Bureau of Ordinance had issued fleetwide orders, all commands, including Hart's were
not to spend the money and waste expensive torpedoes on tests we ( The Newport torpedo factory Mafia) have conducted. Tests and live firing was allowed with the MK X torpedoes carried by the S Boats. the USN would have been far better off if all subs were set up for the excellent MK X (It really worked). When the Sub tenders Holland and Otus evacuated they carried primarily MK XIV torpedoes. After over 200 torpedoes and sub launched mines were destroyed in the bombing of Cavite all the available torpedoes were on the Canopus at Miravales a mix of MK Xs and MK XIVs.

As a side note, twice previously in his career Hart had tangled with the Newport torpedo Mafia, who had FDR's political ear, and it had hurt his career.

Why did this Newport entity have so much political power?
 
Noted before that the Commonwealth Firces captured the rifles and machine-guns, and ammunition stores of about 100,000 Italian troops in 1941. These were credible weapons for stopgap kit of 5 divisions of Malayan troops. Some Finnish units were supplied Carcanos by Germany. They were not happy as they might be, but they beat rocks and cudgels.
The Carcano in 7.35mm was rubbish; not helped by very poor quality control of the powder used. In 6.5mm it was a with good powder it is a different beast. Like Japan, war caught the Ities changing calibre. They reverted to the 6.5mm, so the Finns not only got non-standard cal. rifles with bad ammunition, but had no way to replace it as it was out of production. You might have stop-gap rifles; but the ammo is going to be wildly variable. Unless new ammo that can be vouched for was provided; such stop-gaps would be worse than useless.
 
He was connected politically.

It sounds like the problem was actually one more level up the chain of command?

"The Chief of Naval Operations authorized the use of the obsolete destroyer USS Ericsson, but placed so many restrictions on its use Newport was forced to decline the offer. As a result, the Mark VI exploder never underwent a live test, and its shortcomings would not become apparent until the outbreak of hostilities."
 
Why did this Newport entity have so much political power?
State and National Politics and union politics, FDR needed Rhode Islands Senate and House votes.. The State leaders said all torpedo testing and construction will be at Newport, unless in a state of war. This is simplistic but you could write a Thesis on the subject.
 
If I remember, the Japanese radios could cover a longer range by several hundred meters.
When they had them. The Japanese often lacked enough radios from what I've read. While Allied radios could often be twitchy (especially early war) or shorter in range in some types, at least they had often plenty of them. Late war the Allies had MORE than enough!
 
The problems for submarine commanders extended past the torpedo. Wikipedia quotes, "During a tense Washington conference with fellow admirals in early 1943, he (VADM Lockwood) demanded that, "If the Bureau of Ordnance can't provide us with torpedoes that will hit and explode, or with a gun larger than a peashooter, then for God's sake get the Bureau of Ships to design a boathook with which we can rip the plates off the target's sides."

Perhaps on a positive side, the problems with the Mk VI and Mk XIV may have influenced the IJN disdain for their own Submarine Force and ASW efforts.

Dunno.
Japan's disdain fir ASW warfare dated to far before the war: Surface fleet commanders felt protecting merchant ships was "beneath" them. As for their submarine doctrine that was developed far back in the early 30s as part of their plan to attrite the US Fleet as it pushed through to relieve the Philippines. So nope. That's on them...and shows just how myopic their military culture was.
So nothing to do with piss poor US torpedoes, that's all on the Newport clique's incompetence.
 
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State and National Politics and union politics, FDR needed Rhode Islands Senate and House votes.. The State leaders said all torpedo testing and construction will be at Newport, unless in a state of war. This is simplistic but you could write a Thesis on the subject.
This is true. But just because the torpedo testing and construction was in Newport doesn't mean it had to done in a crappy manner. That's on the naval officers who didn't do their jobs and on Congress and Navy budget directors for being stingy a-holes on R&D.
Then everyone at the yards being truly shitty on a epic level on both development and manufacturing quality control.
Not that Newport wasn't first class at ass covering mind you. They KNEW they'd screwed up and scrambled to protect that little bit of info for years into war...which is outright treason in my book.
 

Fatboy Coxy

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Blimey Guys, I leave you alone for a few days, and the posts go wild, pages to read and reply to, has Christmas come early for some of you?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Besides the shipyard, and ship repair facilities in Singapore there were well equiped ship repiar facilities in the Dutch East Indies. The Droogdok Maatschappij Tandjong Priok (Tanjung Priok dry dock company) had a floating dock of 4000 tons and a floating dock of 8000 tons and since the thirties a slipway for new build ships.
Next to this private company the Royal Netherlands Navy facilities had several bases in the East Indies in Soerabaja and Tandjong Priok and several smaller, some of them with very well equiped facilities for maintenance of surface ships, submarines and torpedo's and later floatplanes
Hi Parma, thank you for this. I need to do a bit on what the Dutch had, especially in Java, who's development was similar to Malaya
 

Fatboy Coxy

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Re the floating Dry Docks, as discussed by Butchpfd, Driftless, Neverinemex, and gallen95, these were not very easy to redeploy, see

But that was still quicker than building a new one
 
If I remember, the Japanese radios could cover a longer range by several hundred meters.
Surely not the Japanese aircraft radios. The memoirs of pilots like Saburo Sakai consistently describe them as next to useless - you could only communicate with your land base or aircraft carrier if you were practically flying right above it, and plane to plane communication was a pipe dream.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
There was also Darwin, a port that all too often gets forgotten in your musings. Houston was ported there several times to replenish ammunition and fuel in late '41/early '42. While it wasn't capable of repairs it was sufficiently important to warrant the Japanese attacking it on 19 February 1942.
hi Ventinari, not forgotten, but not central to the story. There will be a few Australian focused posts, but once the bullets start flying, Australia will figure more in my writings
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Surely not the Japanese aircraft radios. The memoirs of pilots like Saburo Sakai consistently describe them as next to useless - you could only communicate with your land base or aircraft carrier if you were practically flying right above it, and plane to plane communication was a pipe dream.
Japanese aircraft to aircraft R/T was useless, at least in 1941-42, not sure about later in the war, that's partly why bomber formations flew in tight formations. For fighters, once they were in combat, they were reduced to a Vic of three, at best.

