From what I can tell the Class G's were used mainly on the main west coast line which was a lot less twisty and had less tighter bends than the central highland line. Where having a fixed front 4 wheels would have been a disadvantage. The later H & O's with their separate leading wheels on their own bogey, together with the trailing bogey and the four tender wheels on separate bogeys would have made journeys on the twisty central highland line a lot safer and more comfortable for the passengers.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Thanks JIM, well with the wagons I've detailed, I don't think these locomotives have too much to pull, so hopefully they'll be OK, and on a second point the FMSR will need all the trains it has, so using a couple built around 1901-05, makes them some of the least needed, dare I say expendable.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Historically, there was an armoured train used by the British in Malaya in 1941, although there's precious little detail about it.

Percival's Operations of Malaya Command, The Opening of Hostilities, 131, says "Concurrently, an armoured train, with a detachment of 2/16 Punjab Regt, and some engineers, advanced into Thailand from Padang Besar in Perlis." And later in the paragraph we have "Meanwhile the armoured train party had reached Klong Gnea, in Thailand and successfully destroyed a large bridge before withdrawing to Padang Besar."

Then moving to West Coast Operations 12th-17th December, 1941, 191, says "During the day (16th December) the units of the 11th Division were being reformed in Province Wellesly, covered by a weak rear-guard which consisted of one platoon and the armoured train on the railway bridge (over the River Muda) "

And that's it!

Alam Warren, in his book, Singapore 1942, Britain's Greatest Defeat, mentions the train's advance into Thailand subsequent withdrawal. Later, page 100, after detailing Murray-Lyon's brush with an advance party of Japanese cyclists at the Alor Star road bridge over the Kedah River, he goes on to say
"Soon after the road bridge was blown the demolitions on the rail bridge to the east were also set off. The charges failed to do their task and the bridge was left sagging, the rails broken, but still standing. An armoured train had been cut off north of the river by the attempt to demolish the bridge. Somebody decided to drive the train over the bridge in a final 'Hollywood' style bid to collapse the damaged structure. The train was slowly rolled towards the bridge. The crew leapt off, but, with its whistle jammed and shriking loudly, the train jumped the broken rails and steamed off southwards".

What happened to the train afterwards I'm not sure, and I have no idea if there was just the one armoured train of two, what steam engines were used, and what armour and guns they were equipped with?

If anyone knows more, please enlighten me.
 
Historically, there was an armoured train used by the British in Malaya in 1941, although there's precious little detail about it.

Percival's Operations of Malaya Command, The Opening of Hostilities, 131, says "Concurrently, an armoured train, with a detachment of 2/16 Punjab Regt, and some engineers, advanced into Thailand from Padang Besar in Perlis." And later in the paragraph we have "Meanwhile the armoured train party had reached Klong Gnea, in Thailand and successfully destroyed a large bridge before withdrawing to Padang Besar."

Then moving to West Coast Operations 12th-17th December, 1941, 191, says "During the day (16th December) the units of the 11th Division were being reformed in Province Wellesly, covered by a weak rear-guard which consisted of one platoon and the armoured train on the railway bridge (over the River Muda) "

And that's it!

Alam Warren, in his book, Singapore 1942, Britain's Greatest Defeat, mentions the train's advance into Thailand subsequent withdrawal. Later, page 100, after detailing Murray-Lyon's brush with an advance party of Japanese cyclists at the Alor Star road bridge over the Kedah River, he goes on to say
"Soon after the road bridge was blown the demolitions on the rail bridge to the east were also set off. The charges failed to do their task and the bridge was left sagging, the rails broken, but still standing. An armoured train had been cut off north of the river by the attempt to demolish the bridge. Somebody decided to drive the train over the bridge in a final 'Hollywood' style bid to collapse the damaged structure. The train was slowly rolled towards the bridge. The crew leapt off, but, with its whistle jammed and shriking loudly, the train jumped the broken rails and steamed off southwards".

