Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War

Well that is fascinating! Both India and Pakistan in the Western camp. How does that relationship work? It's hard to imagine the two countries reconciling, but if they have the same patron perhaps things won't be quite as tense as OTL.

The changes to the Non-Aligned Movement are likely also staggering. It's very young in the mid-'60s, and India's role was outsized (if that's possible where India's concerned.) Does the NAM have enough steam to proceed without India? Does India try to stay in the NAM and perhaps alter the organization's outlook, or are they drummed out?
 
Indonesia could pretend to lead NAM because India showed little interest in the movement even IOTL. I don't think much has changed here.
 
The TL is on hiatus at the moment, as unfortunately my laptop (as well as my textbooks, notebooks, headphones and iPod) were all stolen from me recently. At the moment I don't have a laptop computer so I won't be able to update the timeline until insurance replaces it.
 
Chapter 33: The Years of Lead and Petrol - The Maghreb (1960s)
The Years of Lead and Petrol: The Maghreb in the 1960s

Whilst Algeria remained under the authoritative rule of the French junta, the rest of the Maghreb underwent a number of changes in the 1960s which would define their role in the future of the region. Although the region would remain politically-dominated by pro-Western regimes, the economic situation in the Maghreb was more varied. As a general rule, the Eastern Maghreb (Tunisia and Libya) would become relatively wealthy from economic and political changes in the 1960s, whilst the Western Maghreb (Morocco and Mauritania) would remain comparatively impoverished.

In Tunisia and Libya economic development was spurred by interstate cooperation and the presence of a relatively high level of demand from Europe, as well as benefiting from instability in the core Middle East region. Libya discovered significant oil reserves in 1959 which allowed one of the region's poorest states to become arguably the wealthiest in the Greater Middle East area. Although the initial major oil field at Zaltan in Cyrenaica was discovered by Esso, the Petroleum Law of 1955 [113] (after it's amendment in 1963) forced foreign oil companies operating in Libya into a subservient role to the National Petroleum Company, which merged in the 1960s with Tunisian interests into PetroTuLib [114]. Despite grumblings from the West regarding these pseudo-nationalisations, no action was taken due to King Idris' positive relations with the West, particularly the United Kingdom and United States, both of which maintained military bases within the country, the most significant of which is Mellaha Field near Tripoli [115]. Idris also made efforts to improve Libya's political coherence. What had once been three separate areas (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan) had been united under his rule into a united Libyan Kingdom in 1949, but in 1963 the constitution was revised an a unitary state established. In the later parts of the 1960s, King Idris' health began to falter and the Crown Prince Hasan as-Senussi became de facto ruler of Libya. Regionalism was partially weakened during Idris' reign by the establishment of a new capital at El Beida. Whilst it was geographically-positioned within Cyrenaica, close to Idris' traditional powerbase, it was symbolic of national unity, having not been a historic capital of any of the regions.

In Tunisia, political life was virtually entirely controlled by Habib Bourguiba and his Neo Destour party. Bourguiba promoted economic and social stability, suppressing Islamic fundamentalism and promoting social equality for the sexes. Bourguiba put little emphasis on military matters, believing that Tunisia's small size and lack of obvious international enemies would ensure their status as an irrelevant military power in perpetuum, and that a powerful military apparatus would be more likely to interfere in domestic politics than secure the borders of the state. Bourguiba's only major opponent was Salah Ben Youssef, who took advantage of the popularity of pan-Arabist leader Nasser to embody himself as the main driver of pan-Arabism in Tunisia. Ben Youssef fled to Cairo in 1964, after an unsuccessful rally of 20,000 supporters in Tunis was dispersed by riot police. In 1964 the Neo Destour party rebranded itself as the Socialist Destour briefly, but reverted to the original name in 1968. With a new Minister of Planning, Ahmed Ben Salah, the party engaged in a number of socialist-style public works projects, the most successful of which was the construction of a petroleum refinery at Sfax. The project, under the vertically-integrated joint administration of PetroTuLib, made optimum use of the two nations' comparative advantages. Libya's abundance of natural resources and Tunisia's comparatively plentiful labour allowed the two states to make maximum profit out of their exports of refined petroleum to Southern Europe. The main customer of Eastern Maghreb petroleum was Italy, still benefiting from their post-WWII 'economic miracle' which drove the growth of secondary industry reliant on stable raw material supply. By the mid-1970s, Italy would account for 43% of refined petroleum exports. To put this in perspective, the second-largest consumer, France, accounted for 27% of Western Maghrebi refined petroleum supplied to the world market.

