Assume for a moment the Japanese still decide to go to war in the OTL timeframe, and with approximately OTL resources and forces available. Given TTL greater success of the FAA, and presumably a bigger and more carrier orientated Force Z, wouldn’t the Japanese give more priority to attacking Singapore and Force Z in the opening phases? IIRC, Singapore was attacked via ground based aircraft based in French Indochina, but they weren’t very effective. Could a more dangerous looking Force Z pull in more Japanese forces, perhaps a carrier or two? Even at the expense of other operations such as Pearl Harbour?
The Whale has Wings
- Thread starter Astrodragon
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That would be my thinking, the FAA has shown that it can hold it's own against land based airpower of the sort that they had in Indochina. They can either as you say, divert resources from the PH raid which in turn reduces the amount of damage they can inflict or they can forego PH and send the Kido Butai south where it would likely overwhelm Force Z. Either way there will be big implications for the Pacific War.
Garrison
Donor
I think the IJN still has to regard the US Pacific fleet as its primary enemy, and the PH attack is unlikely to be abandoned or scaled down given it's essentially a one off opportunity. Bear in mind they couldn't know for certain that Germany would declare war on the US so they would have been aware of the possibility that they would face the entire might of the US alone, so I don't think a couple of extra RN carriers in the Pacific would change their calculation about Pearl Harbour
As far as Singapore goes its going to be affected by whether the Germans captured those documents that revealed how poor it's defences were. A stronger Force Z and no clear intel might result in Singapore being postponed until a later date when other perhaps more vital objectives have been secured.
Singapore is not defensible in the longer term no matter what defences it has unless one of either two requirement can be met:
- Overland supply chain from Burma/India, which would require Burma to be held and a fair chunk of Thailand/Siam to be taken
- Sumatra is held or at least control of the air remains disputed, depending on where the channel in the Malacca straight is, ships could remain within Artillery Range of the Sumatra side for a considerable distance.
- Overland supply chain from Burma/India, which would require Burma to be held and a fair chunk of Thailand/Siam to be taken
- Sumatra is held or at least control of the air remains disputed, depending on where the channel in the Malacca straight is, ships could remain within Artillery Range of the Sumatra side for a considerable distance.
The problem really was that Japan was only geared for a short war, even more so than any of the Great Powers in 1914 - Germany at least had the scientific capability to address its resource shortages by inventing synthetic substitutes for the most part. (Had it been a fully petro-based economy, OTOH...)
All this was dictated by its industrial infrastructure vis-a-vis the Allies and its lack of natural resources, but it's astounding how the Japanese aggravated that by such poor planning when it came to training critical personnel.
Can't argue your point that fixing these things would allow them to field a competitive air presence for longer. In the end, however,they would have been swamped by far greater quantity and, increasingly, simply better fighter models.
But Japan in 1941 really was in a cleft stick, and it was put in that stick by the nuts running the Kwangtung Army. It was left with two disastrous options - pulling out of Indochina and much of China, or be crippled by lack of critical resources within 12-18 months. Possibly they could have gone after the Dutch East Indies alone, which would have supplied much of those needs, and hoped that the U.S. would not go to war to save an (unusually oppressive) European colony. But I think even that's a risky longshot.
If I'm Yamamoto and I'm handed a fait accompli decision to go to war, I suppose I'd try to play out my string by requiring Nagumo to include the tank farms and dry docks in the PH attack (regardless of cost), and institute rotations of air and ground crew for better training - and while I'm at it, convert as much naval construction to flight decks as I can manage. But that probably only buys Japan another year or so at best. Astrodragon's timeline here really drives home just how lucky the Japanese were as it is. If you had told Yamamoto of late 1941 where Japan would be in OTL in May 1942, I think he'd be pinching himself in disbelief.
Hyperion
Banned
Hitting those targets would either mean a third wave, which was a logistical problem to say the least.
The idea of better pilot training, OTOH, isn't something that would be completely out of the question. The big problem is that I wouldn't see the entire Japanese pilot training program changing overnight, but for all their faults the Japanese Navy at least wasn't completely stupid.
The idea of individual officers taking more initiative to improve the bottleneck of pilot training might be worth looking at.
Garrison
Donor
To win in the Pacific requires a totally different Japan; maybe one that meant it with all that rhetoric about 'Asia for the Asians' and with the 'Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere' being an actual trade/political bloc instead of just being a glib slogan to cover being enslaved by Japan. Thus it becomes the leader of a movement with the Western powers firmly cast as the bad guys.
