ACW: How much of an advantage does the Union get by having Grant stay in command after Shiloh?

[DTF955Baseballfan]

In searching a few of the other threads, it's clear that a massive Union win at Shiloh would have been hard - Grant was akin tot he star athlete who needs a wake-up call to realize he can't do it all on just talent, he has to prepare a bit, too.

But, presuming something like Lew Wallace choosing to attack when he finds himself behind CSA lines, the Union can find itself with a bigger win, so that noone can say the Buell "saved the day" on the 2nd day - even if Grant probably could have regrouped without him since the CSA's lines were also pretty jumbled. It's still not going to be a huge change, given that Grant hadn't prepared as well as he could have - but just giving the CSA more losses than the Union suffered (let's say reversing the numbers, 10,000 killed, wounded, or missing for the Union, 13,000 for the cSA) would probably prevent Halleck from relieving him and taking over.

But, other than probably getting to Corinth faster, chasing Beauregard down, is there any huge advantage? If Grant takes Corinth a month early, it's going to be a battle, anyway, probably not a siege - perhaps getting those extra 3,000 casualties anyway with the CSA suffering the same. The Confederate troops were already pretty weary; Beauregard might withdraw anyway after some skirmishing. But, the Union would have also been pretty bloddied, and would need time to regroup, get supplies, etc..

Can the Union really get down to vicksburg in 1862? They wouldn't have the added men from Halleck's army, unless Lincoln ordered him there - and it might take a few months to fight their way down there anyway, by which time they wouldn't really have time to combined with the Navy in trying to surround Vicksburg and take it; though the siege begbnning earlier and ending in March of so of 1863 is possible. (OTL the city wouldn't celebrate July 4 for 80 years, maybe here they refuse to allow any Irish to celebrate St. Patrick's Day. )

Onthe other hand, Chattanooga might be easier to take, with an earlier Tullahoma - but the CSA wouldn't be as exhausted, either. Still, if they have Corinth by the end of April, Lincoln might want Grant to come east and take Chattanooga just to relieve the pressure on Washington, though thought being that seeing an army moving East would not only add potential Union supporters to recruit from, it might just cause the CSA to detach some troops from Virginia to send over the try to help defend it, if they can get the rail lines moving and get to Chanttanooga fast enough, say starting in late May. (Yes, that's a long wa, but Lincoln loved playing general and he might think it could work.)

Of course, if Grant is successful in this, it could still be early enough for Grant to be sent East to replace McClellan, so maybe there's an advantage after all. (THough if Grant is in charge of the AotP in late 1862/early 1863, who guards Chattanooga, and who attacks Vicksburg?)

 

[Raferty]

Grant after Shiloh would have been far more decisive in terms of pursuing a capture of Corinth. It's possible however that Beauregard would just withdrawal much sooner than in OTL. Grant's idea for Corinth was to surround the city much quicker and launch an assault.

This almost certainly would have been repulsed as his assaults on Vicksburg were, but if he is able to surround the Confederate army, a siege will eventually be successful and breakout attempts will not be, as getting out of Corinth requires using the rail network, something easily block able.

After this, it's hard to say what happens. Chattanooga was easy to take in 1862 but Buell never got around to doing it and allowed himself to be diverted by the Heartland Offensive. Vicksburg, as we see in Grant's memoirs, would have been tough if only because an overland approach was easily stoppable by cavalry raids on the rails and supply depots. However, a massive victory at Corinth could change this if it's the kind of 70K man capitulation I had in mind. Once Beauregard's command scatters to the 4 winds, Vicksburg is going to be tough to take overland.

 

[Arnold d.c]

It's still not going to be a huge change, given that Grant hadn't prepared as well as he could have - but just giving the CSA more losses than the Union suffered (let's say reversing the numbers, 10,000 killed, wounded, or missing for the Union, 13,000 for the cSA) would probably prevent Halleck from relieving him and taking over.

