Nimitz lets the Japanese have Midway

Grey Wolf

Donor
What if instead of setting his own trap for the Japanese, the choice of Nimitz is to not fall into THEIR trap by staying away from the island. The Japanese send out all their battle groups, and take the island... but there is no battle.

What happens next?
 
It is next to impossible for the Japanese to keep supplied and becomes a training range with live targets for US air crews.
 
No need to waste ammo, it does not grow on trees.

Just leave the Japanese rot on Midway until the end of the war, this atoll is of very little use for the US.
 
The Japanese gain a useless island that they have a very hard time supplying and is constantly harassed by the US fleet in one way or another. It isn't as bad as OTL for them but it is a definite negative.
 
The Japanese force had more than enough firepower to overwhelm Midway garrison so they wouldn't be repelled easily, but the fate of the atoll aside, avoiding the complete destruction of two carrier divisions is certainly going to play in Japan's favor. Port Moresby might fall after all.

That said, I don't think the Americans would just let the Japanese fleet go. That just seems... implausible to me. Even if they decides not to play the game with Yamamoto, they'd at least make sure to cut him to bleed from somewhere. Submarines and bombers are perfect tools for that.
 
The 2 operations (Midway and Aleutian Island campaign) basically cost the IJN and therefore Japan a years worth of Fuel for the Navy

So assuming that Nimitz for whatever reason does not contest the island - perhaps believes that the Japanese are sending 5 carriers - Zuikaku was still operational but did not have a complete airgroup* but perhaps USN intel thinks it has formed a composite airgroup

Nimitz decides that 5 verse 2 + damaged Yorktown is not good odds and decides the abandon the island - retreating 500 odd miles South East

*Japanese Doctrine had airgroups as a part of the ships company rather than separate Squadrons that could be added and taken away etc like with British and US carriers - so while Shokakus air group was relatively unscathed - it was part of Shokakus crew!

So 1st and 2nd carrier groups bomb the hell out of Midway for 2 days before being obliged to withdraw to refuel

The 7th Cruiser Squadron shells the island but despite the bombardment the 1st landing does not go well with several ships including a destroyer damaged by coastal guns and the 1st wave of assaulting troops are murdered in the surf in a repeat of Wake writ large.

The Landing ships retire in order to regroup and ask for 7th Crusier to repeat the bombardment

However while each cruiser carries over 2200 shells for their main guns over half of them are SAP rounds intended for ship to ship combat and virtually every single HE round (just shy of 4000 odd) was expended on the first day and so are unable to oblige and with at least some of the heavier shore guns still operational Kurita is loath to send in destroyers to conduct bombardment within range of said shore guns.

But with no other alternative Kurita orders the landing force to make another attempt on the morning of the 10th

On the evening of the 9th just as the troop ships were regrouping and forming up in order to return to the island for a second attempt the USS Tambor puts a spread of 6 and then 4 torpedos into the transports sinking Azuma Maru with heavy loss of life and damaging Toa Maru No. 2 Go - 2 other transports collide in the subsequent confusion.

The Tambor goes deep and slinks off fearing a counter attack and does not report in until sun down on the 10th for this and the relative 'timidity' of his actions her captain Lt.Cdr. Murphy is relieved of command when Tambor returns to Pearl Harbor for repairs after a B17 bombs her on the 12th damaging her periscope and other systems (this happened OTL)

Thinking that several US Submarines are loose among his transports their commander Admiral Tanaka orders the fleet to scatter and the 2nd attempt is effectively ended before it had begun.

With fuel reserves running low and Nimitz obviously not biting Yamamoto reluctantly orders the invasion to be called off and for units to return to their bases.
 
So 1st and 2nd carrier groups bomb the hell out of Midway for 2 days before being obliged to withdraw to refuel

The 7th Cruiser Squadron shells the island but despite the bombardment the 1st landing does not go well with several ships including a destroyer damaged by coastal guns and the 1st wave of assaulting troops are murdered in the surf in a repeat of Wake writ large.

The Landing ships retire in order to regroup and ask for 7th Crusier to repeat the bombardment

However while each cruiser carries over 2200 shells for their main guns over half of them are SAP rounds intended for ship to ship combat and virtually every single HE round (just shy of 4000 odd) was expended on the first day and so are unable to oblige and with at least some of the heavier shore guns still operational Kurita is loath to send in destroyers to conduct bombardment within range of said shore guns.

If it came down to such situation it wouldn't be pansy cruisers but battleships pounding the garrison.
 
You may want to investigate what the IJN doctrine for shore bombardment was in mid 1942 as well as the ammo loadouts for the BBs before making such a claim.
Indeed IJN Battleships did all of one shore bombardment during the entire war albeit the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal thwarted another two such attempts
 

RousseauX

Donor
The Japanese force had more than enough firepower to overwhelm Midway garrison so they wouldn't be repelled easily
Actually I'm not so sure about this part. The Pacific war showed that fortified Island positions are rarely neutralized by off-shore/air bombardments even when the volume of fire is much greater than what the Japanese had at midway. And the IJN have really really shit doctrine when it comes to fire support from naval forces. For one, their battleships aren't suppose to fire at land targets, only cruisers were suppose to do that which obviously limit firepower available. For another, the Japanese had no cooperation between landing forces and ships, and no mechanism for spotting/directing fire. Which means any bombardment will be very inaccurate. You can also look at Wake Island for how utterly diseasterous Japanese ampibious operations against even weak defense turned out to be.