What happened to the train afterwards I'm not sure, and I have no idea if there was just the one armoured train of two, what steam engines were used, and what armour and guns they were equipped with?

If anyone knows more, please enlighten me.
Why they decided to blow the bridge cutting themselves off is beyond me?
 
In terms of this operation using two trains is a sensible choses, as you said these are two old trains that would have been scrapped but for this last use. In terms of target the railway junction at Hat Yai has to be on the list. This is where the Southern Thai Railway spits with one line branching off to cross the boarder at Padang Besar on the west side of Malaya and the other line heading to Rantau Panjang on the east side of Malaya. Here is were can be found the Harmony Railway bridge over the Golok River. Targets for the engineers at Hat Yai would be the Signal boxes and the actual points that they control, also the telegraph and telephone lines which will probably run parallel to the rail line. Also any locomotives and rolling stock would receive the loving attention of engineer. A satchel charge in to the fire box of a locomotive regardless if it is lit or not is going to wreck that locomotive. Then as they withdraw if they had say use a rail ripper, some time called a rail plough that is going to make using the line impossible without totally replacing all the sleepers and rail.
 
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Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Why they decided to blow the bridge cutting themselves off is beyond me?
Well it wasn't supposed to go like that, but the retreat from Jitra was handled very badly. Firstly, the troops were very inexperienced, there had been very little battalion and brigade training, so moving formations about was always going to be a bit difficult. The debacle at Jitra, with Murray-Lyon wanting to retreat on what appeared to Heath at Kuala Lumpur and Percival at Singapore, as a mere first contact at the main defensive line, meant that permission wasn't given until after dark, with a number of units already disorganised, and some infantry companies in the front line out of contact with their HQs. The retreat coming only two days after the Indians had first met the advancing Japanese, caught many of guard, preparations hadn't been properly made, and chaos ensured.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
In terms of this operation using two trains is a sensible choses, as you said these are two old trains that would have been scrapped but for this last use. In terms of target the railway junction at Hat Yai has to be on the list. This is where the Southern Thai Railway spits with one line branching off to cross the boarder at Padang Besar on the west side on Malaya and the other line heading to Rantau Panjang on the east side of Malaya. Here is were can be found the Harmony Railway bridge over the Golok River. Targets for the engineers at Hat Yai would be the Signal boxes and the actual points that they control, also the telegraph and telephone lines which will probably run parallel to the rail line. Also any locomotives and rolling stock would receive the loving attention of engineer. A satchel charge in to the fire box of a locomotive regardless if it is lit or not is going to wreck that locomotive. Then as they withdraw if they had say use a rail ripper, some time called a rail plough that is going to make using the line impossible without totally replacing all the sleepers and rail.
I've seen pictures of the rail ripper used on the Eastern Front, and seem to recall seeing it used in the American Civil War, but was it widely employed?
 
MWI 41072112 The Tail Gets Bigger

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941 Monday 21 July;

The Monday morning meeting at the General Council was finishing and the best part of it had been consumed with discussing the various bottlenecks in their respective organisations, and how they impacted on other organisations. And things always seemed to have to get worse before they could get better, the fix always causing pain, before relief.

As new fighting formations arrived or were formed, so they called on for more support and infrastructure. And the demand to provide that was insatiable, never enough labour to do the work, or enough earth moving equipment to clear the land, and enough sand & cement, cut timber, stone & bricks, to build. Provision of food and water, sanitation, medical services, transportation, the list just seemed to keep growing.

They never seemed to be winning, always another problem, a crisis here, a disaster there. The way they planned to dealt with it was to prioritise, to share, to lend, to timetable the work. And so, it gradually developed, the railway improvements, new roads, the new airfields, barracks, stores and munition dumps, the creation of training schools, hospitals, improvements in communications with more telephone cable, radio nets, despatch riders, and postal services.

