Hitler's Gamble by Brendan Simms


Anybody read this?

Anybody buy Brendan Simms thesis?

He had a nifty narrative and at least a well-structured narrative in his "Three Victories and a Defeat" on Britain's pre-1800 foreign policy history.

Entered this subject here because it is a post-1900 historical discussion, though not a proposed historical timeline, nor a specific discussion question, although implicitly, "What if Hitler hadn't declared war on the US after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?"

If responder consensus or moderator judgment is this doesn't belong here, but in chat, mods feel free to move to chat, help and rules, or wherever appropriate.
 
I haven't read it so I can't say for sure, but it seems pretty iffy. The blurb reads as though the world irrevocably changed when Germany declared war on the US? 🧐 Is that correct? Yet FDR was practically chomping at the bit from the moment the war began, maybe even before. I'm 100% certain Germany and the US would have ended up at war regardless, whether due to Germany declaring war, or Germany attacking enough Lend-Lease shipments and other forms of aid to get the US to declare war.
 
Gallup took a poll on 8 December - the day after Pearl Harbor and before the US declared war on Japan. It showed over 90% support for declaring war on Germany as well.

The US was already hostile to Germany (especially Roosevelt), and in wartime, rulers tend to get what they want. Roosevelt would have gotten a declaration of war on Germany within six months, while continuing to provide Lend-Lease and build out the US armed forces.

Hitler understood that, and decided to act rather than react. Plus the poorly-protected waters near America would be open to U-boats.
 
Book is total bunkum, the US and Germany were already at the stage of an undeclared war in the North Atlantic with US ships escorting convoys nearly to Ireland and attacking U-boats on sight without warning. Neutrality was being stretched to the limit with some war related items being declared surplus or scrap purely so they could be transferred in addition to the formal lend-lease and destroyers for bases etc agreements. Germany was at most a few misidentified ships off the US declaring war at a time of its choosing and Japan had already ensured US military production was going into overdrive.

So all the happens if Hitler does not declare war is the US has a bit more time to get its ducks in order on the Atlantic side before getting shot at. New Army and Navy units will still be being raised as per OTL, so when the balloon goes up, there is just less lag and units are still available at roughly the same rate. Same with equipment and supplies, nothing much changes. So a delay just ends up with a more organised, less rushed response in the Atlantic with the Pacific pretty much OTL as the US , due to Pearl, is already fighting the Japanese alongside its British ( and Dominions )/French/Dutch Allies.
 
I assume this is based just on the blurb in Amazon, or the book's title: subtitle, not a reading of the book, or kindle sample?
No need to read more than the sample when its central premise is flawed, it overstates the isolationist strength and minimises the link drawn between Germany and Japan. The US was as I stated all but fighting a war in the Atlantic, it would fighting alongside the British et al in the Pacific. At that point the US course to fighting Germany is clear, the only real query is if it goes Germany first or not. However all that would do is delay D-Day, as until the US is looking at a land invasion of Japan ( and hopefully deciding blockade is better if the bomb is not ready ), the spare resources still exist to clear out Africa and ensure the battle of the Atlantic is won.
 
No need to read more than the sample when its central premise is flawed, it overstates the isolationist strength and minimises the link drawn between Germany and Japan. The US was as I stated all but fighting a war in the Atlantic, it would fighting alongside the British et al in the Pacific. At that point the US course to fighting Germany is clear, the only real query is if it goes Germany first or not. However all that would do is delay D-Day, as until the US is looking at a land invasion of Japan ( and hopefully deciding blockade is better if the bomb is not ready ), the spare resources still exist to clear out Africa and ensure the battle of the Atlantic is won.
So you based your conclusion only from the title and the sample without actually reading the book... okay.
Anybody read this?

Anybody buy Brendan Simms thesis?

He had a nifty narrative and at least a well-structured narrative in his "Three Victories and a Defeat" on Britain's pre-1800 foreign policy history.

Entered this subject here because it is a post-1900 historical discussion, though not a proposed historical timeline, nor a specific discussion question, although implicitly, "What if Hitler hadn't declared war on the US after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?"