Like I say though, radically different Japan.
Like I say though, radically different Japan.
Ah but I don't think they can win, what they can do is delay the inevitable some, or change the dynamics of the later part of the war.
While that makes sense it sounds like the idea that the Nazis could have conquered the USSR if they'd portrayed themselves as liberators from Bolshevism. The strategy would probably work but it would require such a dramatic change in the character of Nazism for it to work that it wouldn't be Nazism as we know it and they may not even have been as aggressively expansionist meaning they wouldn't have gone to war in the first place.
Garrison
Donor
While that makes sense it sounds like the idea that the Nazis could have conquered the USSR if they'd portrayed themselves as liberators from Bolshevism. The strategy would probably work but it would require such a dramatic change in the character of Nazism for it to work that it wouldn't be Nazism as we know it and they may not even have been as aggressively expansionist meaning they wouldn't have gone to war in the first place.
Or it would have been a war initiated by the west to put down those dangerous radicals, maybe as I saw suggested in a wiki article a heroic Japan revered in Asia for going down fighting foreign oppression. Of course such a TL is about as likely as the FAA adopting carrier based porcine aviation in this one.
Garrison
Donor
?I'm wondering what affect a larger Australian Aircraft Industry, & larger RAAF/RANFA will have in the opening days of the SEA Theater?
Well it might reduce invasion fears in Australia and they will be more willing to deploy troops to to the defence of other areas.
Maybe but I suspect their involvement in Tunis will be more significant.
Hello Hyperion,
Hitting those targets would either mean a third wave, which was a logistical problem to say the least.
That's right - the third wave that Fuchida urged.
It was doable, but risky. Japan was already at the outer edge of its logistical reach as it was. But Nagumo was more concerned about the risk of detection by American carriers, the risk of higher losses from alerted American defenses, and the probability that the planes of the third wave would be returning to the Kido Butai at or after dusk.
Nimitz has gone on record as saying that without the tank farms and docks, he'd have to relocate the fleet to San Diego for a while, and it would certainly have set back the war in the Pacific for six months to a year. It would have been worth the risk, and worth the possible cost.
The idea of better pilot training, OTOH, isn't something that would be completely out of the question. The big problem is that I wouldn't see the entire Japanese pilot training program changing overnight, but for all their faults the Japanese Navy at least wasn't completely stupid.
It's at least plausible.
It wouldn't change the ultimate outcome appreciably, but it could delay it.
Hitting those targets would either mean a third wave, which was a logistical problem to say the least.
That's right - the third wave that Fuchida urged.
It was doable, but risky. Japan was already at the outer edge of its logistical reach as it was. But Nagumo was more concerned about the risk of detection by American carriers, the risk of higher losses from alerted American defenses, and the probability that the planes of the third wave would be returning to the Kido Butai at or after dusk.
Nimitz has gone on record as saying that without the tank farms and docks, he'd have to relocate the fleet to San Diego for a while, and it would certainly have set back the war in the Pacific for six months to a year. It would have been worth the risk, and worth the possible cost.
The idea of better pilot training, OTOH, isn't something that would be completely out of the question. The big problem is that I wouldn't see the entire Japanese pilot training program changing overnight, but for all their faults the Japanese Navy at least wasn't completely stupid.
It's at least plausible.
It wouldn't change the ultimate outcome appreciably, but it could delay it.
Hyperion
Banned
Nagumo was a good admiral, but he was definitely not stupid. Cautious yes, stupid, no.
You are also taking 20/20 hindsight into the discussion, which isn't good.
Nagumo has achieved two successful strikes, done crippling damage to the US fleet and air defenses, and started the biggest war in history in the process.
Yet he also has no idea where the US carriers and their escorts are.
He has limited fuel and a number of his heavier bombs have already been expended. If he waits around even a short amount of time, he faces the real risk of having to abandon some of his support ships and destroyers due to running out of gas, not exactly a good thing given how many destroyers the IJN actually had in commission at the time.
He also knows that US defenses where becoming much more dangerous, and he had several dozen aircraft already that ended up being written off after landing. A third wave could see him loosing many more pilots and having to write off potentially dozens of returning aircraft. He'd basically be putting his carriers and their airwings out of action for at least a couple of months.