Consequently, as the formations grew, so too did the support units, both military and civil. Always seemingly understrength, too many personnel newly trained or learning on the job, but gradually improving, gaining experience, becoming more efficient. Personnel was the biggest problem, at the bottom of the pile, shortages in general labourers told in other ways, the contractors struggled to hold to rates of pay, so the free market in the civilian world, dictated where that happened, and where they gave in. Next came the skilled workers, being fought over by the different services in the military, recruiting them into technical grades, and by the civilian contractors, with trade schools failing to keep apace. Meaning the trained and experienced were worth their weight in gold.

The FMSR had seen a large increase, in rail side work gangs, in train servicing engineers, and in station staff, administrators, signallers, porters etc. The post and telegraph department had increased as more field gangs were recruited to upgrade trunk routes with bigger cables, renew telegraph poles, and provide communications to new military and civilian sites. The Public Works Department had nearly doubled in size in workforce and equipment, gaining a lot of new mechanical machines and vehicles, as well as contracting out work to expanding civilian contractors, to undertake the largescale works ordered by the War Council. The Harbour Boards had seen some improvements in new dockside cranes, and more wharf side rail tracks, but not nearly as much as they would like, while the shipbuilding firms were expanding tenfold.

For the Army, numerous barracks had been built, with yet more building or planned. Singapore still held some major bases, but more was being created in Malaya. Gemas was now fast becoming a major strategic site, with big RASC stores depots and RAOC munition dumps joining the newly building barracks and airfield. Kuala Lumpur and its port, Port Swettenham, were seeing the development of a number of major sites, while in the north, through the port of Penang, other sites were being developed at Ipoh, Taiping, Sungai Petani and Alor Star, as well as on the island of Penang itself. Other significant sites were to be found at Kluang, Malacca, Seremban, Port Dickson and Telok Anson. And the coastal towns of Mersing, Kuantan and Kota Bharu were becoming steadily more fortified, with increasing restrictions on movement.

For the RAF, as well as the operational units, and new airfields, so more maintenance units were raised, spawned from 151 MU at Seletar, which undertook general aircraft maintenance, so 152 MU, based at Bukit Panjang, Singapore became a general stores holding unit, and 153 MU, based just north of Kuala Lumpur undertook major aero engine servicing, and 155 MU, based at Kluang, was fully employed in assembling the crated aircraft that arrived from Canada and the UK, as well as major repair on the few seriously damaged aircraft from training accidents. Another unit 154 MU, had been raised and sent to Rangoon, Burma, to service the RAF units based there.

For the Royal Navy, the increases were nowhere near as major as the other two services, but nevertheless, expanding existing and creating new shore establishments had taken place to cater for the growing fleet of small ships, newly built or requisitioned that now plied the coastal waters. And the Fleet Air Arm, based at the shared airfield of Sembawang was now fully established with their own maintenance unit.

And today they had given authority to the Coal Mines at Batu Arang and the Penang Harbour board to employ another 300 and 150 coolies respectively, from Hong Kong, the Rubber Plantations to bring in another 400 Tamils, along with their families, from Ceylon, the Army to request another two Indian Auxiliary Pioneer battalions, bringing their total to five, the RAF for another Canadian Airfield Construction Company, while the manpower board had raised the basic rate of pay by another 5 cents a day.
 
I've seen pictures of the rail ripper used on the Eastern Front, and seem to recall seeing it used in the American Civil War, but was it widely employed?
In you last instalment the Lord Gort went with the superintendent of the railway workshop in to another shed to see a specially reinforced flatbed! Well that could be to see a prototype for a flatbed that could be fitted with a Rail Ripper. Alternatively the cow-catchers on the front weighted flatbed each train could be made to be jettisoned so that once they get to their final destination Hat Yai railway junction. The cow catchers could be swapped for Rail Rippers and then as each train reverses back down the line they travelled up on they can wreck the line as the withdraw.
 

Driftless

Donor
^^^ For all of the organized chaos described above, its still miles better than the utter chaos of the US Army's growth following the DoW in 1917. Virtually no preparatory planning had been done for bringing raw recruits on board in vast numbers. In several cases, the recruits arrived to find they needed to finish clearing the ground for the camp itself, and to assemble the buildings. There was a great dearth of trained leaders at all levels, a lack of canvas for tents and cots, a lack of wool for uniforms, and of course, an insufficient supply of armaments (the training and armaments were largely provided by the French and British over in France)

By comparisson, the Commonwealth has its ducks in a row, or at least has a path to get those ducks on the march.
 
