"War Plan Red-Orange" in 1920's

[zoomar]

Presuming a situation in which Germany is able to "win" the Great War in 1914and early 1915 in a manner that defeats France and/or Russia but with a "white" armistice involving Britain. I'm interested in speculation regarding how this could have affected the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, British relations with the US, and US relations with Britain and Germany.

It seems to me that if the Great War ended early, US sentiment would not have crystalized as much against Germany. The German submarine campaign would not have had the effect on US attitudes that it did historically, and US negative attitudes toward Britain and her own blockade might have been stronger. As a result, the US might not see Britain in a more favorable light overall than Imperial Germany.

Britain, facing a powerful Germany that has defeated and weakened France and is dominant in Europe might value its alliance with Japan more and strengthen it.

The US, believing that a war with Japan is perhaps inevitable and recognizing the reality of a strengthened Anglo-Japanese alliance, might then begin serious planning (no junior officer stuff like WP Red) for a war against both Japan and Britain.

More than likely anything like the Washington Treaty is off the table, meaning that the US, Japan, and probably Britain and Germany will continue naval buildups and the US will fortify its Pacific bases...and possibly even base a substantial portion of the Pacific Fleet in Manila. Germany, although technically at peace with Britain, will be hostile toward Japan for the loss of Tsingtao and its other Pacific islands the Japanese would probably have taken anyway in 1914-14.

Given all his, I'd like to explore two general possibilities:

(1) If a war between the US and a Anglo-Japanese alliance broke out in, say 1920, how would the US wage a true two ocean war? What would be the likely US strategy against Japan and Britain? What would be the possibility for joint British/Japanese operations against US Pacific territories? Is it inevitable that the US would seek to invade Canada immediately, or - given the likelihood that the US army would be relatively small - would the US adopt a defensive posture on the US-Canadian border and seek to wage the war primarily as an economic naval campaign against the two island nations' home islands? Would the US attempt to "liberate" Ireland?

(2) What is the chance that the US would seek to involve Germany in the conflict against Britain and Japan...or that Germany herself might enter as a US ally to recover its Asian colonies and/or fight the RN on more even terms (assuming much of the RN would be deployed against the US).

Is this in any way shape or form a remotely plausible outcome of a world in which WW1 ends the way I speculate? I have my own ideas, but I'm interested in what others might think.

 

[CthulhuFhtagn]

It's highly unlikely that the US would get involved in a war against Britain and Japan on its own. A more probable scenario would involve the US joining the Central Powers in 1915-16.

The general American strategy for a naval war with Britain up until 1930 was completely defensive. The US government believed that it couldn't match the Royal Navy. There were to be no operations outside of North America at all. The entire plan revolved around capturing Canada and some islands in the Caribbean, which would force Britain to the negotiating table. For a war with Japan and Britain at the same time, I'd assume that American war strategy wouldn't be all that different. The Philippines and Guam would probably be abandoned, and the US would focus on defending Hawaii and the west coast.

 

[Zheng He]

This is very interesting but I swear, getting the US and Great Britain into a major scrap sometime between 1861 and 1940 has got to be the single favorite topic of this forum.

Do we need to a "Glossary of US-Great Britain Late 19th to Early 20th Century War Threads" like we have for the threads about the fin-footed, semi-aquatic marine mammal that shall not be named?

 

[CthulhuFhtagn]

This is very interesting but I swear, getting the US and Great Britain into a major scrap sometime between 1861 and 1940 has got to be the single favorite topic of this forum.

Do we need to a "Glossary of US-Great Britain Late 19th to Early 20th Century War Threads" like we have for the threads about the fin-footed, semi-aquatic marine mammal that shall not be named?

I think a lot of us into it because the irony of America turning around and crushing its former colonial master is just too perfect. Not to mention that it would probably be to naval warfare what the USSR vs. Nazi Germany was to land warfare.