In all frankness, the casualties were bound to be more lopsided than that. Assuming Lew Wallace arrived at 2:30 P.M. the Confederates had committed their last reserves and Wallace would have been in position to sandwich the Confederate left wing with Sherman and McClernand's troops and thereby protect the Hornet's Nest from envelopment. I should also note that recent research by historian Timothy B. Smith shows that the Confederate casualties were understated by a third and that there was possibly as many as 14,000 Confederate casualties IOTL. That said...

ut, other than probably getting to Corinth faster, chasing Beauregard down, is there any huge advantage? If Grant takes Corinth a month early, it's going to be a battle, anyway, probably not a siege - perhaps getting those extra 3,000 casualties anyway with the CSA suffering the same. The Confederate troops were already pretty weary; Beauregard might withdraw anyway after some skirmishing. But, the Union would have also been pretty bloddied, and would need time to regroup, get supplies, etc..

The problem here is that Halleck is still in command and weather is still an issue. Halleck wanted to wait for the Army of the Mississippi (Pope's Army) to join them and for better weather. Although Pittsburg Landing and Corinth were only 22 miles apart (roughly 3 days of marching), heavy rains between the two points had caused considerable swelling in the creeks. On the other hand, when the campaign finally started a month later, Halleck's advance was decent until Pope almost got ambushed of May 9. After that, Halleck's advance slows to a crawl. Perhaps if the Confederates really do suffer heavy casualties, they might not be so bold as to attempt a counterattack, speeding up the siege.

Can the Union really get down to vicksburg in 1862? They wouldn't have the added men from Halleck's army, unless Lincoln ordered him there - and it might take a few months to fight their way down there anyway, by which time they wouldn't really have time to combined with the Navy in trying to surround Vicksburg and take it; though the siege begbnning earlier and ending in March of so of 1863 is possible. (OTL the city wouldn't celebrate July 4 for 80 years, maybe here they refuse to allow any Irish to celebrate St. Patrick's Day. )

Onthe other hand, Chattanooga might be easier to take, with an earlier Tullahoma - but the CSA wouldn't be as exhausted, either. Still, if they have Corinth by the end of April, Lincoln might want Grant to come east and take Chattanooga just to relieve the pressure on Washington, though thought being that seeing an army moving East would not only add potential Union supporters to recruit from, it might just cause the CSA to detach some troops from Virginia to send over the try to help defend it, if they can get the rail lines moving and get to Chanttanooga fast enough, say starting in late May. (Yes, that's a long wa, but Lincoln loved playing general and he might think it could work.)

On Vicksburg, Earl J. Hess notes that an overland approach wasn't very realistic. The rail network would have to be rehabilitated, which could take months. On the other hand, Sherman was already thinking and recommending a movement down the Mississippi River with transports in the summer of 1862. I'm not certain if it could be done or successful on time. There's also the risk that the Confederates would counterattack at Corinth if they go down the Mississippi. On Chattanooga, that's Buell's sector. On paper, Buell could have gone much faster if he had been allowed to march from Nashville instead of Corinth. It would have put him in a better position to respond to Bragg's counteroffensive and provide a better logistical route than middle-of-nowhere Alabama.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

In all frankness, the casualties were bound to be more lopsided than that. Assuming Lew Wallace arrived at 2:30 P.M. the Confederates had committed their last reserves and Wallace would have been in position to sandwich the Confederate left wing with Sherman and McClernand's troops and thereby protect the Hornet's Nest from envelopment. I should also note that recent research by historian Timothy B. Smith shows that the Confederate casualties were understated by a third and that there was possibly as many as 14,000 Confederate casualties IOTL. That said...