In Morocco, the 1960s was effectively ushered-in by the accession of King Hassan II to the throne on March 3, 1961. Hassan took a number of steps to solidify his power atop the executive branch of government, provoking considerable political unrest. His ruthless response to this unrest, which included torture and detention without trial, earned his rule the name of "the years of lead". In a new constitution written up in 1962, King Hassan established a bicameral parliament and guaranteed an independent judiciary. Nevertheless, often this judiciary was blatantly ignored by the executive, which maintained control over media organs within the country. In May 1963, the royalist coalition in parliament only barely won a plurality, experiencing an effective challenge from the Istiqlal party. As a result of the political upheaval resulting from the elections and their fallout, King Hassan took full control of the executive and legislative branches under a "state of exception" which lasted until 1970. Throughout much of the 1960s, Morocco experienced modest growth, but which fell well-short of growth targets set by government. Main focuses of economic efforts were tourism and modernisation of agriculture. From 1960-1964, $1.3 billion of investment was put into achieving a target growth rate of 6.2%. In reality growth only amounted to 3%. Nevertheless, the 1960s is often viewed as a period of relative stability in Morocco compared to the 1970s.

In Mauritania, independence was gained from France in 1960, ruled by President Moktar Ould Daddah, who had been installed by the French. In 1964 he established an official one-party system led by the People's Party of Mauritania (Parti du Peuple Mauritanien, PPM), claiming that Mauritania was unready for multi-party democracy. Upon independence, Mauritania saw an influx of sub-Saharan peoples, primarily from Senegal. These sub-Saharan people would see conflict with the Arabo-Berber Beidane peoples who dominated Mauritania and the Haratin ("Black Moors"), Arabized people of sub-Saharan origin who formed the lower castes of Mauritanian society, against the new sub-Saharan incomers.

[113] The Petroleum Law of 1955 didn't deal with the state of foreign interests in OTL.
[114] PetroTuLib is not an OTL entity.
[115] OTL's Wheelus AFB. It was renamed 'Wheelus' after USAAF Lieut. Richard Wheelus who died in a plane crash in Iran in 1945 in OTL. His death is butterflied away ITTL.
 
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Glad to have you back! Great update
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Very glad to see this return! And as always, great to see a TL spend some time in under-explored parts of the world (AH-wise.)

Libya's certainly a country that could have a profoundly different destiny in an ATL, given their oil wealth. Very interested to see that explored!
 
Chapter 34a: South Arabian Disturbances - Arabia (1960s) (Part 1)
For information on Egypt, Sudan and Palestine in the 1950s: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-4#post-8638530
For information on the formation of the UAR, Lebanon and Iran in the 1950s: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-5#post-8715054

===

South Arabian Disturbances: North Yemen and the Free Arabian Republic (Part 1 of 2)


Throughout the 1960s the entire Arabian Peninsula was engulfed in a number of crises which significantly threatened Western influence within the region and claimed the lives of thousands. The chronology of these events often overlapped, as did the political forces in place within Yemen, Dhofar, Muscat and Saudi Arabia. Far from being merely local affairs, the crises pulled in the involvement of other Arab states, of Iran and the superpowers. Within the crises also lay the seeds for the gradual distancing of relations between the Arab nationalist movement and the forces of Soviet Communism.