So the tools the Japanese had for neutralizing MIdway's defenses were inaccurate cruiser cannons and Kido Butai's light bombers. The problem is that neither are really very good at deivering firepower: the Japanese air attack on the morning of June 4th failed to knock out the island's defenses and took something close to 25% attrition rate.

As for the assault itself, there's also a reef in front of midway that the Japanese landing force had to go through which meant the Japanese infantry had to land very far from the beach and then wade through neck deep water to get to the island: while under intense USMC defensive fire. In theory the Japanese could get around it, bu the Japanese military of the era was not good at improvising and most likely would have just tried to attack through the reef.

The Japanese brought along a single wave of infantry and if they die that's it. It's actually pretty likely the end result was going to be a farce: the Japanese landing force is destroyed, the mighty Kido Butai sits offshore venting anger at the marines on the island but eventually has to withdraw due to fuel shortages. Instead of the USN bomber pilots being the legends of Midway it will be the marines on the island.
 
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Actually I'm not so sure about this part. The Pacific war showed that fortified Island positions are rarely neutralized by off-shore/air bombardments even when the volume of fire is much greater than what the Japanese had at midway. And the IJN have really really shit doctrine when it comes to fire support from naval forces. For one, their battleships aren't suppose to fire at land targets, only cruisers were suppose to do that which obviously limit firepower available. For another, the Japanese had no cooperation between landing forces and ships, and no mechanism for spotting/directing fire. Which means any bombardment will be very inaccurate. You can also look at Wake Island for how utterly diseasterous Japanese ampibious operations against even weak defense turned out to be.

So the tools the Japanese had for neutralizing MIdway's defenses were inaccurate cruiser cannons and Kido Butai's light bombers. The problem is that neither are really very good at deivering firepower: the Japanese air attack on the morning of June 4th failed to knock out the island's defenses and took something close to 25% attrition rate. There's also a reef in front of midway that the Japanese landing force had to go through which meant the Japanese infantry had to land very far from the beach and then wade through neck deep water to get to the island: while under intense USMC defensive fire. In theory the Japanese could get around it, bu the Japanese military of the era was not good at improvising and most likely would have just tried to attack through the reef.

The Japanese brought along a single wave of infantry and if they die that's it. It's actually pretty likely the end result was going to be a farce: the Japanese landing force is destroyed, the mighty Kido Butai sits offshore venting anger at the marines on the island but eventually has to withdraw due to fuel shortages. Instead of the USN bomber pilots being the legends of Midway it will be the marines on the island.

Assuming Nimitz doesn't attack at this point, - Carriers South of Midway? - with the infantry slaughtered and the transport ships and supporting ships in a small area and known location. Turn up, hammer these guys and anything else in the area that looks good with one big strike from the carriers available and then head back to Pearl at top speed with whatever is left of his air groups.

The Japanese Army would be incandescent with rage at the Navy failure to support them properly, the IJN would be insulting them back claiming army failure, the transport ships - cruisers, oilers? - sunk would be a serious loss and a big drain on Japans fuel stockpiles for no other return.

Yamamoto might be handed a knife and told 'you can use the garden'.
 

Geon

Donor
On the other hand, assuming Nimitz doesn't go all in at Midway that may protect the USN carriers. And likely Midway is able to deal with the invasion attempt, as indicated elsewhere picture a Tarawa in reverse. But honestly, even with FDR's support I suspect Nimitz will be in a lot of political trouble. There will be those demanding that a real "fightin' Admiral be put in charge of the Pacific Fleet to strike back finally and decisively at the IJN. And all Nimitz has done here is put off the confrontation until Guadalcanal. Where,in OTL the naval battles were as bloody as the land battle. I have to wonder how much more bloody it will be if Nimitz decides to "skip" Midway. Guadalcanal then becomes the naval battle he can't avoid.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
If it came down to such situation it wouldn't be pansy cruisers but battleships pounding the garrison.
The Japanese battleships carried a negligible amount of bombardment shells. They were hunting bear, not out to shoot skeet. AP shells are just about useless in a bombardment role.
 
One option, if it's decided not to fight: Evacuate the island. Leave booby traps everywhere, and big placards with insults to Japan and the emperor. (Americans being Americans--and Marines being Marines, that won't even take any orders.)

Now the island has to be garrisoned, and perhaps retaken.
 
My impression from the OP is that Midway is evacuated. In that case, the Japanese may be asking why the Americans abandoned their outpost.

If Midway is not evacuated is the garrison still reinforced like OTL? Would the reinforcements be sent if the island was to be abandoned?

Say Japan takes Midway. Does the US still invade Guadalcanal? That gives the potential for a big carrier battle near the Solomons, one that could go badly for the USN.
 
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