If responder consensus or moderator judgment is this doesn't belong here, but in chat, mods feel free to move to chat, help and rules, or wherever appropriate.
I did not read the book so I cannot comment one way or another but in regards to Brendan Simms as the author, he is well regarded in the historian circles, doing good research and the book is positively viewed by Adam Tooze, the author to go for very in-depth and detailed information on the economics of the Third Reich, together with Jonas Scherner.
 
I don’t think the US and Germany could have plausibly avoided war with each other given the same events up to Pearl Harbor. Hitler declaring war first was a rational decision since it was only a matter of months. The issue was defeating the USSR first and then devoting their full resources to the WAllies like AANW.
 
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No need to read more than the sample when its central premise is flawed, it overstates the isolationist strength and minimises the link drawn between Germany and Japan. The US was as I stated all but fighting a war in the Atlantic, it would fighting alongside the British et al in the Pacific. At that point the US course to fighting Germany is clear, the only real query is if it goes Germany first or not. However all that would do is delay D-Day, as until the US is looking at a land invasion of Japan ( and hopefully deciding blockade is better if the bomb is not ready ), the spare resources still exist to clear out Africa and ensure the battle of the Atlantic is won.
Yes, for you there would be an obvious need to read it because you literally failed to understand what the book is about. It is not some what if historical analysis, but an actual analysis of the thought process of Hitler & Co in the aftermath of Pearl Harbour. The book describes how wrong it is to apply hindsight and predetermined results in the matter of historical analysis.

I will quote the preface for people like you that literally judge a book by its cover.
The five days from the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor to Adolf Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States were among the most fraught, but remain some of the least understood, of the twentieth century. The dominant narrative holds that Japan’s surprise attack led inexorably to the outbreak of a truly global conflict. In this view, American opposition to involvement in both the Pacific and European wars simply melted away on December 7, 1941. As the stridently anti-interventionist Senator Arthur Vandenberg subsequently claimed in an oft-quoted remark: “That day ended isolationism for any realist.”1 It is assumed that the United States’ entry into the war against Germany was inevitable from the moment that Japan struck Pearl Harbor. This perspective has been encouraged by no less a witness than Winston Churchill himself, who later spoke of having “slept the sleep of the saved and thankful” after hearing the news of Japan’s attack. In his memoirs, he would declare that “now at this very moment I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all!”2

Yet at the time, Churchill did not regard America’s full-scale entry into the war against Germany as a foregone conclusion. Nor was he alone. Across the world, politicians and military leaders tried to fathom what had happened in Hawaii and where it might lead. In fact, it would take almost one hundred hours from Pearl Harbor for the situation to resolve itself—five agonizing days in which the fate of the world hung in the balance. In the end, it was Hitler who declared war on the United States on December 11, rather than the other way around. Among those who do remember this order of events, the declaration is considered an inexplicable strategic blunder by Hitler, sealing the fate of his regime. But in reality, Hitler’s declaration of war was a deliberate gamble, driven by his geopolitical calculations, his assessment of the balance of manpower and matériel, and, above all, his obsession with the United States and its global influence. -Hitler's American Gamble preface p.1
This is the premise of the work. An analysis of the thought process of Hitler instead of directly declaring it a strategic blunder or anything else, they started at the source material and tried to give us a look inside the head and thought process of Hitler, which led to his declaration of war. It showcases how Pearl Harbor was not automatically seen as the great moment that swung everything against the Nazis. As an example, Churchill himself feared that influx of aid from the US would suffer from this event and wanted to immediatedly go to Washington.

The aspect of uncertainty that is so often ignored is artfully described in this work. Narratives, memories as well as personal experiences are often shaped by the final outcome, this book steps back from this perspective and tries to start from point zero.
Anybody read this?

Anybody buy Brendan Simms thesis?
Yes, and yes.

As said, this book is not some 'what if' tale, but an actual analysis of why Hitler declared war on December 11 1941. It describes ablty and conclusively that it is wrong to attribute the greatest effect towards the events of Pearl Harbor and directly point towards an inevitable conclusion, instead of pointing to the actual historical events and the decisive moment that was Hitler's declaration of war.