Also, I'd be willing to bet that at least 70% of this site's members are from the US or the British Commonwealth.

 

[bsmart]

If WWI ended early would Germany have lost its Pacific and African colonies as it did OTL? Or would part of the treaty ending the war have returned some or all of them to the Kaiser? If so Germany would have seen an Anglo Japanese alliance as a threat to its colonies and might have looked to an alliance with the US to balance things out.

 

[usertron2020]

This was done as a discussion thread back in 2009 on spacebattles.com

It turned into a 20 page flame war between some small time american exceptionalists and some Big Time Sun Never Sets Britons. Thankfully, Alamo's enormous encyclopediac knowledge and the sheer logic of his points raised settled the matter eventually.

 

[zoomar]

Not to mention that it would probably be to naval warfare what the USSR vs. Nazi Germany was to land warfare.

Well, you pretty much nailed it on the head for me. This scenario is about the only way to create a global naval war in the 20th century involving roughly equal forces and get to see some of those cancelled 1920's superships built. Plus, an Atlantic war between the US and UK in the 20th century is so far removed from from the realm of our time line that the whole idea is fascinating.

Frankly, My belief is that Germany would be the minor player if it entered the war, and that its value to the US in an alliance would be mainly as a fleet-in-being to tie down a significant portion of the Royal Navy in the North Sea theatre (essentially creating the equivalent situation the US would face in a two ocean war against Japan and Britain). Although the HSF is large, the majority of its ships were designed for short sorties in the North Atlantic, not long deployments throughout the world like the RN and USN.

 

[zoomar]

This was done as a discussion thread back in 2009 on spacebattles.com

It turned into a 20 page flame war between some small time american exceptionalists and some Big Time Sun Never Sets Britons. Thankfully, Alamo's enormous encyclopediac knowledge and the sheer logic of his points raised settled the matter eventually.

Well, what did Alamo say?

 

[zoomar]

If WWI ended early would Germany have lost its Pacific and African colonies as it did OTL? Or would part of the treaty ending the war have returned some or all of them to the Kaiser? If so Germany would have seen an Anglo Japanese alliance as a threat to its colonies and might have looked to an alliance with the US to balance things out.

Unless memory fails me, didn't Japan seize Tsingtao and the German Pacific islands fairly early in the war? Frankly, if Germany was able to acheive most of its pre-war aims (weaken France and Russia and expand in the east somewhat at the expense of Russia) in this 1914-15 Great War scenario, I don't believe the return of lost colonies in Africa would be a sticking point...With the RN in place, Britain would be in a position to "just say no" to that and I doubt Germany would push the issue. Plus, Japan would certainly refuse to hand its conquests back. Twice before Europeans forced them to back down from conquests...this time they wouldn't and Britain would back them.

 

[Saphroneth]

I suspect the way it all breaks down is that the UK can't deploy and supply overseas ground forces on the scale required to materially harm the US, and the reverse is also true.
Canada is quickly occupied in large part (they're basically in the position of 1940 France - unlucky enough to be on the same landmass as the primary enemy belligerent), but impossible to completely garrison (it's just too big).


If this is before the Naval Treaty scrappings, then the UK has a fleet larger than the US one (I make it ~33 RN Dreadnoughts on strength - though I'm not sure how many were in Ordinary - as compared to 36 battleships total including PDNs for the US). If the WNT occurred but is then discarded, I strongly suspect the Brits would court the Japanese anew... a lot comes down to if the RN has other commitments, such as European enemies.
Arguably the most advantageous time for this to take place from the RN point of view is just post-Grand Scuttle. There's no enemy in Europe who'd want to start something, and the RN's still geared up for wartime building and has Japan as an ally to boot.
The most advantageous time from the USN point of view might well be just as the Dreadnought era kicks off, as that largely reset the relative positions and the USN may have more scope for expanding their build potential. Not sure if the USN was large enough to be a contender circa 1905 though.