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Brilliant, absolutely brilliant exposition of what it takes to be ready to Do Anything in military activity. I am reminded of a comment in Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe: that during the 1942-43 post-TORCH campaign, there were times when a shipload of coal was needed more than a shipload of bombs.

One guesses that much of this happened OTL, as the forces in Malaya were increased substantially by December 1941. Perhaps some notes could be included to indicate what is additional ITTL. Or added activity could be highlighted in italics. Or occasional "grand totals" might be included with OTL's equivalent numbers footnoted?

I am wondering (for a contemplated TL) what the effect these considerations would have if CRUSADER is a complete Allied success, and the Pacific War is delayed by three months. How much more could and would the OTL leadership accomplish in three extra months, including two months with priority for resources?
 

Driftless

Donor
^^^ And compare the conundrums above to the logistical shoestring the Japanese ran their whole Southern Resource Area campaign on. Some of the Japanese success was a mix of good fortune, some was bad luck for the Allies, much was ruthless daring by a largely battle tested Japanese military willing to risk everything, and much was Allied force inexperience and discombobulated commands pursuing their own local goals.
 
Your quite right Derwent Water, but anything extra that goes to Malaya has a cost implication elsewhere. We are seeing more aircraft, radar units, staff officers coming from the UK, as well as raw materials from the Dominions. There shouldn't be a major effect on other theatres at the moment, so no historical changes but this incremental nibbling away will tell somewhere eventually. In addition, these reinforcements to Malaya are costing more in shipping, which also means stuff doesn't get delivered elsewhere. At some stage it will have a clear effect on another theatre, probably the Middle East.

The other thing I'm struggling with is the changes at the strategic level, if say Malaya, Sumatra and Java are still held in March 1942. Despite the sign up to Germany First, the attritional struggle with the Japanese is going to twist that somewhat in my opinion. Losing Malaya and the DEI so quickly meant Britain, and the USA was spared the agony of making difficult choices with regards to deployment of military assets and the the subsequent supplies they drew on.

However, that's a long way off, and we might not get to that, stopping the initial Japanese onslaught will be challenging.

To be honest if your goal is to write a successful timeline where Malaya holds, it's not going to help long term if North Africa or other more vital theaters collapse.

Take the earlier update of moving 4 submarines plus enough personnel to form a squadron staff to Singapore. In the grand scheme of things, 4 boats isn't much. In the tough times of 1941, that's 4 boats not going after Italian shipping, or doing other tasks closer to home to free other boats up to kill Italian ships.

By giving the British a better submarine force in the Far East that are training and patrolling and not much else that might help long term against the Japanese, but that could have the downside of improving Rommel's logistics in Libya. Given how shoestring and close he cut his logistics at times, even one or two Italian freighters that get a new lease on life could see thousands, possibly tens of thousands of tons of supplies get to North Africa that couldn't be moved OTL due to lack of shipping, or that got sunk along the way. An extra brigade or so in Malaya isn't gonna matter much if Rommel at some point has enough supplies to keep fighting that one extra day or hold better against a British attack an extra day and end up wrecking one or two British/Commonwealth formatioms that OTL faired better.

Even if short term these reinforcements save Singapore, a bigger or worse then OTL defeat closer to home, or possibly an OTL British victory that becomes a defeat ITTL could negate earlier successes in the Far East if the British lack the resources to capitalize.
 
To be honest if your goal is to write a successful timeline where Malaya holds, it's not going to help long term if North Africa or other more vital theaters collapse.

Take the earlier update of moving 4 submarines plus enough personnel to form a squadron staff to Singapore. In the grand scheme of things, 4 boats isn't much. In the tough times of 1941, that's 4 boats not going after Italian shipping, or doing other tasks closer to home to free other boats up to kill Italian ships.