The book works alongside a timeline around the 5 days from Pearl Harbor till the DoW, with a day before and after to round the whole thing out. If someone wants to know why Hitler declared war on the US, this book holds the answer. Why and how this was important is also given more than enough space in this book. It is fascinating to read how different the people at the time saw things and how they are seen now.
As an example I go back towards the supply issue, the British feared that the new situation for the US would lead to them suffering. Such a sentiment was widespread from the military, political leaders to the press. That in the end, this wasn't the case doesn't matter for the perception of the people at that time.

Fact is that even nowadays how far Roosevelt wanted to go is unclear. O’Brien's "How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II" has a simple overview of the conflicting interpretations for Roosevelts plans, if someone wants that. Just remember for every Dallek, Trachtenberg or Headen, there is Weinberg or Reynolds. Everyone agrees that Roosevelt wanted Hitler and his vile regime gone, they simply disagree on the how he wanted to accomplish it.

To quote the book again:
His private considerations notwithstanding, it is clear that Roosevelt was committed to the total and utter defeat of Hitler, even if his method for achieving this before December 1941 was uncertain. As Tugwell astutely observed, Roosevelt “was apt to see the importance of immediate ends more readily than the consequence of doubtful means." By 1941, Roosevelt had decided that Hitler should be vanquished, but he was flexible as to how. While the president hoped to secure victory by aiding Britain and the Soviets as a noncombatant if possible, he was increasingly open to formal intervention if necessary, but only if he could do so with the support of a united nation at home. But he remained doubtful about this unity even after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which was why Hitler declaring war neatly solved his most urgent problem. The Nazi dictator ultimately did so out of fear that, if he did not, the United States would overwhelm Germany at a time of its choosing, even though the American president was convinced that only a fait accompli would ensure the congressional and national unity necessary for another war in Europe. -Hitler's American Gamble The World of December 12,1941

I dislike people saying historical events or circumstances were inevitable. For me such explanations always try to simplify complex events or situations. The moment you actually look at these events they claim to be inevitable, you see that it is not the case. We are on a forum for alternate history and people still argue with inevitable events and predetermined things.
 
Yes, for you there would be an obvious need to read it because you literally failed to understand what the book is about. It is not some what if historical analysis, but an actual analysis of the thought process of Hitler & Co in the aftermath of Pearl Harbour. The book describes how wrong it is to apply hindsight and predetermined results in the matter of historical analysis.

I will quote the preface for people like you that literally judge a book by its cover.

This is the premise of the work. An analysis of the thought process of Hitler instead of directly declaring it a strategic blunder or anything else, they started at the source material and tried to give us a look inside the head and thought process of Hitler, which led to his declaration of war. It showcases how Pearl Harbor was not automatically seen as the great moment that swung everything against the Nazis. As an example, Churchill himself feared that influx of aid from the US would suffer from this event and wanted to immediatedly go to Washington.

The aspect of uncertainty that is so often ignored is artfully described in this work. Narratives, memories as well as personal experiences are often shaped by the final outcome, this book steps back from this perspective and tries to start from point zero.

Yes, and yes.

As said, this book is not some 'what if' tale, but an actual analysis of why Hitler declared war on December 11 1941. It describes ablty and conclusively that it is wrong to attribute the greatest effect towards the events of Pearl Harbor and directly point towards an inevitable conclusion, instead of pointing to the actual historical events and the decisive moment that was Hitler's declaration of war.

The book works alongside a timeline around the 5 days from Pearl Harbor till the DoW, with a day before and after to round the whole thing out. If someone wants to know why Hitler declared war on the US, this book holds the answer. Why and how this was important is also given more than enough space in this book. It is fascinating to read how different the people at the time saw things and how they are seen now.
As an example I go back towards the supply issue, the British feared that the new situation for the US would lead to them suffering. Such a sentiment was widespread from the military, political leaders to the press. That in the end, this wasn't the case doesn't matter for the perception of the people at that time.

Fact is that even nowadays how far Roosevelt wanted to go is unclear. O’Brien's "How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II" has a simple overview of the conflicting interpretations for Roosevelts plans, if someone wants that. Just remember for every Dallek, Trachtenberg or Headen, there is Weinberg or Reynolds. Everyone agrees that Roosevelt wanted Hitler and his vile regime gone, they simply disagree on the how he wanted to accomplish it.

