany on the first day of fighting- but this could not have worked in the 1950s with nuclear weapons so sparse, especially if the Soviets prioritise SAC bases. The Americans obviously would obviously have far more nuclear weapons to use, but SAC was always, well, strategic, and I know of no plans to send the bombers against Soviet troops in the field. In the mid-50s, things like nuclear artillery shells and nuclear-capable fighter bombers were only just entering service, so my first impression is that the fighting in Germany would have been primarily conventional. Is this accurate?

-Logistics: Tied into the above is: how long can both sides fight before their supply chains give out on them? The 1950s were not the 1980s- long wars remained the norm, as Korea demonstrated. The counter to this is, here nuclear strikes would have destroyed vast swathes of Europe- the Soviets will not be in a position to produce anything en masse, never mind shipping it to the front. Britain and France will be in the same position and will have only very limited port facilities to receive supplies from the United States. What the powers brought in to this war, in other words, is all they would have had to fight it with, and the war would have become a contest to make the other's logistics collapse first. Who would win in that situation? My gut tells me the West, because America is still intact and over a period of months, they can bring in far more than the Soviet Union, but I want to hear your thoughts.

-Level of destruction: My general impression of the period 1950-1957 (ie, between the outbreak of the Korean War and the invention of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) is that, while it would be vastly more destructive than OTL's WWII, it would also be an order of magnitude less than what we see in, say, the Cuban Missile War scenario on this site, to say nothing of true end-of-Western-civilisation scenarios such as Threads. According to "Our World In Data", the Americans had 1169 nuclear bombs in 1953, 1703 in 1954, and 2,422 in 1955, while the Soviets only had 5 (!) in 1950 and 200 in 1955. Assuming a war in, say, 1954, the Americans could likely have put 250 sub-megaton bombs onto the Soviet Union and 250 onto China, while the Soviets could only have launched 50-100 successful sub-megaton strikes, accounting for things like air defence and salvage detonation. This would have been a massively lopsided war.

The effects would have been horrible in Western Europe- certainly more physical damage inflicted in one day than in the course of World War II, and command and control would have, at minimum, been severely ruptured. That being said, it would be qualified: the US and Canada would almost certainly have escaped unscathed, and 100 sub-megaton strikes (possibly even under 100 kilotons), would not have destroyed everything of value in Western Europe. Plenty of towns, factories, and the like, along with large swathes of the population, would have survived. In this, we are still close to WWII in that evacuation would be a viable strategy and the countryside would have come through mostly intact. Britain, France, etc, would have been "down but not out" and the Western Hemisphere would most likely be untouched.

In the Soviet Union and China, on the other hand, we might see something resembling Threads- the complete destruction of all cities and modern industry (the Soviet tendency to hyper-centralise production into one big industrial complex would be a major weakness here) and mass depopulation with the survivors becoming refugees. Once command and control broke down, and it wouldn't take long, both the Soviet Union and China would be finished as functioning states. It would make the Chinese Warlord Era look orderly. Eastern Europe would probably get hit somewhat lighter- for one thing, the Americans would probably want to portray themselves as liberators, which is somewhat harder to do when you've just nuked a nation's capital. I imagine there would be brutal violence when the Communist regimes collapse as Soviet troops pull out, though. I'm not sure if the West would have the military strength to occupy the whole of Eastern Europe, but that might be the only thing which imposes order.

@raharris1973 and @ObssesedNuker - I know this is an area of expertise for you both, anything you have to add would be greatly appreciated.
SAC had a lot of tankers so they could fly bombers deep into the Soviet Union. The US also had a lot of bases around the periphery of the USSR including access to bases in Iran, Turkey, Libya the UK, Iceland, Pakistan and bases in WESTPAC to attack targets in the Eastern Soviet Union, SAC had a mixed force of B29/B50/B45/B47 and B52 (depending on when the war happens) plus nuclear capable tactical fighters such as F84, F100, F101 and F105 some of which were expected to fly one way missions into the Western Soviet Union if there were no tankers available for recovering to NATO bases. If NATO was involved then there would be RAF bombers and assorted NATO aircraft carrying US supplied weapons.
 