 

[Falecius]

I believe that Germany will manage to get back her African holdings, possibly with some addition at France's expense, but can kiss goodbye to anything the Japanese (and probably the Australians) got their hands on in the Pacific (which mostly happened in Autumn 1914).

This is a requirement for any sort of "white peace". Germany is not going to willingly write off all her colonies.
Add that, with the exception of Togoland, all German colonies lasted well into 1915 (Kamerun into 1916 and Tanganyika, in some form, to the end of the war) so they are very likely to stick to Germany.
Germany will also want to keep something in the Pacific, but the only bit that may possibly be got back at the negotiating table is the Bismarck archipelago, if they're lucky.

I see a US-German warming of relations if something like the Lusitania is avoided and both parties come to see Britain and Japan as their main competitors (which Germany probably would, the US are trickier).

Not sure if outright US-British enmity is likely, but it is at least possible, and it makes for an interesting scenario.

 

[zoomar]

Here is some more of my thinking.

The PoD is essentially 1914, the outbreak of the "1914 Great War". The war ends without an overall peace treaty - rather a series of bilateral/trilateral treaties. Germany in a stong position in Europe; France weakened by heavy reparations and treaty limitations such as demilitarized eastern frontier somewhat equivalent to the OTL Rhineland; Russia is weakened and possibly in the throes of revolution. Italy entered the war at the last minute as a German ally and remains technically in the Central Powers, and Austro-Hungary is still around. Both Italy and Austria-Hungary have siezed territory in the Balkans and exacted their own treaties on a prostrate France, further weakening France as a major Mediterranean threat to them. They also distrust each other as well. The Balkans are still unsettled, although Serbia has been crushed and dismembered. The Ottoman Empire is unchanged but fighting various Arab liberation movements. Nobody, except defeated France and disintegrating Russia, is broke. Small wars continue, but the big war has ended.

The bilateral treaty that ends Germany's war with Britain is essentially a "white peace". It simply ends hostilities and restores diplomatic relations. It also leaves many issues open but unresolved, particularly the final status of any German colonies seized by solely by Britain or Britain's undefeated ally, Japan in 1914. Britain and Germany remain in a "cold war" and their respective naval and military buildups against each other continue, if perhaps slowed a bit because of the economic and materiel diversions caused by the war.

Having lost its chief European allies, and considering a formal alliance with the isolationist US unlikely to obtain, Britain strengthens its alliance with Japan, including revisions that make it a true bilateral military assistance treaty, while at the same time doing whatever it can to eliminate any possible threat of conflict with the US despite this alliance. One element of this is a decision to keep Canada essentially demilitarized so as to not be a perceived threat to the US.

The US stayed out of the war and was truly neutral. It neither brokered the Anglo-German peace treaty nor signed it. It remains strongly isolationist with respect to European entanglements and really doesn't trust anyone "over there". There is, however, a sizeable Anglophile element in the diplomatic establishment that does see a blustering and victorious Imperial Germany a potential long-term threat. While the US Navy is large and continues to expand at a fast rate (largely in response to similar Japanese building programs), the US retains an all-volunteer military and its army (and army air force) remains small and underdeveloped in comparison with other major powers. For an isolationist nation at peace and with nominally friendly relations with Britain/Canada, it would be politically impossible in Congress for any US Administration to create a large and powerful conscript army capable of waging a large-scale on the North American continent. What limited active US land forces exist are largely deployed around - and occasionally in - Mexico, which is in the throes of revolution and instability.