To quote the book again:


I dislike people saying historical events or circumstances were inevitable. For me such explanations always try to simplify complex events or situations. The moment you actually look at these events they claim to be inevitable, you see that it is not the case. We are on a forum for alternate history and people still argue with inevitable events and predetermined things.
Nah, it's really not that complicated. Seemingly small events move on huge timescales. The five days between Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war were really not that important to the end result. It's like thinking 5 minutes of desperate last minute studying for an exam will make a difference to the course outcome. As I and others have said in the thread, the US had already been in an undeclared war with Germany for years. Germany declaration of war in 1941, or Roosevelt drums up enough support after Pearl Harbor to declare war on Germany, it's happening.
 
Nah, it's really not that complicated. Seemingly small events move on huge timescales. The five days between Pearl Harbor and Germany's declaration of war were really not that important to the end result. It's like thinking 5 minutes of desperate last minute studying for an exam will make a difference to the course outcome. As I and others have said in the thread, the US had already been in an undeclared war with Germany for years. Germany declaration of war in 1941, or Roosevelt drums up enough support after Pearl Harbor to declare war on Germany, it's happening.
This is a nice narrative that you try to sell me, it's simply wrong.

The naval conflicts were never exploited on such a level as you would expect if Roosevelt desired outright war. It a simple notion to compare the medial echo of Lusitania with the one received for the WW2 to events. As stated, it is a disputed fact if Roosevelt even desired outright war. The naval aspect had severe repercussions for him that you completely ignore, just to have a nice narrative. Roosevelts actions were coming close towards leading to a constitutional crisis. Overall, as stated your narrative makes it too easy and disregards everything that doesn't fit it's conclusion and such a perspective isn't one I will ever subscribe to.
 
I dislike people saying historical events or circumstances were inevitable. For me such explanations always try to simplify complex events or situations. The moment you actually look at these events they claim to be inevitable, you see that it is not the case. We are on a forum for alternate history and people still argue with inevitable events and predetermined things.
As long as Germany keeps sinking shipping to the UK in the Atlantic then yes, war is inevitable after Pearl Harbor. In fact even without Pearl Harbor war is hard to avoid if Germany keeps sinking shipping in the Atlantic. Now if Germany stops the U-boat war, then there's a chance of avoiding war against the US.
 
This is a nice narrative that you try to sell me, it's simply wrong.

The naval conflicts were never exploited on such a level as you would expect if Roosevelt desired outright war. It a simple notion to compare the medial echo of Lusitania with the one received for the WW2 to events. As stated, it is a disputed fact if Roosevelt even desired outright war. The naval aspect had severe repercussions for him that you completely ignore, just to have a nice narrative. Roosevelts actions were coming close towards leading to a constitutional crisis. Overall, as stated your narrative makes it too easy and disregards everything that doesn't fit it's conclusion and such a perspective isn't one I will ever subscribe to.
What are the naval repercussions, what would have been the constitutional crisis? The Two-Ocean Navy Act was passed *unanimously* by Congress well before US entry, authorizing over $8 billion for almost doubling the navy. This is after the Navy only asked for $4 billion. So the naval aspect is, what, more money and ships? The constitutional crisis is, what, Congress united and voting unanimously? Reminder to you that 90% of Americans surveyed the day after Pearl Harbor supported going to war with Germany as well. Is it a constitutional crisis for Congress's actions to have too much support?
 
As long as Germany keeps sinking shipping to the UK in the Atlantic then yes, war is inevitable after Pearl Harbor. In fact even without Pearl Harbor war is hard to avoid if Germany keeps sinking shipping in the Atlantic. Now if Germany stops the U-boat war, then there's a chance of avoiding war against the US.
Yeah, the Germans are really in a Catch 22 there. Keep sinking shipping and make US entry inevitable, or don't sink shipping and US entry is still possible and the Brits and Soviets remain extremely well supplied.
 