The problem here is that Halleck is still in command and weather is still an issue. Halleck wanted to wait for the Army of the Mississippi (Pope's Army) to join them and for better weather. Although Pittsburg Landing and Corinth were only 22 miles apart (roughly 3 days of marching), heavy rains between the two points had caused considerable swelling in the creeks. On the other hand, when the campaign finally started a month later, Halleck's advance was decent until Pope almost got ambushed of May 9. After that, Halleck's advance slows to a crawl. Perhaps if the Confederates really do suffer heavy casualties, they might not be so bold as to attempt a counterattack, speeding up the siege.

On Vicksburg, Earl J. Hess notes that an overland approach wasn't very realistic. The rail network would have to be rehabilitated, which could take months. On the other hand, Sherman was already thinking and recommending a movement down the Mississippi River with transports in the summer of 1862. I'm not certain if it could be done or successful on time. There's also the risk that the Confederates would counterattack at Corinth if they go down the Mississippi. On Chattanooga, that's Buell's sector. On paper, Buell could have gone much faster if he had been allowed to march from Nashville instead of Corinth. It would have put him in a better position to respond to Bragg's counteroffensive and provide a better logistical route than middle-of-nowhere Alabama.

Wow, that's some pretty bad rain!

It seems such a shame to waste a victory if it is that big, but it wouldn't be the only time in the Civil War a big victory was not followed up on although perhaps sending another small Detachment from Nashville and Buell from Koreans would be allowed if the Union has enough of an advantage.

 

[Arnold d.c]

It seems such a shame to waste a victory if it is that big, but it wouldn't be the only time in the Civil War a big victory was not followed up on although perhaps sending another small Detachment from Nashville and Buell from Koreans would be allowed if the Union has enough of an advantage.

The problem with Buell's route from Corinth was twofold: first, it was a real awful path, which some Army of the Cumberland veterans described as the worst march of the whole war. Second, if the railroads around Nashville were already in the process of being rehabilitated, it made no sense to divide the small corps of civilian engineers and laborers to open another line of communication.

That said, one thing I hadn't considered was that Grant could have been sent to Virginia instead of John Pope for command of the Army of Virginia. Without the embarrassment of Shiloh, Grant comes off as the strongest candidate to the administration with his record and his Republican patron Elihu B. Washburne. Grant would face considerable challenges, especially when his three principal subordinates in the Army of Virginia were Irvin McDowell, Franz Sigel, and Nathaniel Banks. However, unlike Pope, I doubt that Grant would be hanging around Washington and work to solve the logistical problems of the Army of Virginia much sooner. This would give him more time to fight Jackson alone, who was detached from Lee's main force that was keeping watch on McClellan.

Eventually, Grant would have been put on the back foot when the rest of Lee's army shows up, shifting the advantage of numbers to the rebels. But when the Army of the Potomac reinforcements show up, I can hardly imagine that Grant would waste them as badly as Pope or infuriate them.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I had forgotten that Grant could be sent East that early, too, I had only thought of him replacing McClellan. If he replaces Pope then would Pope wind up leading the forces against Corinth?

Of course, checking the Wikipedia article I see that it's also possible Pope is sent East anyway given that his promotion preceded Shiloh by a bit. But it is interesting to think that Grant could have done well enough to at least prevent Lee from going north to Antietam.

What was it that caused the union to decide to march from Corinth and not Nashville to get to Chattanooga?

 

[Arnold d.c]

I had forgotten that Grant could be sent East that early, too, I had only thought of him replacing McClellan. If he replaces Pope then would Pope wind up leading the forces against Corinth?

Halleck and Pope were only sent east after the Siege of Corinth ended. On who becomes commander of the Army of the Tennessee... that's a good question. If Grant's gone east, John McClernand and Johne Pope were of the same rank - with the same dates of promotion. However, before Halleck leaves, he could always mess with the hierarchy of command. John Pope was already the commander of the Army of the Mississippi. John McClernand and Lew Wallace would be contenders for the Army of the Tennessee, but Halleck very much disliked political commanders. That said, I'd be concerned about the Union's chances of taking Vicksburg.