The 1950s are a TERRIBLE time for the Soviets to launch a first strike. 1954 would be an ideal time for the Americans to launch a first strike (if the goal was to destroy the Soviet Union and commit mass atrocity).

Let's go with 1951 (same year as "The Hot War"). The B-47 is not yet deployed, so your SAC force comprises:

98 B-36
219 B-50
349 B-29

Now, many of your B-29s are based in the Far East for operations in Korea, but the other planes are specifically earmarked for nuclear tasks. Fighter escort is provided by F-84Es (later F-84Gs).

Bombers would be based in the US, Algeria, and the UK.

The Soviets would have 500-900 Tu-4s (B-29 copies) depending on when in the year the war happened.

Depending on when in the year the war happens, the US has from 400-800 nukes. The Soviets have 25-50.

There are enough MiG 15s (thousands) that I imagine good air defense could rip apart a concerted B-36/B-50 strike. Provided it happened in the daytime. If it happens at night, I don't think there's anything the Soviets can do. And even in the day time, a thousand MiGs won't find all, and maybe not even most of the 300 bombers attacking the country...

The US has a few hundred F-94s and 40 F-89Bs. They probably can't stop all the Soviet bombers, but probably most of them. If the Soviets use their bombers on the US, which they probably wouldn't.

(I can do other years, too, but that's the first one I pulled out my source materials for).
You also don't know the impact SAC EW will have on Russian C3 , plus SAC and TAC will be going after Russian command nodes and bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union further degrading intercept efforts.
 
What percentage of the warheads would have likely been duds at that point in time? You're forgetting to assume a certain failure rate for your arsenal splitting math. Also China was a giant North Korea back in the 1950's, so even if they are fully supporting the Soviets you'd only really need to neuter them with nukes preventing them trying to invade South Korea or mess with Hong Kong or something along the lines of decapitating the government.
Doesn't matter a whole lot. Even if say 30 or 40 percent of US nukes are duds all you do is create another waiting period while the US proceeds to build more warheads and delivery vehicles while the Soviet Union has pretty much been killed as a country and most of it's major cities are either very heavily damaged or wiped out (even if say the city isn't outright wiped out by the warhead that targeted the post initiation firestorm could burn for a good long while and pretty much burn anything for a decent perimeter to ash. The Soviets will have used or lost virtually all of their warheads or long range delivery vehicles as well as their major air defense assets (major radar stations, fighter bases, pretty much anything with a moderate sized air strip, av fuel supplies, any and all Soviet military flight training apparatus/aircraft/staff. Maybe a decent chunk of the Soviet fighter portion of the air force survives initially but even if SAC is still waiting for another full blown wave it will still be looking to wipe out any remaining air defenses/WMDs/command and control even if it means say bathing any surface flatter then the lunar surface with alternating treatments of high explosives/Napalm/VX/Anthrax and so on in the meantime and would systematically work to eliminate fuel sources gradually forcing any remaining Soviet fighter assets to either try to reposition (where US long range and very high altitude aircraft have a good chance of picking up any sort of unit sized movement) or try to fight for their bases which is a death sentence no matter what because if you have no known sources of fuel besides your current base even say having a single SAC bomber drop a payload of a long lasting nerve agent or something like VX means the defenders have no where to go. Or if at least some of the American aircraft successfully attack and even damage remaining fuel stores it's also a death knel for that set of defenders. Their position has been located and their ability to call in support (or even just get confirmation when radar sites pick up upcoming attacks) has evaporated and by that point any remaining portion of said defenders can choose to land to try and refuel and salvage what they can. In which case odds are most die on the ground before they can successfully refuel and take off again, Or they can try and flee and likely die either when they run out of fuel and crash or when running on fumes try to land to perhaps try and walk it. If said refugee fighter pilots even succeed at identifying and locating and reaching a position with the fuel, supplies and runway like surface to even temporarily act as a runway for whatever defenders may be hiding their already then congratulations the first set of would be refugee fighter jocks have likely managed to lead SAC to a second base which will likely be attacked again to cripple any attempt to fly and then destroy the aircraft, the infrastructure, supplies and the skilled personel.