Most dramatic and costly in human terms was the North Yemen Civil War and the UAR's attendant intervention. Yemen was one of the most backward countries in the region, deprived of oil wealth and with an archaic governmental system. The primary force holding the various tribes together was the figure of the ruler, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya, known by the chieftains of the country as "Ahmad the Devil". Imam Ahmad had defeated a serious challenge to his authority in 1955, bribing the forces of mutinous Colonel Ahmad Thalaya until they were severely understrength, leading the charge against the remainder with scimitar in hand, clad in a demon mask. As he aged though, the Mutawakkilite monarch's greatest enemy was his own health. In 1959, he travelled to Rome for medical treatment. In his absence, skirmishes broke out between various tribes. Imam Ahmad's son, Muhammad al-Badr, attempted to buy off tribal leaders with promises of reform and greater representation. Upon Ahmad's return, the elderly Imam exacted vengeance on the dissident chieftains. In retribution, an assassination attempt on Imam Ahmad was unsuccessfully carried out. As a result of his close shave with death and his old age, the Imam became increasingly withdrawn from the affairs of state, leaving them in the hands of his son. The transfer of power was finalised in September 1962, when the feared Imam passed away.

One of the first acts of al-Badr's rule was the one that ultimately sealed his fate. Upon accession, he appointed Col. Abdullah Sallal, a socialist and Nasserist, as commander of the palace guard. He felt secure in doing so because the Mutawakkilite Kingdom had entered into a confederation with the UAR. Despite this alliance, Nasser had been seeking regime change in Yemen since at least 1957. In 1962 he even have radio airtime, financial support and office space to the Free Yemen Movement.

In the event, there were a number of separate plots in various levels of preparation. After Sallal's overthrow of the monarchy, most of the conspirators joined the republican cause, notably the Hashid tribal confederation, which had sworn vengeance on the royal family for the execution of their paramount sheikh at the hands of Imam Ahmad.

On September 25, the distinctive sound of tank tracks could be heard in Sana'a as sympathetic officers to Sallal secured a number of strategic positions throughout the capital and started shelling the palace. Sallal himself wasn't initially party to the coup, which was led by Lieutenant Ali Abdul al Moghay. Moghay sent for Sallal and convinced him to join the coup, encouraging him to take the mantle of first President of the Yemen Arab Republic. On September 29, Egyptian General Ali Abdul Hameed arrived to assess the situation and the needs of the Yemeni Revolutionary Command Council to consolidate control. With General Hameed arrived a battalion of Saaqah (special forces), tasked with the job of ensuring the safety of Sallal. al-Badr had escaped disguised from the capital, arriving 15 days later at the Saudi border near Khobar where he took refuge under the patronage of the Saudi King Saud.

As a response to the instability on it's southwestern border, the Saudis redeployed troops to their border with Yemen. King Hussein of Jordan dispatched his Chief of Staff for discussions with al-Badr's uncle, the influential Prince Hassan. The newly-declared republic received diplomatic support from the United Arab Republic, the Republic of Italy, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the USSR. By contrast, the imamate was supported by the United Kingdom, the United States, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The Americans staged a number of shows of force in the skies over Saudi Arabia.

Whilst there was some fighting in 1962, the final part of that year was largely marked by the development of alliances between the alternative governments and the local tribes, as well as material preparations for the oncoming civil war. After significant diplomatic wrangling, the United States recognised the Yemen Arab Republic on December 19, 1963. A day later, the United Nations recognised the YAR. A week later, Sallal made a number of veiled threats to the Saudis, who held the disputed towns of Najran and Jizan. In early January 1963, the Egyptians bombed and strafed Najran. As a response, the United States sent a number of countermeasures to the town.

Whilst the West put diplomatic pressure on Nasser to withdraw his forces, he declared that the only circumstance under which his troops would be pulled out was if Saudi support to the royalists was halted. The United States hoped to convince the Saudis to cut their supply to al-Badr's forces in exchange for American guarantees of security. With this aim, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker arrived in Riyadh with this offer, which was initially rejected by Crown Prince Faisal. Eventually, however, Faisal agreed, and Bunker met with Nasser in Beirut, where the President agreed that if the Saudis kept their word, he would withdraw his forces.