Japan's conquests of Tsingtao and the German Marshall islands - and their refusal to consider abandoning them acerbate the already poor US-Japanese relations. Japanese possession of the Marshalls is particularly vexing to the US since it puts potential Japanese fleet anchorages and airfields in a position that could cut off US quick resupply and reinforcement of the Philippines in the event of war. Japan continues its naval buildup in a manner that is clearly threatening to US interests in the Pacific and China. Both Japanese and US war planners believe that a war between the US and Japan is virtually inevitable and prepare accordingly. Japan begins to fortify and develop the Marshalls as naval bases, while the US does the same in Guam, Wake Island, and Manila. US concern over the Japanese Marshalls gradually pushes the US to officially support German claims in the area - Japan is a current threat, while Germany is only a potential threat. This sets the stage for somewhat improved US-German relations. Germany, in particular, sees a US-Japanese war (almost certainly to be won by the US) as a way to recoup its Asian colonies perhaps without firing a shot.

For whatever reason, A US-Japanese war breaks out in the Marshalls in 1920 in a manner that makes the US seem as an aggressor. Excessive Japanese bluster coupled with "adventures" in Manchuria and diplomatic offers to enter into an alliance with France in exchange for naval basing and favorable trade relationships with Indochina tip the US toward preventative occupation of several Islands in the Marshalls before they are fully developed and Japan completes the feared “encirclement” of the Philippines.

Japan then declares war on the US and initiates its long planned push south to occupy the Phillipines and Guam. Britain honors its treaty with Japan and declares war on the US, but hopes to keep the war limited to the Pacific. The British detail a battle cruiser squadron to Australia (HMS Tiger, the Renowns, and four new BCs similar to the Admiral Class) to Australia and informs the US they will actively support the Japanese navy in restoring the occupied Marshall islands to Japanese control, but not take part in offensive Japanese actions against the Philippines or other US interests in the Pacific. The US does not immediately declare war against Britain, preferring to take a wait and see attitude. The US and Britain independently declare that their aims do not include attempts to invade or occupy each other’s territories in the Americas as long as no offensive military actions are initiated by the other. The US-Canadian border is closed, but defensive works are established by Canada and the US in only a few strategic locations.

Before the war, Germany had sent a battle cruiser squadron (two Lutzows, two Mackensens, and an Ersatz Yorck) to New York on a “good will” tour, and after the Japanese and US go to war, Germany also declares war on Japan, indicating that these ships will assist the US if called upon in its war with Japan.

As required by the amended Anglo-Japanese alliance, Britain must now declare war on Germany. As opposed to the limited war Britain intends to wage as a Japanese ally against the US, Britain mobilizes fully against Germany, and reinstitutes its distant naval blockade of German overseas trade and commences military operations against remaining German holdings in Africa not occupied in 1914. In essence, Britain has elected to resume the Great War against Germany. In return, Germany declares war on Britain and reinitiates its own submarine blockade of Britain. All other European powers elect to sit this one out, either because they have their own fish to fry (Austria-Hungary and Turkey) or because they lack the ability to successfully fight a war against Germany in 1920 (France and Russia).

Despite the German declaration of war against Japan, the US is hesitant to enter into a formal alliance with Germany because this will upset the carefully constructed diplomatic applecart both Britain and the US have developed to limit US-British hostilities. In order to minimize this potential, the US asks that the German battlecruisers leave the Atlantic and either return to Germany or join the US Pacific Fleet assembling in Hawaii to counterbalance the British squadron sent to the Pacific. Germany agrees to send the ships to Hawaii, but unknown to the US the ships also have orders to attack British assets and shipping they might encounter on their way there. This they immediately and aggressively do, shelling the Bahamas and sinking several British merchantmen. These incenses the British, who see this as a violation of US/British understandings regarding the Americas. Britain demands that the US sever all military ties with Germany and close its ports to any German warships. The US refuses what it sees as a high-handed British demand and replies that it has no control over what Germany does in its war with Britain. Only now, does the US declare war on Britain, but like the British they limit the declaration to specific goals and ends. Eventually the German battlecruisers make it to Hawaii, where they will assist US operations to seize the Marshalls as part of the 2nd battle scout division. Upon sucessful conclusion of this operation, the Germans will base in the Marshalls under their own independent command.

What happens next?