Like I said even with a pretty damned big chunk of US warheads being complete duds at this point in time the comparative arsenals of the US versus the USSR, the delivery methods and capabilities, access to allied or distant basing closer to your enemy then your homeland, ability to utilize submarines and aircraft carriers to deliver a sizable number of nukes via integrated attacks on critical targets by entire squadrons worth of top tier carrier combat craft of different types mixing say capabilities to best deliver the nukes with types best for decimating enemy air defenses, supressing enemy radars and ground based units, launching decoys and havoc to disorient the defenders, utilize for the time extremely powerful and long range radars both shipborne and AWAC combined with radio to allow for rapid detection of any new enemy air threat and vectoring along with general command and control to make the most of the force, anti submarine warfare craft to surpress and destroy any cheap enemy attempt to remove carrier air operations from the table, air tankers to allow other planes to fly longer, recon models to gather information and help plan continued or future strikes and the like along with the assembled attached forces of supply ships/cruisers/destroyers/frigates/support vessels allowing for a massive area of electronic coverage and warning, hundreds of medium to long range guns capable of anti aircraft work fighting subs, keeping the carriers supplied and so on. And the US vast fleet carrier force (What like 16 active Essex class boats and 3 Midway class with at the time a Essex class still being capable of carrying a typical load of like 70-80 aircraft most large (for the time) combat jets and Midways being able to carry like a payload of 100 mostly jets along with some prop jobs and choppers or a somewhat smaller "normal air attachment" and a heavily modified PV2 maritime recon plane modified with extra fuel tanks, modifications to carry a large nuclear weapon, JATO or RATO devices to allow the huge plane to launch no matter what so figure maybe 40-60 for a "rest of air complement". But the PV2 gives the 3 Midways the capability to pretty much delivering a single low strategic yield manned Kamikaze missile within a pretty good range of a long distance from the Soviet coast in both east and west. Or by then figure for plans without the manned missiles and instead just a mixed first air attack of like 50 mixed variety top tier combat aircraft possibly carrying multiple nukes in the first air sortie and perhaps the same in the second which would arrive minutes after the first. And the greatest benefit of USN carrier air groups is that they can move fast and continously with a huge underway supply fleet and lots of experience meaning that the carrier battle groups could probably keep getting fuel, weapons, spare parts and such for a long time while also potentially both combining or splitting. Say combining a Midway carrier battlegroup with two Essex class CBG would potentially allow rapid attacks of waves of top of the line combat planes manned by excellent pilots numbering in the hundreds from a base that never exists in one plane. And things like recon birds, submarines radar and such can help identify Soviet hunting aircraft and lead back to surviving targets.