Meanwhile, the United Nations sought to create a peacekeeping force to ensure Saudi acquiescence with demands to stop supply. This force, the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was formed by Major-General Carl von Horn, a former commander of the UN mission in the Congo. UNYOM called for the establishment of a demilitarised zone 20km deep on either side of the Saudi-Yemen border and the stationing of observers within the zone to prevent Saudi supply of the rebels. On April 30, he was sent to determine what kind of resources were necessary to achieve the mission. A few days later he met UAR Vice President Abdel Hakim Amer in Cairo and found that, despite their reassurances, that the Egyptians had no intention of withdrawing from Yemen. By June, von Horn resigned, having failed his objectives. UNYOM only lasted itself until September 4, 1964, when the UN admitted failure and withdrew the peacekeeping mission.

The UN's concern had been increased by the large-scale Ramadan Offensive beginning on February 1963. In the lead-up to the offensive, Amer had successfully requested that Cairo double the 20,000-man expeditionary force in Yemen. By early February the first 5,000 of those reinforcements had arrived. On the 18th, 15 tanks, 20 armoured cars, 18 trucks and numerous jeeps moved from Sana'a north to Sadah, followed by garrison troops. Days later, another task force struck from Sadah southeast towards Marib. They maneuvered into the Rub al-Khali and were supplied by airlift. The UAR forces captured the city on the 25th. The same force took Harib on March 7. The only resistance they encountered was attack from a force of 1,500 royalists who had travelled from Najran, but who were unable to inflict damage on the hard targets and were easily brushed aside. The only relatively effective combat response from the royalists was at the Battle of El Argoup 25 miles to the southeast of Sana'a. 500 royalists commanded by Prince Abdullah attacked an Egyptian position on the summit of a sheer-sided hill, fortified with six Soviet-made T-54s, a dozen armoured cars and a number of machine gun emplacements. The royalists were armed with rifles, a single mortar with 20 rounds, and a bazooka with four rounds. The battle lasted a week and cost the Egyptians 3 tanks, 7 armoured cars and 160 dead. Nevertheless, their successful defence (despite losses) and their advances on other parts of the front allowed them to interdict royalist movement of supplies in the mountains north and east of Sana'a. In April the royalists held a conference with Faisal in Riyadh, where it was decided that camel caravans would be used instead of trucks to move supplies. More effective smuggling of materiel allowed the royalists to start bouncing back from the Ramadan Campaign.

The royalists had relatively little time to lick their wounds. Another Egyptian campaign was mounted on June 12, known as the 'Haradh Offensive'. In this offensive, 4,000 Egyptian infantry, supported by units of the Yemeni army and mercenaries recruited in Aden attacked royalist-held Beit Adaqah, 30 miles west of Sana'a. The attacking force advanced 12 miles in two days, before being repelled by a royalist counterattack. The UAR forces then attacked Sudah, using the unpopularity of the local royalist commander to bribe local sheikhs, thus allowing the republican forces to take the town unopposed. Few incidents better illustrate the fickleness of political accomodations in the North Yemen Civil War than the episode a month later, where the same sheikhs sent apologies to al-Badr and requested guns and money with which to fight the Egyptians. al-Badr agreed, putting the surrounds of Sudah under nominal royalist control. However, the sheikhs refused to engage in combat with the republican garrison, leaving Sudah under republican control for the duration of the fighting.

The substantive part of the Haradh Campaign came on August 15, when 1,000 UAR troops, supported by twice as many Yemeni troops, launched an offensive from the major northwestern base in Haradh to cut the 30-mile track south through the mountains from the Saudi border at Khoubah to al-Badr's headquarters in the Qara mountains near Washa. According to the plans, the force would then split in two, with one thrust through Washa, the other branch travelling northeast along the track to seal the Saudi border below the Razih mountains. The main column of troops moved along the Haradh and Tashar ravines. As the republican forces travelled through the ravines, the royalists attempted to take advantage of their lack of maneuverability by directing simultaneous counterattacks into each valley, with al-Badr taking personal command of the Tashar ravine forces, whilst Prince Abdullah Hussein attacked into the Haradh ravine. The Egyptian forces managed to bleed the royalists for their rather limited advance, and were assisted by the arrival of tribal forces and Egyptian reinforcements which had been driving from Sadah southwest below the Razih mountains to link up with the Haradh force. Further, the republican forces were assisted by their airpower, with Egyptian airplanes engaging in strafing runs on armed trucks which had come to bolster the royalist attacks. The arrival of the Egyptian reinforcements allowed the republicans to seal the Haradh ravine and destroy the royalist attack in that sector, capturing Prince Hussein. Meanwhile, the royalist forces in the Tashar ravine withdrew upon receiving communications from their comrades in the neighbouring ravine[116].