With this timeline, I'm also not taking into account the possibility of the US having better aircraft available which may or may not make a token difference, and I'm also not taking into account the possibility that local commanders in Hawaii, either Kimmel or Short, and/or some other senior officers, might not take other actions that would put Pearl Harbor in a better position to fight and defend against an attack.
Right, & still true in 1945. Even after Tokyo burned, IJA HQ wanted to invade SU.The Oncoming Storm said:
Agreed.The Oncoming Storm said:
I'd add a 6h option: recognizing aircrew are valuable, change a/c design to add armor & self-sealing tanks, & reduce losses.
They, like the attacks on tank farm or navy yard, really do require Japan to recognize it's going to be a long war, & that needs an enormous change in Japanese thinking. To get that, you've got to back a long way.
I think that's extremely likely. The difference it'll make at Pearl Harbor will be trivial.iopgod said:
As said, I disagree. The sinking of BBs versus damage makes no difference in the outcome; the BBs were too slow to work with CVs anyhow.The Oncoming Storm said:
Not going to happen. Given U.S-Brit relations, & given IJA-IJN politics, IJN will never give up attacking Pearl.The Oncoming Storm said:
Called off, never. Severely scaled back, maybe. It took pretty heavy lobbying to get all six fleet CVs for the mission; even in mid-'41, HQ wanted 3 for the Southern Op. Stronger FAA, stronger fleet at Singapore or in Oz, 6 for Hawaii becomes a non-starter.Garrison said:
"No clear intel"? Japan had been doing covert recce in the area for months before the war began.Garrison said:
Japan did make an effort to replace oil with synthetic fuel. Her capacity never approached the need. (IDK if that's because the effort was insufficient or because they just didn't know what they were doing...)Athelstane said:
In part because Japan's industry was, by appearances, incapable of building more a/c....Athelstane said:
I think that'd be their best option, seeing the isolationist mood & Congress' manifest unwillingness to go to war in the Atlantic in the face of much more pointed provocations by Germany.Athelstane said:
IJN would never have gone along, tho, as said: it'd mean IJA would get even more money, & it was already getting about 75% of the military budget...
At best, & it might make the fall faster, because it gives a false impression of Japan's ability to fight on. Logistics rule, & IJN didn't control her SLOCs.Athelstane said:
True. He also had to worry about leaving destroyers behind for lack of fuel...Athelstane said:
The major fleet units would've had to pull back; IMO, this could have forced a salutary change: pull the subs back to Hawaii. They could operate from Hawaii & Midway quite nicely. (Yes, they'd need fuel stockpiles replenished, but much less than even one CVTF.) Would this have been ideal for sub ops? No. Would it beat ops out of Perth, Brisbane, & Fremantle? Without question. Would it be bad news for Japan? Again, without question.Athelstane said:
That demands Yamamoto being able to persuade all the subordinate command officers of the need to do it... I don't see him able. IDK why he wasn't willing to push back harder...Athelstane said:
I'd have expected him to commit hara kiri in protest of a disastrous war. It seems he was loyal the Emperor, not the Empire: that is, he did what the Emperor demanded, even if it was ruinous for the Empire.Yep. And by the Diet & IJA HQ not reining them in before war started. And Hirohito actually wanting it this way, & hoping he could get away with it. (So Bix says, anyhow.) And, at bottom, by the Japanese system allowing it: if IJA didn't nominate an Army Minister, the government fell...Athelstane said:
That was the product of a couple of screwups. One, as I understand it, is the U.S. not making clear they were prepared to let Japan have Manchuria, just not metropolitan China. Two, hardliners at State being stupid & imposing a total oil embargo, when FDR had in mind something more limited (avgas & such). The idea was to avoid war in Asia/PTO, because war would divert resources from aiding Britain. (This is something the Pearl Harbor conspiracy loons can't grasp with both hands & a Commerce Department GDP statement.) They miscalculated. It bit them.Athelstane said:
On that, we entirely agree.The Oncoming Storm said:
It really isn't, because it wasn't in isolation. The problems were systemic before the war started, before WW1 AFAICT. There was a fundamental lack of grasp of the difference between tactical & strategic in the senior commands of IJA & IJN, & of the difference in war with a continental power like Russia in a limited theatre compared to a maritime power like Britain or the U.S. in the Pacific.Athelstane said:
Both right IMO. Japan would've needed to give the Chinese a deal, & given Japan's sense of racial superiority, I don't see it, any more than I see Hitler treating Russians as anything but subhuman.