By giving the British a better submarine force in the Far East that are training and patrolling and not much else that might help long term against the Japanese, but that could have the downside of improving Rommel's logistics in Libya. Given how shoestring and close he cut his logistics at times, even one or two Italian freighters that get a new lease on life could see thousands, possibly tens of thousands of tons of supplies get to North Africa that couldn't be moved OTL due to lack of shipping, or that got sunk along the way. An extra brigade or so in Malaya isn't gonna matter much if Rommel at some point has enough supplies to keep fighting that one extra day or hold better against a British attack an extra day and end up wrecking one or two British/Commonwealth formatioms that OTL faired better.

Even if short term these reinforcements save Singapore, a bigger or worse then OTL defeat closer to home, or possibly an OTL British victory that becomes a defeat ITTL could negate earlier successes in the Far East if the British lack the resources to capitalize.
Perhaps Singapore is used as a "Rest area for Subs and crews from the Med.. Send them to Singapore for longer refits and crew rest, or instead move older boats from the UK itself.
 
Perhaps Singapore is used as a "Rest area for Subs and crews from the Med.. Send them to Singapore for longer refits and crew rest, or instead move older boats from the UK itself.

Depends on the logistics and equipment needed. Resources to maintain a small subron are one thing. Having a setup where there could be multiple boats coming and going, and taking up space in Singapore yards or drydocks might stretch things. Easier for subs to rest at a safe port in Egypt, or for a lot of stuff faster, cheaper, and more logistically practical to return to various bases in the UK proper as in OTL.

That's one thing overlooked at times, it's not necessarily the boats themselves, it's the ability to supply and maintain those boats so that they're actually usable. It's not just that 4 subs where moved to Singapore, though glossed over ITTL, likely a few dozen or so extra personnel would have needed to be assigned to shore installations in Singapore to help maintain and supply those 4 boats.

On top of OTL shipments to and from Singapore, that might see extra shipping taking basic supplies to Singapore. That's shipping that can't be used for Egypt or Malta.

To me that seems to be the biggest issue, despite more resources to the Far East, the European Theater is still 99.9% OTL, possibly with that 0.1% falling in favor of Axis forces. A short term series of tactical victories in Malaya isn't gonna matter much if it opens the door for one or two strategic level victories for the Germans and Italians.
 
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Depends on the logistics and equipment needed. Resources to maintain a small subron are one thing. Having a setup where there could be multiple boats coming and going, and taking up space in Singapore yards or drydocks might stretch things. Easier for subs to rest at a safe port in Egypt, or for a lot of stuff faster, cheaper, and more logistically practical to return to various bases in the UK proper as in OTL.

That's one thing overlooked at times, it's not necessarily the boats themselves, it's the ability to supply and maintain those boats so that they're actually usable. It's not just that 4 subs where moved to Singapore, though glossed over ITTL, likely a few dozen or so extra personnel would have needed to be assigned to shore installations in Singapore to help maintain and supply those 4 boats.

On top of OTL shipments to and from Singapore, that might see extra shipping taking basic supplies to Singapore. That's shipping that can't be used for Egypt or Malta.

To me that seems to be the biggest issue, despite more resources to the Far East, the European Theater is still 99.9% OTL, possibly with that 0.1% falling in favor of Axis forces. A short term series of tactical victories in Malaya isn't gonna matter much if it opens the door for one or two strategic level victories for the Germans and Italians.
It helps that the T class subs, which you want to use in the Pacific ( the waters they were really designed for ), were poorly suited to the Med, they were too big and took higher relative losses compared to the smaller boats. So moving a few out is not as bad as it seems just looking at numbers.
 