Honestly in say 1954 I wonder what would have it been like if say 1 full strength Midway CBG combined with say 3 full strength Essex CBG (or perhaps 2 Midways and two Essex groups) have made major strikes upon the Soviet Maritimes. Just how would the carrier interceptors/fighter bombers/attack planes/bombers/specialty types of the year/era have compared against the sort of aircraft and systems that the ground and air based Soviet aircraft/sensor networks and ground based defenses of the Soviet Navy/Soviet air force/Soviet air defense force of the time. Just what would the theoretical max strength of say multiple combined USN CBGs at that point. How effective would US air, sea and sub based radar for early warning, mission planning, guiding defenses and such and how practical would the anti submarine and anti air capabilities of the various largely WW2 warships still only equipped with guns and without any large scale SAM capability reaching the fleet (though that also makes me think about the unlikely but cool plausibility of WW2 ending with like 6 Alaska class CBs or say 10 Des Moines class being say 50 or 60 percent complete but with the war ending work stopping and arguements over what to do with the large and potentially capable fast surface platforms that are both existing as hulks if not ships yet and are even a decade later still pretty much in new condition. With the final agreement being that the unfinished Alaskas or Des Moines are much like the Albanys finished as new combined command and control ships and naval SAM power house. With their extremely powerful and capable engines and electrical systems they can keep up with carriers even at full bore while they still posess the electric capacity and space for very heavy installation of the best (and of course ridiculously huge) radar and other sensors of the time along with a communication sweet and staff space allowing the command staff aboard to not only know whats going on at any moment more then anyone on any other model of ship in the world) while also carrying a comprehensive and very capable armament with deep magazines. Think all three of the Ts! Talos for long range and for jury rig land strike cruise missile or anti radar work. Tartar for medium range work and terrier for short range work. In addition the Alaskas/former Des Moines do maintain a modified and modernized single example of their triple main gun turret forward carrying their amazing triple tube 12 inch/automatic 8 inch gun for emergency anti surface usage or more likely in support of coastal bombardment. Then their are 8 modernized examples of the classic WW2 US dual tube 5 inch DP gun. Then 8-10 two gun modified turrets each showcasing the more polished and functional automatic 3:70 DP gun (designed to rapidly allow a single turret to quickly allow radar guidance and VT fuses to shift across a number of different Kamikaze aircraft targets and for each air target have one of the 76mm VT fused shells essentially remove the enemy plane from existence while miles away and with the gun already shifting and automatically firing at the next target a millisecond before the previous target/VT fused shells detonated. Then comes roughly 25 odd improved 40mm Bofors guns and mounting spaces for a maximum of multiple dozens of MGs in the rifle to 12.7mm range or autocannon of the 20mm to 30mm size. As a prototype aboard is a example of automated prototype weapon combining elements of a captured german autocannon system modified for naval usage and for direct connection to it's own small but surprisingly capable radar set which when set would allow the prototype and it's fellows to automatically target and destroy anything within certain perimeters not with a IFF. The goal is to create a last ditch weapon capable of operating faster then human thought and automatically seek to protect the ship from any potentially hostile target that reaches within a close range. With the massive growth of aircraft range, payload, speed and ability to deploy long ranged weapons it's believed at this point that by the time a man in a armored tub with a 20mm Bofors mount could even think about firing the plane would have already deployed its weapon, have detonated and the enemy aircraft already beyond range. So the concept is to equip each warship and support vessel with multiple supporting examples of systems that combines IFF systems, recent advances in electronics, some of the more capable advances in autocannons in terms of anti aircraft usage by the Nazis during the war and combining the entire automated package with a integral radar, protected ammo magazine, redunant IFF system, and multiple electrical feeds. The 40mm-50mm weapon when combined with the other 5 aboard will automatically target anything not squawking by the time it reaches 3.5 miles from ship. If it passes 3 miles all systems capable of aiming will begin readyng. At 2.75 all available systems will begin firing while also sending notifications for the ships crew to set off every decoy or distraction system. One shell that manages to detonate within roughly 10-15 yards of the target is guranteed almost instant destruction. If it hits within 5-10 yards fragments might remain. If within 5 yards very little will remain. At maximum firing rate all six systems aboard can in the period of time between the target crossing the 3.5 mile mark and reaching the 2.5 mile mark have fired over half their supply of ammunition or roughly 550-600 rounds per gun. If not terminated at 2.5 miles then full rate of fire will commence guranteeing either complete exhaustion of ammunition or target destruction by the time it reaches 1.75 miles. It's intended to increase the ammunition supply and improve the liquid cooling. It's believed that it would be superior to deploy the units in dual tubs with two barrels and ammunition feeds in each tub with a firing guidance for each with automatic backup so that if one fails the remaining one will slave to the gun still with data. It's believed that if superior liquid cooling/air conditioning systems are installed that still with minimal penetration each firing system could increase it's inegral ammo supply to 1500 rounds. Though another proposal would combine the heavier 50mm autocannon with a electrically powered 7 barrel 23mm Gatling gun. The concept involves similarly paring a complete 50mm autocannon close alert system with a 23mm electric Gatling gun system in the same installation unit. Much like the first proposal they would essentially each have a redudant guidance system where individual failure automatically means the blind gun slaves to the live one. The 23mm Gatling design while obviously of a smaller caliber has at minimum several times the rate of fire and only a slightly lesser range then the 50mm design. Similarly a much larger ammo supply can be carried for the Gatling then the heavy autocannon. The concept is that both would work together with each having a magazine divided by round type designed to operate at different ranges per ammo type before firing through and switching. The 23mm design would start firing longer ranged rounds at a slower speed before increases trading range for speed of fire and pure accuracry for covering the target area. The heavy autocannon would do the reverse firing fastest and with a cloud burst VT round design at max distance before shifting down to a lower rate of fire (marginally) while increasing accuracy and potential colllateral damage considerably. The combined set up would theoreticlly mean that if either gun system in a unit completely and totally failed the other could still succeed completely and combine the long range and power of the former Nazi B17 destroyer autocannon with American electronics and the rather old Gatling design with improvements in electronics, metals, cooling systems. magazine systems and ammunition types. The dual redudant system seems the perfect system with each gun network complimenting the other and together greatly increasing their capability. Though there is the possibility to also build a smaller and simpler unit simply containing the Gatling design and all integral elements . The cost would be much less, weight would be less, much easier to install, you could even install one on something as simple as a PT boat or a lowly landing craft with minimal trouble. There's also proposals to create what could be called constellations. Essentially building indiviual unit containers for the heavy gun design and installing one or multiple on a ship. The trick would be that there would be a larger number of the smaller gatling design in either dual or single gun units but with the capability of mating or slaving multiple Gatling systems to one or two heavy systems. One rather extreme proposaal calls for the newest and largest carrier class to be built with two heavy gun systems per side with each two gun system being mated to at least 4 to 6 Gatling gun systems along with one or two Gatling systems on bow and aft. The suggestion is that installing guided anti air missiles on them would be vastly more expensive, take up more interior space, signifigantly reduce aircraft capacity and yield only marginally better protection. A single one armed launcher for the short ranged SAM in comparison would reduce the "normal combat load" from up to 115 or 120 aircraft to 90. To add integral SAM capability lower then the planned multi role frigate designs (each of which would cost roughly a 1/15th of a individual carrrier by itself) would reduce at least a quarter of the capability and likely more as aircraft size grew. It might lead them to within five years at most fielding 55-65 aircraft.