It a simple notion to compare the medial echo of Lusitania with the one received for the WW2 to events.
Even with the Lusitania, there is no straight, linear, inevitable, uninterruptible line from the Lusitania sinking in May 1915, less than a year into the war, and the US DoW in April 1914, 23 months, nearly two years, later, after several quite important intervening incidents and diplomatic impasses. Lusitania was not the last straw exciting America into a warlike frenzy or making war with Germany inevitable. Even Theodore Roosevelt, bully enthusiast, didn't suggest war in its near-term aftermath. He merely suggested seizing German ships interned in US ports as a way to force German compensation or whatever changes in policy or pledges of good behavior we in the USA wished. Lusitania was not the last straw. It was the first straw....the one that made the idea of the US having *any* stake in the ongoing war in Europe against Germany conceivable, even thinkable, in the first place. Before Lusitania, universal consensus in the USA, except possibly for some weird gadfly cranks, was the USA would not be a combatant and had no reason to. That is any criticism or condemnation of Belgium or Prussianism aside. That was all mere commentary, not calls for action, much less war.

As long as Germany keeps sinking shipping to the UK in the Atlantic then yes
Not.....freaking....at....all.

Months of submarine sinkings, since Nov. 1939, in the Atlantic, without a US DoW, 25 months, more than two years, attest to the possible coexistence of submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and US-German nonbelligerency, or official nonbelligerency, or quasi-nonbelligerency where US ground and air forces are kept away from fighting on other continents. So does the shorter period of over sixth months of unneutral American behavior and undeclared naval hostility and sporadic conflict in the Atlantic. That's not proof of inevitability of war, it is proof it was not.


I dislike people saying historical events or circumstances were inevitable. For me such explanations always try to simplify complex events or situations. The moment you actually look at these events they claim to be inevitable, you see that it is not the case. We are on a forum for alternate history and people still argue with inevitable events and predetermined things.
Thank you for your giving it a look and giving it a review, and fair consideration.

I am not necessarily convinced of the thesis. But it appears Simms and his partner assembled the recorded contemporary evidence that fits with all the buzz of activity that certainly makes the appearance of all this activity being relevant and decisive. My God people really were leaving diaries and written records very often in 1941! How did they ever find the time without the internet! [I suppose in the internet age we are leaving just as copious diaries of our thoughts, intentions, fears and decisionmaking].

However, in my view, and I say this from reading a lot of history, including diplomatic history. I do not believe a lot of activity and contemporary documentation of theories necessarily prove that those activities had the true driving force the historians relating them ascribe to them in their narrative. Larger structural issues may really be forcing decisionmakers' hands heavily, despite any doubts or speculations voiced out loud that are captured on paper. And sometimes historians "fall in love" with their sources. "I unearthed and organized all these documents and letters, they must be really important vital to our understanding of why things actually happened, dammit! Eureka dammit!" Historians sort of need to pitch the profundity of their primary research findings like that, even to get a leg up in publishing in academic journals, much less in pitching a book to a publisher or trying to sell copies to the public.

This item, first brought to my attention by the late David T, points to the possibility of much of the worry and activity possibly being beside the point of the ultimate outcome. As does the somewhat popular theory at the time that Germany, an ally of Japan at the time, participated in, directed, or approved of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Gallup took a poll on 8 December - the day after Pearl Harbor and before the US declared war on Japan. It showed over 90% support for declaring war on Germany as well.
The fact of the US and UK being fully cobelligerent against Japan would have increased the complexity and inconvenience to the USA of limiting the conflict with Germany below levels of full bell belligerency for any meaningful amount of time, because Britain's defeat at the hands of Germany, already deemed pretty unacceptable by the American public and governing elite, would be *extra* unacceptable with the British Empire as one of the USA's main fighting allies against Japan, logistically vital for the struggle in the southwestern Pacific, or any attempts to support our *other* fighting ally against Japan, China.

@Erzherzog_Karl - since you read the whole thing - and you are not obligated to give more spoilers if you do not want to:

1. Is Simms assertion that if Hitler had not declared war on the USA *and* not expanded the U-Boat warfare up to American and Caribbean shores (a *deadly* change in ROE time-coincident with his DoW) Roosevelt would have had difficulty, or been unable to declare war?
a) or could declare war but with more division/less support with vague negative effects
b) or could declare war but with political pressure for a strategically unsound Japan-first policy
c) Or, he could not declare war on Germany AND he would be forced by Congress and public to *cut off* Lend-Lease funding/support for the USSR (not involved in war with Japan) and British Empire ops, in Atlantic/Europe/Africa, at least.