Of course, checking the Wikipedia article I see that it's also possible Pope is sent East anyway given that his promotion preceded Shiloh by a bit. But it is interesting to think that Grant could have done well enough to at least prevent Lee from going north to Antietam.

Grant's promotion to major general was dated on February 16, thus outranking everyone in Halleck's army save for Halleck.

What was it that caused the union to decide to march from Corinth and not Nashville to get to Chattanooga?

From Halleck's point of view, the path from Corinth was the shortest path to Chattanooga. When Buell pointed out that he could better protect the railroads from Nashville, Halleck at first agreed and then changed back to his original stance.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I wonder if Grant added to Buell could convince him if Grant does stay - it's possible Pope is still seen as the better commander.

Another thought - if Grant stays Sherman could try his operation idea in the summer, and then everything in the Vicksburg campaign just gets moved up; perhaps instead of July 4th Grant windcs up getting Vicksburg to capitulate in Jaunary or February. Sort of the diea, IIRC, of the "Grant at Gettysburgh" TL where Grant, rather than Meade, releves Hooker.

OTOH, a crushing defeat by Grant of Lee in early 1863 after he and a *very* lucky McClellan win at 2nd Bull Run in 1862 (and Grant replaces him) could be interesting if combined with a Vicksburg that is going very poorly. Grant could take Richmond in spring of 1863 without the Union being close to capturingVicksburg.Where the CSA government flees to is anyone's guess.A heavily defended Charleston perhaps?

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I wonder if Grant added to Buell could convince him if Grant does stay - it's possible Pope is still seen as the better commander.

Another thought - if Grant stays Sherman could try his operation idea in the summer, and then everything in the Vicksburg campaign just gets moved up; perhaps instead of July 4th Grant windcs up getting Vicksburg to capitulate in Jaunary or February. Sort of the diea, IIRC, of the "Grant at Gettysburgh" TL where Grant, rather than Meade, releves Hooker.

OTOH, a crushing defeat by Grant of Lee in early 1863 after he and a *very* lucky McClellan win at 2nd Bull Run in 1862 (and Grant replaces him) could be interesting if combined with a Vicksburg that is going very poorly. Grant could take Richmond in spring of 1863 without the Union being close to capturingVicksburg.Where the CSA government flees to is anyone's guess.A heavily defended Charleston perhaps?

In reading about the situation, it seems like Grant winning big at Shiloh would probably not send him East only because Pope is still only a month or so behind when it comes to rank and Pope really seemed to be pushing for things anyway in the east.

I can see Hallock letting Grant have his attack on chorus a couple weeks early instead of The Siege, the Confederate Army taking so many casualties meaning that Pope is not taken by surprise in early May as they march, which would probably also sway Halleck to send him East. And the disorder between the generals as pouring is taken makes Hallock figure that they just can't work together oh, so it makes sense to just let Grant go on the offensive with his army if he wants as Buell and Pope or separated from him.

It does appear that Grant could decide to try to use Sherman's idea of sending boats down the river, since the Inion will still trying to attack Vicksburg firing lots of cannon at it from the ships on the Mississippi.

So, I think that the Vicksburg campaign is pushed up several months.

 

[DTF955Baseballfan]

I decided to add a poll, spinning it over from this poll in another topic I posted. (I found while you can't delete polls you can edit them, but I felt it better to just add a poll as it might make it more noticeable, rather than clog the board with another post, and this has a bit more of the discussion of one part.)

Basically, I'm looking into whether to simply use the idea of LIncoln living as the POD this this combination of baseball being integrated fromt he start by a rich owner who believes in it, and a bit of a "Growing Mouse"- type thign I did where Tilden winning in '76 is actually a bad thing, wrecking the democrats, leading to the thigns I have later there as being pro-Civil Rights.

I just want input on how much should be apparent before Lincoln living - would a shorter Civil War help, too, and how much shorter would it be?