Of course one of the largest attractions of the redesigned Alaska class is that comparitively it has at least 2.5 times the heavy/long range SAM capabiity of the converted earlier heavy cruisers with less launchers, less guidance systems, 45 percent more TALOS space storage, at least 25 percent faster operation in each assembly system, Alaska TALOS having a guided range at least 25-30 miles more thanks to it's improved guidance system including a remarkably advanced select guidance land attack capability and more remarkable anti radar capability which had succeeded once targeted at a copy of a medium grade expy of the capability of air warning radar system most known Russian air bases used. The missile had needed less then 25 second of active listening before the radar was of course turned off. On any other ship or design any guidance would be lost. But thankfully they had a few more options and at roughly 40 miles from the fake airbase the Talos had taken off with the missile containing the extra propulsion package, the special toy, and the prototype round. The propulsion package meant that the missile had more range and speed. The special toy activated a special form of radar or decoy which immediately gained the active attraction of the other similar set up (minus the special toy) TALOS assembled and fired immediately afterwards chasing the first. When making final approach to the fake radar mast the first Talos made an ascension and then while pointing downwards across a wide but efficient slice fired off it's first payload namely roughly 150 pounds of small ounce or two oddly shaped pieces of tungsten propelled by a mini explosive charge. Instantly over 5000 wishbone shaped incredibly sharp and dense chunks of Tungsten fired across a wide areaa both slicing the radar mast to ribbons as well as causing decimations across a wide area of the sorrounding airbases including the tungsten shrapnel opening up multiple reserves of fuel, tearing decoy aircraft apart and then carpeting a large area. The effect was like a shot gun loaded with buckshot with the gun being designed for a 50 foot man.

