Your faith in identification is very strong and not really borne out by history. Many times aircraft attacked mixed formations of ships and reported multiple battleships when it was in reality a battleship with a screen including cruisers.

A good example was Midway, when the USN was attacking the Mogami and Mikuma, they thought the Mikuma was a battleship, or hell, when the Center Force engaged Taffy 3, they consistently ID'ed the CVE's and DD/DE's as Fleet carriers and cruisers.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
I only see two fringe groups. The farmers and the upper class idiots and violent criminals :)
The Dominion to the north are reintroducing elevated IQ feral pigs. They are becoming
a nuisance. No. I'm not referring to Albertans, Manitobans, Saskatoons or Western Ontarioites.
Are you folks actually having a gun control debate here. outside of Chat?
 
9 Nell’s from Genzen air group who were searching for Force Z mistook the destroyer Tenedos for a Battleship when they came across her. Perspective is difficult from above, particularly at angles when you are supposed to be maintaining formation. Ships regularly got misidentified as larger than they were.

Seems pretty possible for a ship close in size and gun layout to be mistaken for Repulse.
Respectfully they're not. Looking down one can clearly see one is much bigger than the other. You can also see the large fighting top on Repulse which is typical of capital ships. Repulse has an overall length 794 ft vs 575 for Exeter, and the length to beam ratio is wider on Repulse. They can also see the huge difference in the size of the main guns, 15" vs 8", and the funnels are bigger on Repulse. The leaders of strike groups, and the observers were looking down with binoculars not just the naked eye. Also factor in they were looking for Repulse & POW, so they just had refresher training on identifying them.

For the very highly trained strike leaders to misdirect the attack onto the wrong ship would be a fantastic fluke. The misidentification of ship types almost always happened when the ship was alone, not in a group. To my knowledge no air attack on a fleet ever made this type of mistake. In 1944 in the Battle of Sibuyan Sea the USN aviators could clearly see that Yamato & Musashi were much bigger than the other IJN battleships by a similar ratio as we're talking about, certainly in terms of beam and concentrated their attacks on them. Now granted the Yamato's looked very different but what all the pilots noted was just how big they were.
 
Hi DDM, now that's a very interesting point, something I've not given any thought over. Does the US have much on any of the other islands, Luzon was the most significant and where the main defence was planned, a bit like Java for the Dutch East Indies. I'll have to look more closely at the maps, but everything revolves around airfields, and a potent air force to work from them.
From my readings other then Constabulary units the only formed U.S. Army forces were on primarily Mindanao, at Del Monte Airfield you had the the Airbase Group, there were 3 small but adequately trained Philippine Divisions , under American Officers, "Commanded by Brigadier General William F. Sharp these were the PA 61st, 81st, and 101st Infantry Divisions, they were reinforced 2 newly activated regiments The 61st Division was located on Panay, the 81st on Cebu and Negros, and only the 101st on Mindanao. In January a fourth division, the 102nd, was created on Mindanao from the field artillery regiments of the 61st and 81st Divisions acting as infantry (they had no artillery pieces), and the 103rd Infantry of the 101st Division. The 2nd Infantry of the Philippine Army's 1st Regular Division and the 2nd Battalion of the U.S. 43rd Infantry (Philippine Scouts) were also made a part of the Mindanao Force."


Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_campaign_(1941–1942)#:~:text=In January a fourth division,Infantry of the 101st Division.
 
The misidentification of ship types almost always happened when the ship was alone, not in a group.

This is outright wrong, if anything, misidentification of ships when they were sailing in a group was even more atrocious...and history proves this.

You can also see the large fighting top on Repulse which is typical of capital ships.

Rebuttal, again Marblehead and Jacob Jones comes to mind, because what your saying is that the Japanese should have properly identified the two as a Light Cruiser and a Destroyer, and then focused their efforts on Marblehead sinking her since she was in no shape to dodge bombs. What actually happened? Jacob Jones spent a decent chunk of time dodging bombs and not a single Japanese Bomber went after Marblehead.

For reference, the size difference between Marblehead and Jacob Jones is bigger than the size difference between Repulse and Exeter. The size difference in the former pair is 241 feet and in the latter pair its 219 feet - plus the differences in their silhouette while distinctive enough...wasn't enough to prevent the Japanese from focusing on the DD rather than the CL...
 