 

[David S Poepoe]

Good deal of fiction there. No, I don't see the British strengthening any alliance to the point that they would contemplate war with the US.

 

[Falecius]

Here is some more of my thinking.

The PoD is essentially 1914, the outbreak of the "1914 Great War". The war ends without an overall peace treaty - rather a series of bilateral/trilateral treaties. Germany in a stong position in Europe; France weakened by heavy reparations and treaty limitations such as demilitarized eastern frontier somewhat equivalent to the OTL Rhineland; Russia is weakened and possibly in the throes of revolution. Italy entered the war at the last minute as a German ally and remains technically in the Central Powers, and Austro-Hungary is still around. Both Italy and Austria-Hungary have siezed territory in the Balkans and exacted their own treaties on a prostrate France, further weakening France as a major Mediterranean threat to them. They also distrust each other as well. The Balkans are still unsettled, although Serbia has been crushed and dismembered. The Ottoman Empire is unchanged but fighting various Arab liberation movements. Nobody, except defeated France and disintegrating Russia, is broke. Small wars continue, but the big war has ended.

The bilateral treaty that ends Germany's war with Britain is essentially a "white peace". It simply ends hostilities and restores diplomatic relations. It also leaves many issues open but unresolved, particularly the final status of any German colonies seized by solely by Britain or Britain's undefeated ally, Japan in 1914. Britain and Germany remain in a "cold war" and their respective naval and military buildups against each other continue, if perhaps slowed a bit because of the economic and materiel diversions caused by the war.

Having lost its chief European allies, and considering a formal alliance with the isolationist US unlikely to obtain, Britain strengthens its alliance with Japan, including revisions that make it a true bilateral military assistance treaty, while at the same time doing whatever it can to eliminate any possible threat of conflict with the US despite this alliance. One element of this is a decision to keep Canada essentially demilitarized so as to not be a perceived threat to the US.

The US stayed out of the war and was truly neutral. It neither brokered the Anglo-German peace treaty nor signed it. It remains strongly isolationist with respect to European entanglements and really doesn't trust anyone "over there". There is, however, a sizeable Anglophile element in the diplomatic establishment that does see a blustering and victorious Imperial Germany a potential long-term threat. While the US Navy is large and continues to expand at a fast rate (largely in response to similar Japanese building programs), the US retains an all-volunteer military and its army (and army air force) remains small and underdeveloped in comparison with other major powers. For an isolationist nation at peace and with nominally friendly relations with Britain/Canada, it would be politically impossible in Congress for any US Administration to create a large and powerful conscript army capable of waging a large-scale on the North American continent. What limited active US land forces exist are largely deployed around - and occasionally in - Mexico, which is in the throes of revolution and instability.

Japan's conquests of Tsingtao and the German Marshall islands - and their refusal to consider abandoning them acerbate the already poor US-Japanese relations. Japanese possession of the Marshalls is particularly vexing to the US since it puts potential Japanese fleet anchorages and airfields in a position that could cut off US quick resupply and reinforcement of the Philippines in the event of war. Japan continues its naval buildup in a manner that is clearly threatening to US interests in the Pacific and China. Both Japanese and US war planners believe that a war between the US and Japan is virtually inevitable and prepare accordingly. Japan begins to fortify and develop the Marshalls as naval bases, while the US does the same in Guam, Wake Island, and Manila. US concern over the Japanese Marshalls gradually pushes the US to officially support German claims in the area - Japan is a current threat, while Germany is only a potential threat. This sets the stage for somewhat improved US-German relations. Germany, in particular, sees a US-Japanese war (almost certainly to be won by the US) as a way to recoup its Asian colonies perhaps without firing a shot.

For whatever reason, A US-Japanese war breaks out in the Marshalls in 1920 in a manner that makes the US seem as an aggressor. Excessive Japanese bluster coupled with "adventures" in Manchuria and diplomatic offers to enter into an alliance with France in exchange for naval basing and favorable trade relationships with Indochina tip the US toward preventative occupation of several Islands in the Marshalls before they are fully developed and Japan completes the feared “encirclement” of the Philippines.