Then the second payload of the first missile went off scattering 250 pounds of extremely fine Magnesium shavings mixed with pellets of a sort of caked fuel, small partially open cubes each composed of a walling of finely shaved and then composed magnesium shaving with a center of very pure white phosphorous Finally several dozen grenade like items were scattered across a wide area of the base each looking similar to a large smoke grenade and slowly beginning to emit a odd sort of smoke as they dissolved and began dissolving the magnesium they got into contact with. Within 25 seconds a cloud of gas combining in essence a partially stabilized form of a extremely unstable rocket fuel, huge quanties of very finally shaved magnesium floating in a cloud that lifted much of the metal shavings and even the fuel pellets up covering an area of a square kilometer of the fake airbase. When the second Talos missile went off it instantly distributed huge numbers of floating and long burning particulates that in second had turned the extremely finely filled air ablaze in a fraction of a section the square kilometer previous covered seemed to just disappear as it expanded all at once. Immediately after a hole covering the gas shaded area some 35 feet deep (though a number of the tungsten fragments had been very very fastly propelled throughout the crater and had in some areas gone a further 15 feet down among other things succeeding at penetrating a armored deeply dug emergency fuel reserve in such a wave that it would rapidly begin expelling liquid fuel that was at a incredible rate turning to a gas and exiting under high pressure through several small holes. Once roughly 5K gallons of high grade av gas had changed from a liquid to a gas the flaming particulates took effect again and proceeded to detonate the emergency fuel storage shifting large irregular sections of all nearby paved areas signifigantly increasing any runway repair.

Besides being able to actively guide two or 4 Talos missiles (if the latter two were slaved to the first) up to some 40 or so miles the medium ranged tartar had a simpler design and three two armed launchers and a single one armed launcher. Unlike the TALOS it didn't need a huge and complex assembly line and could be stored en magazine almost ready to go. While the ship could store up to 45 or potentially as many as 50 TALOS missiles depending on components per assembly line for launcher (granting the ship on average 43 in one and 53 in the other as well as a emergency supply of components that given several hours could give each assemble line a maximum of 15 to 20 more TALOS missiles. Each of the dual Tartar launchers was connected to a magazine capable of holding 50-60 missiles a piece. The single arm launcher had a different magazine chamber capable of holding roughly 40 missiles. At any given time the active guidance systems of Alaska could guide roughly 8 to 10 tartar missiles up to 25 miles away. The single arm launcher was both more capable and simpler. It fires long range decoy missiles that tends to set of various messages followed by a repeater missile that identifies any unusual noise and location. In an emergency the single arm launcher rounds can be mounted with a shorter ranged rocket and a fuel air/tungsten shrapnel warhead with a heat seeking head and no guidance from the ship beyond self destruct. When needed as such the single armed launcher could launch up to 4 to 5 missiles a minute capable of going up to 15 miles and hunting their own prey.


For the short ranged same Terrier consists of 2 trident launchers each with one missile per point along with another 3 dual point launchers and three more simplified, more basic and smaller single armed launchers. The trident magazines each contained 5 missiles per trident point. The dual launchers contain 6 or 7 per point. The five single armed launchers are a somewhat more basic design containing a protected pre mounted missile and two more ready to mount. The single arm launchers can fire all self directed missiles in magazine in 1.5 minutes and these examples can range 10-12 miles carrying a very high explosive warhead equipped with 100 pounds of pre fragmented tungsten wire designed to detonate in one of multiple conical shapes directing ounce weight chunks of tungsten at a speed capable of taking one through a armored car. Their designed as a last minute resort defense. The double and trident launchers are not as fast reloading or launching but have better range and accuracy and can be guided by one of the ships radar systems.

In addition as another experiment 2 triple pack containers each lightly armored and containing a complete guided anti ship missile developed from a common and cheap jet powered target drone. Each of the missiles can reach up to 8 miles range, can automatically make several evasive maneuvers, dispense chaff and flares, and carry multiple different propulsion or explosive packs. The bang packs range from 300 pounds to a mere 130 while the propulsion packs range from a simple RATO or JATO to some far more capable. As a experiment instead of a bang pack the missiles can carry a sort of homing system. A system which will when set automatically draw every SAM launched towards it before proximity detonation. When equipped with a very basic camera system theoretically you could send it and guide it towards a major large target and just use it as a slow judas goat for a maximum of up to 24 TALOS,46 Tartars, and 75+ terriers.