The aftermath of the Haradh Campaign saw the breakdown of negotiations at the Alexandria Summit of September 1964. The Egyptians resumed their bombing of royalist positions in November, violating a ceasefire agreement that had been adopted in October. But the final death knell to the royalist cause was the overthrow of Faisal, who had become king after his father's death in November 1964. The impact of the drying-up of Saudi support was immediately apparent. December 1964 saw an Egyptian drive into the Razih Mountains, where they spent the next three months flushing out royalist tribesmen in the region. A number of small-scale abortive attempts to cut Egyptian supply lines make it painfully obvious that the royalists were running low on key supplies, particularly ammunition. The Nahm tribe of the Wadi Humaidat were particularly useful in providing local knowledge on the area[117]. The Egyptians followed these successes up with a drive towards Najran and Jizan to seize the towns and return them to Yemeni administration.

By this point the UAR's activities in Yemen were eclipsed by the developing Arabian crisis. Encouraged by Nasser, the Free Princes and sympathetic army officers seized Saudi army bases, airfields and the capital Riyadh. Shockwaves rippled through the region and as far as Washington D.C., where panic spread about the overthrow of their most close-knit ally in the Middle East and the threat the new regime posed to American oil imports. The powers within the region scrambled. Concerned at their ability to provide security for the region, the British provided independence to the Trucial Emirates, of which Bahrain and Qatar opted for complete independence, whilst the remaining emirates formed a confederation known as the United Arab Emirates. Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE formed a collective security agreement with Iran, known as the Gulf Cooperative Security Community (GCSC). Bahrain abstained from joining due to concerns over Iran's claim of the country as their rightful territory. Whilst the Americans began to mobilise forces to intervene, Iranian troops landed on Bahrain, occupying the island nation under the pretext of protecting it from potential overthrow by unspecified Nasserist elements. This created an uproar with the Sunni Arab states of the Gulf, who criticised the Iranian action as a blatant land grab. This internal conflict in the Gulf created uncertainty in the United States itself as to where land forces should be based, as well as whether or not the United States should criticise Iran's occupation of Bahrain. By late December 1954, when a decision was made that an American force based in Kuwait would move into the country overland whilst supporting an Iranian amphibious invasion at Dammam, the Free Princes had full control of the situation within the country. The leader of the movement, Talal bin Abdulaziz al Saud, had declared the Free Arabian Republic (FAR) and had become the country's first President.

Whilst the Soviet Union initially opposed Nasser's meddling in Saudi Arabia as a potential provocation to 'reactionary' forces. Nevertheless, when American ships turned up in the Gulf, the Soviet leadership saw it necessary to respond to US military aggression. Paratroopers and GRU operatives were sent to Riyadh, Tabouk and around (but not in) Mecca as a defensive measure. These forces were placed around key places in order to ensure the continued operation of the Free Arabian government. As American tanks rolled into the Al'Ahsa and Iranian infantry stormed Dammam, Khrushchev announced that "any attack on or attempt to disarm Soviet forces will be considered an act of war and be met with massive retaliation". Hawks within the American camp pointed out the absurdity of the invasion if American forces cannot seize the key infrastructure occupied by Soviet forces. They suggested that the United States should call the Russian bluff and disarm Soviet troops in Arabia and engage them if they resist violently. By contrast, the doves suggested that American forces should withdraw from the country, engage the new Arabian regime and the UAR diplomatically, and strengthen the GCSC and other pro-Western forces in the region.

[116] IOTL, the Egyptian forces got stuck due to heavy rain turning the ground into mud. They therefore experienced much greater losses ITTL, and they didn't capture Prince Hussein in OTL.

[117] IOTL the Nahm tribe backstabbed the Egyptians and attacked their supply lines. ITTL, with the collapse of the Saudi royal regime and the resultant swing in the balance of power, the Nahm don't dare.
 