Japan then declares war on the US and initiates its long planned push south to occupy the Phillipines and Guam. Britain honors its treaty with Japan and declares war on the US, but hopes to keep the war limited to the Pacific. The British detail a battle cruiser squadron to Australia (HMS Tiger, the Renowns, and four new BCs similar to the Admiral Class) to Australia and informs the US they will actively support the Japanese navy in restoring the occupied Marshall islands to Japanese control, but not take part in offensive Japanese actions against the Philippines or other US interests in the Pacific. The US does not immediately declare war against Britain, preferring to take a wait and see attitude. The US and Britain independently declare that their aims do not include attempts to invade or occupy each other’s territories in the Americas as long as no offensive military actions are initiated by the other. The US-Canadian border is closed, but defensive works are established by Canada and the US in only a few strategic locations.

Before the war, Germany had sent a battle cruiser squadron (two Lutzows, two Mackensens, and an Ersatz Yorck) to New York on a “good will” tour, and after the Japanese and US go to war, Germany also declares war on Japan, indicating that these ships will assist the US if called upon in its war with Japan.

As required by the amended Anglo-Japanese alliance, Britain must now declare war on Germany. As opposed to the limited war Britain intends to wage as a Japanese ally against the US, Britain mobilizes fully against Germany, and reinstitutes its distant naval blockade of German overseas trade and commences military operations against remaining German holdings in Africa not occupied in 1914. In essence, Britain has elected to resume the Great War against Germany. In return, Germany declares war on Britain and reinitiates its own submarine blockade of Britain. All other European powers elect to sit this one out, either because they have their own fish to fry (Austria-Hungary and Turkey) or because they lack the ability to successfully fight a war against Germany in 1920 (France and Russia).

Despite the German declaration of war against Japan, the US is hesitant to enter into a formal alliance with Germany because this will upset the carefully constructed diplomatic applecart both Britain and the US have developed to limit US-British hostilities. In order to minimize this potential, the US asks that the German battlecruisers leave the Atlantic and either return to Germany or join the US Pacific Fleet assembling in Hawaii to counterbalance the British squadron sent to the Pacific. Germany agrees to send the ships to Hawaii, but unknown to the US the ships also have orders to attack British assets and shipping they might encounter on their way there. This they immediately and aggressively do, shelling the Bahamas and sinking several British merchantmen. These incenses the British, who see this as a violation of US/British understandings regarding the Americas. Britain demands that the US sever all military ties with Germany and close its ports to any German warships. The US refuses what it sees as a high-handed British demand and replies that it has no control over what Germany does in its war with Britain. Only now, does the US declare war on Britain, but like the British they limit the declaration to specific goals and ends. Eventually the German battlecruisers make it to Hawaii, where they will assist US operations to seize the Marshalls as part of the 2nd battle scout division. Upon sucessful conclusion of this operation, the Germans will base in the Marshalls under their own independent command.

What happens next?

A mess. Probably, either side will be likely dragged deeper and deeper into the conflict out of nationalist inertia especially without the sobering lesson of a devastating WWI (which did not work out really well anyway IOTL) as the stakes slowly get higher.
Interestingly, no side is really in the position to inflict existential damage to any other (although Japan is in a more difficult corner).
The US and Germany make pretty strange bedfellows and they are likely to be more co-belligerents than allies.
An interesting point is what Italy does. She is almost the only country with any power and stake in the matter (except the Netherlands, that would probably put every effort in clinging to their neutrality as strictly as possible) insofar it makes potentially a scenario for opportunistic landgrab at Britain's expense (Malta - technically Italian irredenta - comes to mind, and bits of East Africa too). OTOH, dependence on British coal might make the occasion less palatable.