It helps that the T class subs, which you want to use in the Pacific ( the waters they were really designed for ), were poorly suited to the Med, they were too big and took higher relative losses compared to the smaller boats. So moving a few out is not as bad as it seems just looking at numbers.
True, but they were using T-Class Boats in the Med because that's what was available. It's not like the RN has lots of extra boats to assign, and the logistical demands of setting up Singapore as a major sub-base just adds more strain on Allied resources that they need in other theaters. Underlining all this is that the Japanese can bomb Singapore, and the Commonwealth doesn't have the aircraft, or AA to properly protect it. Pulling more fighters, and AA units from other theaters will have an adverse effect there. Something has to give, because in 1941 the blanket is too short to cover everything.

Singapore was lost in 1936 when Italy joined the Axis. The British had a home fleet, and a Med fleet, but they didn't have a third fleet to send to Singapore. The Washington treaty in 1922 made that impossible.
 
You'd either need to find a way to start a small buildup of forces earlier, possibly up to and including building and/or buying some more equipment sooner.

Or another alternative of which there are a host of ways to do this without going to overboard, find some way to remove a few key German and/or Italian chess pieces from the board sooner then OTL.

Personally, I found the information about the possible missed opportunity of several Greek destroyers at Cape Matapan informative.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
One guesses that much of this happened OTL, as the forces in Malaya were increased substantially by December 1941. Perhaps some notes could be included to indicate what is additional ITTL. Or added activity could be highlighted in italics. Or occasional "grand totals" might be included with OTL's equivalent numbers footnoted?
I think it might help if I produce an Order of Battle just before things kick off, to help people follow the action.

I am wondering (for a contemplated TL) what the effect these considerations would have if CRUSADER is a complete Allied success, and the Pacific War is delayed by three months. How much more could and would the OTL leadership accomplish in three extra months, including two months with priority for resources?

The war with Japan will kick off same time as it did historically, the 'What If' is about whether Britain can hold Malaya/Singapore, with all that entails. A delayed start would have to be a different 'What If'.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
To be honest if your goal is to write a successful timeline where Malaya holds, it's not going to help long term if North Africa or other more vital theaters collapse.

Hi Viper99, well the goal is to see if that can happen, I might find as we go along that it just isn't going to happen, I'm not fixed on any outcome yet, just trying to give Britain the best possible realistic chance. Of course 'realistic' is subjective.

Take the earlier update of moving 4 submarines plus enough personnel to form a squadron staff to Singapore. In the grand scheme of things, 4 boats isn't much. In the tough times of 1941, that's 4 boats not going after Italian shipping, or doing other tasks closer to home to free other boats up to kill Italian ships.

By giving the British a better submarine force in the Far East that are training and patrolling and not much else that might help long term against the Japanese, but that could have the downside of improving Rommel's logistics in Libya. Given how shoestring and close he cut his logistics at times, even one or two Italian freighters that get a new lease on life could see thousands, possibly tens of thousands of tons of supplies get to North Africa that couldn't be moved OTL due to lack of shipping, or that got sunk along the way. An extra brigade or so in Malaya isn't gonna matter much if Rommel at some point has enough supplies to keep fighting that one extra day or hold better against a British attack an extra day and end up wrecking one or two British/Commonwealth formatioms that OTL faired better.

Keeping the four Rainbow class submarines in the Far East is an ask! The sea war in the Med was all about attacking or defending the lines of communications, and submarines were a big part of that. Their losses were horrendous, the submarine arms of both the Royal Navy and the Regia Marina suffered badly, the Royal Navy building program barely kept pace with their losses. Both the British and Italian ASW defences proved effective, in part this was because many submarines weren't ideal for the shallower waters of the Med, all the Far East boats of the Odin, Parthian and Rainbow classes as well as the newly built T class were too big for the Med. Ideally Britain wouldn't have sent any of them, but needs must, and holding four boats back is the best I can argue.

Even if short term these reinforcements save Singapore, a bigger or worse then OTL defeat closer to home, or possibly an OTL British victory that becomes a defeat ITTL could negate earlier successes in the Far East if the British lack the resources to capitalize.

Well historically the disastrous campaign in the Far East cost the British dear in North Africa. Just think of all those reinforcements sent, that could have made a big difference at Gazala in May 1942.
 
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