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wow, the United States is doing all the possible mistakes in the Yemeni and Saudi crisis, I wonder how the situation will affect the oil prices and will it push to an earlier development of clean energy.
 
Chapter 34b: A Close Call - Arabia (1960s) (Part 2)
Arabian Disturbances: The Arabian Crisis (Part 2 of 3)

The situation within the borders of what had been Saudi Arabia grew increasingly tense as American forces encircled Riyadh, poised to attack the city and overrun the lightly-armed but highly-trained Soviet defenders. But like so many other times during the Cold War, the spectre of nuclear annihilation hung over the heads of both sides. American forces halted outside the city limits as Soviet and American officials engaged in frantic diplomacy to disengage themselves from the threatening situation.

As the Soviet and American leaders discussed the situation in the Middle East, the situation further complicated. In February 1955, UAR troops began to concentrate near the Kuwaiti border with Iraq, alarming the GCSC and triggering Iranian mobilisation in preparation for a regional total war with Nasser. A month later, UAR troops, utilising the announcement of Prince Talal that the FAR wanted to confederate with the UAR as a pretext, poured into Arabia from the north, spearheaded by a vanguard of T-55 tanks. Nasser's provocations enraged Khrushchev, who sent him strongly-worded messages that his actions threatened not only his own revolution, but that of the socialist states worldwide. The Americans, suspecting that the UAR had coordinated with the Soviets to attack their forces unprepared and start WWIII, placed their forces on DEFCON 2. Trigger fingers at Strategic Air Command became increasingly twitchy, which was exacerbated by phantom blips at NORAD, which on March 13th appeared to show a single ICBM heading across the Pacific Ocean towards the United States. This was ignored by the officer on duty at the US early-warning command centre, Stanley Peters, who saw it as unlikely that the Soviets would attack with a single missile, and noting the international tensions, thought it better not to inform his superiors. He was later reprimanded for his actions and court-marshalled, although a presidential pardon absolved him of punishment. But the closest shave came on March 21st, when a skirmish broke out between a platoon of American troops and Soviet GRU defenders.

"Now listen here boys!" Lt. Stevens barked in his gruff Midwestern accent. "Ivan is holed up in those buildings over there, and he thinks we're just gonna sit here and do nothing. Is that what we enlisted to do, gentlemen?" The men responded with unenthused grumbles. "No, Lieutenant". "What did you all sign up for then?". The GIs had been under Stevens' command long enough to know the right answer. "To kill commies, Lieutenant". "I can't hear you!". "To kill commies, Lieutenant!". "Now that's what I like to hear. Now we're going to go over there and give those godless pinkos a good kick up the rear!". "Sir! What did command tell us?". "Don't you worry about command, that's my job". Many of the men didn't look particularly comforted by that answer, but they also knew not to defy orders. "Let's move out, boys!"