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A good example was Midway, when the USN was attacking the Mogami and Mikuma, they thought the Mikuma was a battleship, or hell, when the Center Force engaged Taffy 3, they consistently ID'ed the CVE's and DD/DE's as Fleet carriers and cruisers.
It can happen. but the Mogami was only 19 ft shorter than the Fuso. And again, when they attacked them, they were not sailing with a battleship, so they had nothing to contrast with. At Samar the IJN was looking from the surface not the air. That puts everything in a very different prospective. It is much easier to tell the size difference of ships from the air than at sea level. At sea level you have questionable range, angle of view, and often poorer visibility.
 
This is outright wrong, if anything, misidentification of ships when they were sailing in a group was even more atrocious...and history proves this.



Rebuttal, again Marblehead and Jacob Jones comes to mind, because what your saying is that the Japanese should have properly identified the two as a Light Cruiser and a Destroyer, and then focused their efforts on Marblehead sinking her since she was in no shape to dodge bombs. What actually happened? Jacob Jones spent a decent chunk of time dodging bombs and not a single Japanese Bomber went after Marblehead.

For reference, the size difference between Marblehead and Jacob Jones is bigger than the size difference between Repulse and Exeter. The size difference in the former pair is 241 feet and in the latter pair its 219 feet - plus the differences in their silhouette while distinctive enough...wasn't enough to prevent the Japanese from focusing on the DD rather than the CL...
Respectfully what battle are you talking about? The Marblehead was almost sunk by bombs, and the USS Jacob Jones was sunk by a U-Boat in the Atlantic. I can't find any reference to a Dutch destroyer with that name. If you're referring to the Battle of Makassar Strait, the Japanese might have thought the Marblehead was sinking. She had fires aboard and was steaming in a circle. I don't know that the Japanese focused on a destroyer, but they also attacked the cruisers Houston, and De Ruyter.
 
The Marblehead was almost sunk by bombs, and the USS Jacob Jones was sunk by a U-Boat in the Atlantic.

Goddamn similar sounding names...frak me.

Anyways, found my source, it wasn't Jacob Jones, it was USS Paul Jones.

But here's the video, this happened after Makassar Strait as she was limping back to Tilitjap for temporary repairs.

 
Are you folks actually having a gun control debate here. outside of Chat?
The Kellogg-Briand Treaty had fifteen (15) initial signatories. It outlawed war. However, twelve years later fourteen
(14) of those nations are at war. Well maybe all fifteen, if the British Irish conflict is considered.

The point is that even with the best intentions, one solution is unlikely to address all the issues. One size does not fit all.
What works in one place does not necessarily work elsewhere. What works in Manchester, may not do so well in Bimini,
Mombasa or Singapore.

Whether the Colonial has been in Burma, Malaya, Netherland East Indies, Philippines for years or are about to step ashore
at Kota Bharu, they are all visitors. They come with certain prejudices and are unable or unwilling understand why others
act differently. I suppose that is the original thought behind Kipling's "White Man's Burden" or "Civilize Them With A Krag".

A Good Remembrance /Poppy Day or Armistice/Veteran's Day.
 
While on the other hand, I , in Illinois, can go to WalMart, walk to sporting goods and purchase a Daisy "Red Ryder" BB/Air rifle, for my 12 year old grandson, Take it home give it to him with a pack of BBs, explain how to be safe, and if he hurts pets or damages property, he will be punished and lose the rifle.
I used to have a Daisy - and one day I noticed it was missing

Still haven't gotten the truth out of my little brother regarding what happened to it!
 
Yes, but from several thousand feet up, while under fire from ack-ack, I can very much see Japanese Bombers going for Exeter with alarming regularity. Remember, the Japanese were notoriously bad at target identification....
One of the IJN air groups attacked HMS Tenedos, a 1000 ton S class WW1 destroyer who was detached due to low fuel and was detected by a flight of 9 G3Ms - and reported that they had attacked a battleship!

Air recce is not easy - for example after the sinking of Hood one of the PBYs that subsequently found Bismarck reported there was a carrier with her!

The German Navy didn't have any carriers!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Are you folks actually having a gun control debate here. outside of Chat?
I'm sure we have had, and maybe still do have a cuddly teddy bear, but please bear (pun intended) in mind its not good to poke a real one, especially this one, no matter how cuddly he may appear!
 