FWIW, I find the last, patently unbelievable.


2. Is Simms assertion that Hitler could have expanded his U-Boat warfare up to American and Caribbean shores in December 1941 (a *deadly* change in ROE time-coincident with his DoW), but, if unaccompanied without a DoW from his on the USA, Roosevelt would have had difficulty, or been unable to declare war? Congress and the public would have swallowed it without rage or wanting counter-action, accepting it as "the cost of doing business"?

I find that pretty unbelievable, to the point of implausibility.
 
I did not read the book so I cannot comment one way or another but in regards to Brendan Simms as the author, he is well regarded in the historian circles, doing good research and the book is positively viewed by Adam Tooze, the author to go for very in-depth and detailed information on the economics of the Third Reich, together with Jonas Scherner.
His other book about Hitler wasn't well regarded by another prominent Nazi Germany historian Richard Evans though. And I've noticed that he seems to believe that the manuscript that Hitler wrote in 1928-29 for a planned second book about his planned foreign policy was primarily about America. It was actually primarily about defending his policy of pursuing an anti-French alliance with Italy.
 
Not.....freaking....at....all.

Months of submarine sinkings, since Nov. 1939, in the Atlantic, without a US DoW, 25 months, more than two years, attest to the possible coexistence of submarine warfare in the Atlantic, and US-German nonbelligerency, or official nonbelligerency, or quasi-nonbelligerency where US ground and air forces are kept away from fighting on other continents. So does the shorter period of over sixth months of unneutral American behavior and undeclared naval hostility and sporadic conflict in the Atlantic. That's not proof of inevitability of war, it is proof it was not.
The obvious difference between november 1939 and december 1941 is that Japan attacked the US and the UK is now an ally in the war against Japan. You can reckon that shipping to the UK now also goes with US ships and protected by US escorts. In name to help the UK with the war against Japan. The shortest and safest way to India is across the Atlantic and through the mediterrean, after all Germany isn't at war with the US, is it, so they won't sink shipping to India, would they? Well, of course they would, and that makes war with Germany inevitable.
1. Is Simms assertion that if Hitler had not declared war on the USA *and* not expanded the U-Boat warfare up to American and Caribbean shores (a *deadly* change in ROE time-coincident with his DoW) Roosevelt would have had difficulty, or been unable to declare war?
a) or could declare war but with more division/less support with vague negative effects
b) or could declare war but with political pressure for a strategically unsound Japan-first policy
c) Or, he could not declare war on Germany AND he would be forced by Congress and public to *cut off* Lend-Lease funding/support for the USSR (not involved in war with Japan) and British Empire ops, in Atlantic/Europe/Africa, at least.

FWIW, I find the last, patently unbelievable.


2. Is Simms assertion that Hitler could have expanded his U-Boat warfare up to American and Caribbean shores in December 1941 (a *deadly* change in ROE time-coincident with his DoW), but, if unaccompanied without a DoW from his on the USA, Roosevelt would have had difficulty, or been unable to declare war? Congress and the public would have swallowed it without rage or wanting counter-action, accepting it as "the cost of doing business"?

I find that pretty unbelievable, to the point of implausibility.
Yes, it is implausible, bordering ASB. The war in the Atlantic will escalate further and further and at some point either Germany or the US are going to declare war. Unless Hitler stops the U-boat war.
 

Garrison

Donor
Okay so only read the blurb, but it seems to reiterate what has become the common rebuttal to all the thread about how Hitler being stupid/crazy for declaring war on the USA. To quote the blurb:
Hitler’s American Gamble recounts the five days that upended everything: December 7 to 11. Tracing developments in real time and backed by deep archival research, historians Brendan Simms and Charlie Laderman show how Hitler’s intervention was not the inexplicable decision of a man so bloodthirsty that he forgot all strategy, but a calculated risk that can only be understood in a truly global context. This book reveals how December 11, not Pearl Harbor, was the real watershed that created a world war and transformed international history.
So yeah based on that it sounds like the book would be an interesting read, but I can't see anything controversial unless the book takes some wild twists and turns.
 
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