Ryadovóy (Private) Alexei Kuznetsov peered through the scope of his brand-new Dragunov sniper rifle, when he saw troops jogging towards cover in the direction of their position. "Starshiná (Master Sergeant)! Amerikanskiy soldaty!" the other soldiers rushed over and looked for themselves. Their commanding officer, Starshiná Gennady Bogatyryov, ordered the rest of the troops to prepare to defend the two-storey building they occupied. It had been a small grocery store before the occupants of this suburb had been evacuated towards the city centre. The Soviets had about the same amount of troops as the Americans making their way towards their position. Downstairs the Yefréytor (Corporal) Bulat Aitmukhambetov, a stocky Kazakh son-of-a-herdsman deployed his PK light machine-gun behind the counter, facing the single entrance through which any attacker would have to enter, and which also had a decent view of the long street. He lined up in his sights one of the Americans, a sitting duck jogging towards their position with rifle in hand. One thing he mentally noted is that these troops seemed either very poorly-trained or poorly-led. They were running down an open street. Yet the Soviet troops were under command from their CO not to engage until they were fired upon. Kuznetsov watched as the American troops in the street dragged a heavy trash bin into the middle of the street, between two sets of white concrete balusters. The balusters themselves looked flimsy, and as the Americans hid behind them he was mystified. Ryadovóy Kadyr Dudayev, a Chechyn, laughed at the ridiculous spectacle. His laughter was interrupted by the explosion of a grenade launched by an American soldier from his M79. The grenade detonated outside of the door to the shop, doing no harm. Immediately the Soviets opened fire. Kuznetsov downed one of the Americans, a Negro, who was running across the street when he put a bullet through his shoulder. Kuznetsov let the wounded man agonisingly crawl to relative safety behind the balusters. Three Americans tried to rush the position at a wide spread, but dived to cover when Dudayev sprayed fire from his Kalashnikov assault rifle to deter them. Three more Americans hiding behind the bin were floored by fire from Aitmukhambetov's LMG, whose rounds pierced straight through the pig-iron bin. Two of them writhed in pain, whilst the third's slumped body lay still as blood poured out of his cratered skull. In Kuznetsov's scope he caught the sight of what looked like the American commanding officer, barking in a rather bellicose manner. Kuznetsov lined up his head with his crosshair, pulled the trigger and the officer fell silent. Moments later, another Soviet platoon, drawn by the sound of gunfire, charged through an alley on the Americans' right flank, one of the soldiers shouting at them in English to lay down their weapons. The demoralised and outmatched Americans surrendered immediately. Bogatyryov got on the radio to command immediately.

Despite the palpable tension following this incident, the Arabian Crisis was eventually deescalated by an agreement between the Soviets and the Americans that US and Iranian troops would withdrawal from the UAR, as would Soviet forces there. The Soviets returned the captured Americans to the United States, whilst the Americans apologised privately about the incident, assuring the Russians that Lieutenant Stevens had acted illegally, without the permission of higher command. This negatively impacted the prestige of the US military, but more importantly, WWIII was averted. The American leadership grumbled when the Soviet troops involved were awarded Hero of the Soviet Union distinctions, but could say little given the circumstances.

Of oft-forgotten significance is the marked shift in the Soviet-UAR relationship after the Arabian Crisis. Whilst they had initially been close allies, the pace of revolutionary success in the Middle East increased global tensions due to the speed with which the balance of power was perceived as being eroded, by the West in particular, which started to adopt something of a siege mentality regarding the expansion of Soviet allies. The Soviets were aware of this, and tended to try and discourage Nasser from engaging in some of his more provocative moves. This was interpreted by Nasser as being selective with their support of the Arab Nationalist cause, as well as being paternalistic and condescending. The Arabian Crisis was the first of a few events of the 1960s that pushed the UAR from being Soviet-aligned to being truly non-aligned, and a key regional power in it's own right.

===

NOTE: I actually made a mistake on the last post stating that it was Part 1 of 2. In fact, there are three parts to the section on 1960s Arabia.
 
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A little sneak peak regarding the next update. This map is of the Middle East at the beginning of 1970.

Orange represents parts of the UAR prior to the constitutional restructuring of the federation.

Red represents Soviet allies/Socialist states.

Blue represents Western-oriented/allied states.

1970 Middle East map.png
 
A little sneak peak regarding the next update. This map is of the Middle East at the beginning of 1970.

Orange represents parts of the UAR prior to the constitutional restructuring of the federation.

Red represents Soviet allies/Socialist states.

Blue represents Western-oriented/allied states.

How's the UAR holding onto Socotra?
 
The Shia-Sunni relations in the UAR are probably going to be rocky at best, I think it will be wise for Iran to flare up disorder in the Shiite majority regions.
 
The Shia-Sunni relations in the UAR are probably going to be rocky at best, I think it will be wise for Iran to flare up disorder in the Shiite majority regions.

Why? If the UAR is sincere about Arab nationalism, Shia and Sunni will be united by a common cause.

Applying the same importance to the Sunni-Shi'a divide as exists at the moment to a TL like this is anachronistic. The extreme power of that divide is a result of a number of more recent events, including the rise of clerical government in Iran and the destabilisation of Iraq post-Saddam.

ITTL it is less important. That being said, it is something that will have to be dealt with by regional governments, which is going to be part of the rationale for the changes to the administrative structure of the UAR which is going to take place in 1970.
 
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