Yes, it may be debatable how close they came, but the 271 of 1941 wasn't that good at the time. The radar that Duke of York used was a 273Q, a much more evolved system. The radar in POW in 1941 wasn't working well because it wasn't tropicalized to handle the heat and humidity. Even with the radar improvements during 1942 the Japanese could still get the upper hand. Radar & ship to ship communications in night battles were still evolving.
But every time I read an account of this part of the 'action' I read "But POW did not detect the ships on radar even though they were only 5 miles apart"

Which suggests radar was in use at the time.

The Japanese certainly got the upper hand against US forces in SAG actions in 1942 (Savo Island really highlighted this) and into 43 which we can put down to inexperienced crews and a general 'tribal inexperience' among the USN when it came to night fighting.

The crews on the ships of Force Z on the other hand where for the most part battle hardened veterans - the IJN might have been well practiced but they had not been in a battle since 1905!
 
If the information below is correct, then the Type 271 might not be much help for surface search. For a DD/CL the detection range
may only be 8-10 nmi. For a Heavy/CA, it may be 10 nmi. This would be under the optimal conditions.

If I understand it the Type 271 used an A scope. The humidity/temperature on vacuum tubes/display, sea clutter, midwatch stander
(least experienced), etc. will all contribute to the potential radar woes. The Op Area for PoW goes, No. Atlantic, So. Atlantic, IO,
So.China Sea. Maybe this adds to scope baseline confusion?

If I remember right the North Atlantic seas were generally a Beaufort 5 when at summer calm. If that was your area of operations prior to
transit to the South China Sea, you may hesitate and hope to have a visual to confirm the reflection. Don't know about the South Atlantic.
However, the IO can be really interesting depending upon where you are. Fast currents coupled with injection temp of 85F at
1100 hours and injection temp of 35F at 1105 hours. Roaring Forties. Followed on by placid and hot South China Sea perhaps?




Addon
It got me wondering as to the moon on 9 DEC 41.


Waning Gibbous Moon as a Full Moon was 3 DEC 41. So I would surmise that there must have been some real overcast/torrential rains
ongoing. I can only guess how that might play havoc with returns on the A scope. Otherwise, the surface biologics should glisten a wake
and another tell tale might reveal itself.
 
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But every time I read an account of this part of the 'action' I read "But POW did not detect the ships on radar even though they were only 5 miles apart"

Which suggests radar was in use at the time.

The Japanese certainly got the upper hand against US forces in SAG actions in 1942 (Savo Island really highlighted this) and into 43 which we can put down to inexperienced crews and a general 'tribal inexperience' among the USN when it came to night fighting.

The crews on the ships of Force Z on the other hand where for the most part battle hardened veterans - the IJN might have been well practiced but they had not been in a battle since 1905!
I said the Type 271 radar wasn't working well. I didn't say it didn't work at all. The USN had a doctrinal problem and failed to use radar effectively at an early date. It also wasn't that the Americans were untrained. The USN was using ad hock groups of ships in the Solomons that hadn't worked out communication and battle plans together. They had no appreciation of IJN night tactics or weapons. Force Z was also new to each other and had no idea about IJN night tactics or weapons. To just keep saying they used night tactics against the Italians doesn't mean they would be prepared for the Japanese. No, they would be just as unprepared as the USN.
 
I'm sure we have had, and maybe still do have a cuddly teddy bear, but please bear (pun intended) in mind its not good to poke a real one, especially this one, no matter how cuddly he may appear!
TBF, this may be one of the gentlest gun control debates that I've seen in a while.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
In a previous post I mentioned the fact that to avoid Blue on Blue incidents during the D-Day invasion, the RN took to sea a large number of essentially civilian aircraft recognition experts who were recruited from the Royal Observer Corps. However I failed to mention the simple but reasonably additional measure taken, that is the painting of Invasion Stripes on all Allied aircraft, the famous black and white markings applied to all aircraft. Which was repeated during the Suez invasion of 1956, when once again Invasion Stripes were painted on the Anglo French aircraft, but this time they were black and orange. Note both times not all aircraft were painted with Invasion Stripes, as the heavy bomber fleets of the Anglo Americans in WWII remained in their normal colours, and the heavy bombers of the British, Vickers Valiants, remained in their white atomic flash paint job during Suez.

RR.
 