There's some difference (Tojo wasn't a raving lunatic, for a start.
), so it might've been possible to agree to a deal with Chiang. IMO, Chiang would have agreed to one almost any time. (There are those on the site who disagree; my reading says he would.) By 1937, the (few) sane people in IJA HQ were seeing there was no end in sight (after war, more or less, constantly since 1931), & might've taken that option. If it happens, you've butterflied the Pacific War entire, because it was all about "settling the China question". That does need a U.S. that's less concerned about China, or opening the Chinese market to U.S. goods, hence less (or no) aid to China, & that seems to need more isolationism, more attention on Europe, or worse economic conditions in the U.S., possibly all three.That said, if Japan does start something with the U.S. or Britain, it's just a matter of time before Tokyo is a parking lot...
I'd tend to rule out either of them doing more, given the U.S. belief Japan couldn't execute two major naval ops at once. If more CVs are sent south, that's only going to be reinforced.Hyperion said:
Allowing for butterflies, tho, who says it's Kimmel? More important, who says it's Short? If it's not, & it's somebody who has a better relationship with Kimmel, or a better grasp of aviation, you may get even a few more LR patrol a/c in Hawaii...
That does run into MacArthur getting top priority for B-17s, & damn near everything else, because the U.S. expected the attack to be in the P.I.....
If you can get the U.S. off the dime earlier, get the buildup started sooner, by 12/41, you might have the 300 or so B-17s you'd need (or 300 or so PBYs & USN OK to patrol, contrary to the '31 Army-Navy deal on LR patrol, which gave responsibility to the Army...).
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All relevant considerations, to be sure. I didn't say Nagumo made an indefensible move.
But it wasn't hindsight, since there had been discussion of hitting the tank farms and dry docks throughout the planning. Genda had advocated it all along. And Yamamoto came to agree that it was worth trying in the end.
To put it more bluntly, I'd be willing to trade an entire carrier division for the price of driving the U.S. Pacific Fleet out of Hawaii for the balance of 1942 - even recognizing that Japan has a harder time replacing its carriers (and of course, pilots, planes, and service crews) than the U.S. does.
I still don't think that it would change the ultimate result of the war. But it could stretch it out.
I think that only striking the British is unlikely. Once the oil embargo is in place in July 41 the Japanese can only back down or conquer the DEI, which in their minds is no choice at all. If they conquer the DEI, then the Philippines lie as a choke point across their oil shipping lane. Therefore they need to occupy those as well, which means war with the US, and thus PH. It's a logical progression.
Regards
R
More A-bombs.
Wouldn't it be cheaper to go around? Taiwan straight?
I don't see how the US blocks DEI oil from reaching Japan, without declaring war. If Japan 'just' took French Indochina and Dutch East Indies, this is just the colonial arm of previous axis conquests. Hard for the US to make anything more than a colonial war of it. Congress doesn't seem inclined to declare any wars in the near future. Consolidate that and industrialise. Even giving up mainland China (not Manchuria, Vietnam and Korea) in order to keep Taiwan, Hainan and DEI would be so worth it. Japan could only (in theory) hold China while mobilised for war. It was unsustainable. Plenty of raw materials, oil and trade with the defensible (against all but a belligerent major power) fall back position. No need for a treaty with China as you would expect to fortify your land borders anyway.
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?I'm wondering what affect a larger Australian Aircraft Industry, & larger RAAF/RANFA will have in the opening days of the SEA Theater?
AD has the Free French taking Italian Eritrea. ?Anyone else see major butterflies from this?
I would think it could make a reasonable difference.
For one, the Australian and NZ governments are less likely to spook, which may have implications on decision making. I can't think of any big examples to raise
Another point may be that less men head west to Europe early in the war, to be equipped and made useful to the war, if the Australians can build good and useful combat planes. I know that most of the aircrew NZ contributed to the war effort headed to the UK early in the war to be equipped and fight. Here they may still head to Europe, but they might go as operational units
Sacrificing them without having the understanding it would be a long war would be lunatic, not just astronomically unlikely.Athelstane said:
Nobody in Japan believed the war would go so long, so any sacrifice to destroy targets with only long-range gains attached are low probability, & require serious changes at POD to achieve (or distant small-change POD...).- Status