There was also a more normal series of 4 similar lightly armored disposable drone packs. Intended to act as targets, to tow targets or seekers, to distract enemy guidance systems, radiate electronic chatter that would emit random confusing signals including indications of false attacks. They can also be used to draw in targets for a shooting range, do recon, act as decoy dispensers, dispense illumination flares supporting night gunfire support, be used as emergency SOS beacons and more.

The ship also carried a couple dozen much simpler and cheaper single use sling launched target drones.

While the original design had called for carrying something like 4 to 6 of the late WW2 Sea Hawk float plane the current ship didn't carry one. She diid have her own dedicated aircraft area, a new and innovative expanding telescoping hangar with support and maintainance capabilities. At present the ship had in the ready hangar at total of 4 ready to use DASH multi purpose drone copters which could serve recon, act as bafflers and decoys, guide missiles and guns, carry sensors, carry radar extenders that could grant an additional couple miles. They could also be armed with pretty much anything. Nominally the norm was a pair of simple sound guided ASW light torpedos or a single medium torpedo. They could also carry one or more naval mine. Drop various bombs. Carry and fire numerous types of MG/cannon pods/rocket pods/ disposable recoilless tubes, grenade launchers, crude rockets, explosive charges and the like. I'd once seen a quartet of them systematically shoot WP rockets at a section of jungle to provide a break line and then disperse WP pellets covered in a temporarily stable form of very unstable rocket fuel while what looked like dandelions of fine magnesium shavings dissolved and drifted down.
Nobody has ever (technically) actually wanted to fight a nuclear war, that's why they acted like they did. Russians (excluding myself) like to gamble and all things considered have been relatively successful in doing so (and they did it best when pretending that they were not capitalist anymore oddly enough).
I mean pretty much all NATO war plans and Soviet war plans I'm aware including post Korea conventional war pretty much all assume the Soviets were going to launch an attack west. NATO realized it just didn''t have the conventional firepower or the manpower to actually have a fraction of a decent chance of succeeeding at making it to the Polish border let alone repeat Barbossa. Considering just how deeply the Sovietss intel system had penetrated the US intel network/armed forces/elements of governent and such they had to have access to the various general warplans. For some reason the Soviet gov seemed to be endlessly stuck in this loop that NATO was just about to repeat Barbossa via a massive conquest effort east. Yet NATO higher leadership never planned or considered even liberating warsaw pact members conventionally. You can't launch a Barbossa 2.0 when your opponent has like 3 times as many divisions and several times as many artillery pieces (cruise missiles, ground launched ballistic missiles, MLRS systems/tube artillery), what like 4 or 5 as many active or in light storage category tanks. Obviously the Soviet ground based air defense net, alert network, fighters and interceptors making using the superior NATO airforces to make up the difference damned hard.

Just one of those things about the Cold war that always struck me as weird. Like Sweden effectively in every way that matters being an unofficial NATO member and their gov/military assuming any NATO/Warsaw fight would inevitably quickly lead to a conventional attack on Sweden meaning they were always planning to pretty much be fighting alongside NATO from the start of a fight (I guess they figured in order to bypass hostile Northern Norway the Russians would instead drive through North or central Sweden to hit the Southern most important part of Norway. Just kind of odd they never officially joined until recently. IF literally all of your warplans inherently involve you rapidly being attacked and invaded no matter what and requiring you almost instantly being forced to fight alongside NATO forces why not just join NATO and coordinate fforces. I mean France left the command network but they at least had a defensive barrier of the Rheine and a collection of hundreds of Nukes, long rand medium nuclear bombers, mobile or hardened land based nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear cruise missiles and bombs to arm modern and capable planes like the Mirage 2000. And of course a collection of some of the quietest and most capable SSBNs ever made each one when at sea carrying like 15 naval ICBMs with each submerged missile having up to like a dozen MIRVs. Giving them the ability to at least hit some of the most valuable parts of the SU. If they poke past the line you've drawn you could strike at say the Soviet mechanized forward force and gut a corp or two. Or strike say ttheir primary former logistic/transport node with short ranged ballistic and cruise missiles and make it damned painful to conquer France.

Sweden in contrast didn't even have say Nerve gasses. Nor did they have Switzerlands famous defensive terrain.
 
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