In a previous post I mentioned the fact that to avoid Blue on Blue incidents during the D-Day invasion, the RN took to sea a large number of essentially civilian aircraft recognition experts who were recruited from the Royal Observer Corps. However I failed to mention the simple but reasonably additional measure taken, that is the painting of Invasion Stripes on all Allied aircraft, the famous black and white markings applied to all aircraft. Which was repeated during the Suez invasion of 1956, when once again Invasion Stripes were painted on the Anglo French aircraft, but this time they were black and orange. Note both times not all aircraft were painted with Invasion Stripes, as the heavy bomber fleets of the Anglo Americans in WWII remained in their normal colours, and the heavy bombers of the British, Vickers Valiants, remained in their white atomic flash paint job during Suez.

RR.
Can this work in Malaya for the RAAANZAF AAA forces, until they ramp up in proficiency? Paint the underwing area for recognition? I don't see that the Japanese gain any
advantage as they are weeks or months ahead
 
Can this work in Malaya for the RAAANZAF AAA forces, until they ramp up in proficiency? Paint the underwing area for recognition? I don't see that the Japanese gain any
advantage as they are weeks or months ahead
That's why alliances like NATO work all the time on integration of forces. They were trying to build that in WWII, but it wasn't easy. In the 1940 Battle of France coordination was terrible. In SEA 1941/42 coordination was better but there we so many problems. Late in the war there were USN fighter pilots who thought RAF roundels were rising suns and attacked them. They just weren't used to flying with the RAF. Blue on Blue is the worst thing that can happen, you're doing the enemy's job.
 
MWI 41120111 Is it War

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 01 December;

The room was packed, tension in the air, a nervousness among some, less informed, a concealed excitement among others. “Ah hm, Gentlemen” the room fell silent as their chair, Governor Caldecott began to speak. “Before I begin with the business of the day, I will take this opportunity to introduce you to Admiral Phillips, who has arrived to take over from Vice Admiral Layton, as Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, and in advance of the imminent arrival of his flagship, the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, and accompanying ships, known as Force Z.” All eyes turned to look at a small, immaculately dress Admiral, sitting next to the well-liked Layton. He nodded, returning their gaze.

Caldecott continued, “Apologies for the delayed start, the meeting of the Executive Committee, despite starting an hour earlier, ran over by 50 minutes. That is why I have had to put the War Council meeting back by an hour. Furthermore, most of you will have to chair your respective sub committee’s this afternoon, as I anticipate you will have a lot of work today. I had already had the subcommittee members notified of these extraordinary meetings yesterday, and there should be a full attendance, with our northern members flying in from Penang and Kuala Lumpur as we speak.”

He sat back, and paused, letting the words sink in. “Gentlemen, what I am about to tell you, I’m sure you needn’t be reminded, is top secret, but to reinforce that, you will now notice security is being tightened up. I received a message from the Prime Minister yesterday morning updating us with some very disturbing news. As you know the Americans have been in talks with the Japanese over a number of months, in an effort to defuse the crisis caused by Japanese occupation of much of China, followed up more recently with Indo-China.

On the 26th of November, the US Secretary of State, outlined to the Japanese, a proposed basis of agreement between them, with the demands that Japan withdraws from both Indo-China and China. I am informed that the Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that this proposal has been rejected by Japan. In addition, our intelligence continues to report of a steadily increasing build-up of Japanese forces in Indo-China, and significant movement of naval forces

So, with there being no further diplomatic movement, we must assume war is likely to come. With that presumption, I am informed that we are to move to a state of readiness and be prepared for war!” There was an intake of breath from some of them, the General Manager of the FMSR snapping his pencil in surprise. Caldecott continued “In light of this information, and following a unanimous agreement among the Executive Council, with the full powers invested us, we have taken the following decisions.

All military leave has been cancelled, and all units are to bring themselves up to second degree readiness with 24 hours’ notice. The volunteer forces are all to be mobilised, and guards posted at strategic points and instillations. All workers in war sensitive industries will come under the new Malaya War Act, Mr Smart, your railways are going to be very busy the next few days, we have a lot of units to relocate, and Mr Rodgers, I trust the movement of strategic goods and implemented tighter controls won’t significantly affect the efficiencies of the harbour boards.

Inspector General Dickinson, we are going to want to declare quite a number of restricted zones, and we will need to place a number of individuals under close surveillance, and with that in mind Chief Justice Trusted, there will be an unusually high number of calls on your judges seeking authority on this.

So then, gentlemen, I’ll close this War Council, and let you all go to attend your respective sub committees, to put our contingency plans into operation. We will meet again tomorrow at 10am sharp to review and update, thank you” The noise of chair legs scrapped back heralded their exit, their minds were already recalling the agendas and orders for their committees that had been so painstakingly prepared in numerous previous meetings.
 
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