However aircraft to land based station communications worked ok, often using a ship as a repeater station. So maritime aircraft were able to report sightings, the problems they had were mostly atmospheric, December 1941 was full monsoon season in the South China Sea. This problem also plagued the Allies.
 
Hi Parma, thank you for this. I need to do a bit on what the Dutch had, especially in Java, who's development was similar to Malaya
No problem. I like your detailed timeline, with the focus on the seamingly small, personel items. The History of the Japanese attack on British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies are very connected or interconnected there for I thought I posted this comment regarding shipyard facilities on Java.
I didn't expect this would start a lively discussion :)
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
@Fatboy Coxy

When you got time read this:

Maybe some information could help. Also it talks about the drydock USS Dewey
Thank you for this Logan2879, I have read it before, there's a lot here, and I will give more comment when I have a little more time.
 
MWI 41062321 The Canadians Are Here

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Monday 23 June;

Park sat, as a guest of the newly formed RCAF 404 Squadron at Tengah, at its first formal meal, along with another guest, Air Commodore Archie Wann. Sitting with them were a few RAF officers, transferred or seconded from RAF 226 Sqn, and the rest, very young Canadian pilots, including sergeant pilot Eddie Alworth, all trying to display their best table manners, with little nods and subtle gestures correcting those in ignorance of the proper etiquette. They had arrived on the auxiliary cruiser HMCS Prince Henry last week, straight from the flying schools in Canada.

They were a bright cheerful lot, full of self-confidence, which they were going to need, as they learnt the art of flying a Fairey Battle in operational service. They were going to learn to hate, but at the same time love, Archie Wann, as he drove them to a level of competency way beyond what they would think achievable, but probably for Wann, only average. They wouldn’t normally fly with a navigator, perhaps one in the lead aircraft, but the rest would fly just pilot and radio operator/rear gunner. They would learn to fly ground attack, interdiction and close support operations. It wouldn’t be safe level flight, bombs away and home stuff, it would be a lot hairier than that, not that Wann would tell them that, he knew they’d figure it out quite quickly enough anyway.

The plan was for 226 squadron to foster 404, and later a second Canadian squadron, 414, both Article XIV squadrons, just as fast as the aircrew and aircraft arrived. At the moment they trained on general flying, maintaining formation, and navigating. But it would soon be time to start the hard work, while late arrivals would have to play catch up. It wasn’t a perfect plan, but Park was convinced Wann could make it work.

Also, on HMCS Prince Henry, was the advance party of a company of the Royal Canadian Signals Corps, The Canadian Cable and Construction Company, colloquially known as the 4C’s, a one-off unit of telephone cabling engineers, volunteers, nearly all in their forties, who would be used to upgrade and develop Malaya’s telephone network. They came with light trucks, and all the equipment a telephone cabling unit would want, and would progressively grow in numbers, until nearly 300 strong, by the end of the year. Although not a combat unit, they were equipped with pistols and rifles for self-defence.

The few others on the ship were a couple of radar trained technicians for the AMES units, and half a dozen or so newly commissioned Canadian second lieutenants, who had volunteered to transfer to the Indian Army, and, on condition they passed the required courses in Urdu, would see a significant increase in pay. They were the start of a steady trickle of officers choosing this career path.

Further shipments in Canadian chartered steamers had recently delivered a large quantity of signalling cable, numerous light and medium trucks, the ever-needed steel products and cement, and most significantly, enough newly built earth moving equipment to equip a second airfield construction company, which would be held for the expectant arrival of a New Zealand company.

But the best news for Park had been the arrival of the first 20 crated Canadian built Hurricane MK IIA aircraft, armd with eight guns, and no engines. From now on there would be a steady arrival of Hurricanes from Canada, coming across the Pacific in freighters sailing alone with no need of a convoy escort. Meeting them in Singapore were Merlin XX engines, being shipped from Britain, and the first batch were due in the next WS series convoy. When assembled these would first re-equip the OTU, and then begin equipping the fighter squadrons.

The more formal toasts had been taken, the meal eaten, and as the men around the table began to relaxed, so the drink began to flow, Eddie Alworth was well on his way to becoming very drunk, but decorum dictated he keep pace with everyone else. Air Marshal Keith Park, himself beginning to feel the effects of drink, called for another toast, he waited while charges were filled and then called out, to the Maple Leaf, Forever, and the reply cried around the room, to the Maple Leaf, the Maple Leaf Forever!
 
Churchill did things for the UK's benefit. He basically didn't give a damn about Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders or South Africans. He lied to Menzies, he later lied to Curtin. It was all to benefit the UK.
To benefit himself. He wrecked this country. That is his entire political career. I can't think of anything he did that was of a sigificant benefit to us.
 
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