Most threads and discussions regarding alternative endings to the First World War revolve around either a quick, decisive victory in 1914 - most often on the basis of the Schlieffen Plan succeeding as intended - or a knock-down, drag-out fight to the bitter end in 1918 - where the Spring Offensive manages to punch through to Amiens and force a BEF retreat ala Zabecki's thesis. Meanwhile, if a negotiated settlement is the intended outcome, the scenario often posited is that Germany never resumes unrestricted submarine warfare or at the very least refrains from sending the Zimmerman Telegram, so the United States does not join the war, which causes subsequent financial hardships for the Entente that might force them to come to the table with the Central Powers. All these ATLs have been litigated to death and beyond, so I'd like to propose what seems to be a lesser-known opportunity for peace in the Great War.
In July of 1917, the German Reichstag passed the so-called "Peace Resolution" that called for a peace without indemnities or annexations. Shortly afterwards in August, Pope Benedict XV published his own call for an end to the war that suggested a return to the status quo ante bellum and the restoration of Belgium sovereignty. This led to a series of events wherein:
In July of 1917, the German Reichstag passed the so-called "Peace Resolution" that called for a peace without indemnities or annexations. Shortly afterwards in August, Pope Benedict XV published his own call for an end to the war that suggested a return to the status quo ante bellum and the restoration of Belgium sovereignty. This led to a series of events wherein:
- The Count de Salis, Britain's representative at the Vatican, made it known to the Curia that negotiations were hardly possible as long as the Germans were unwilling to make appropriate restitutions for the damages they had dealt to Belgium, with Ribot, Prime Minister of France, actually attaching his name to de Salis' message.
- The Papal nuncio in Munich passed on this seeming probing for terms by the Entente to Germany's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, von Kühlmann, who subsequently gained permission from Wilhelm II to make concessions in Belgium in order to induce Britain to make peace and restrain France's revanchism regarding Alsace-Lorraine.
- Villalobar, the Spanish representative to Belgium, was then asked by Kühlmann to communicate this offer to the British, but Villalobar neglected to do so personally, and when the Spanish embassy eventually conveyed his message to London, Kühlmann's specific Belgian proposal had been watered down to a mere invitation for peace talks.
- Despite this, the British, and David Lloyd George in particular, were sufficiently intrigued by Kühlmann's overture that a Cabinet meeting on September 24th, 1917, came startlingly close to at least hearing out the Germans, with the final decision being deferred to a meeting the next day at Boulogne with Painlevé, the new Prime Minister of France.
- The sources I've found differ on whether it was Lloyd George or Painlevé who ultimately shot down the idea to negotiate with Kühlmann, but they agree that both men were interested at one stage or another in Kühlmann's "peace kite", and the prospect of a peace on the Western Front at Russia's expense seemed a genuine possibility.
During the entire episode, the French were also dealing with their own secret discussions with the Germans, with Baron von Lancken, head of Germany's civic administration in Belgium, engaging in extensive conversations with Briand, yet another former Prime Minister of France, on the matter of Alsace-Lorraine. Briand was led to believe that the lost provinces could be recovered, but his personal rivalries with Ribot led to the secret exchanges becoming muddled, confused, and downright manipulated such that the British thought Briand was willing to pursue separate peace talks with Germany, which was most certainly not the case. At the same time, Austria-Hungary's Count Czernin was desperately seeking a way out of the war as per Charles I's instructions, with the young Emperor going so far as to be willing to recognize France's "just claims" to Alsace-Lorraine, retreat from Serbia, and support an independent Belgium to boot!
Historians question if Kühlmann's offer was ever really a genuine olive branch extended by the German government or just the State Secretary's cynical attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and France as 1917 came to a close. However, the 1914-1918 Encyclopedia describes Kühlmann's attempt at peace to be "very serious", and for the purposes of this discussion, I'd like to presume that there was indeed a window of time for the Entente and Central Powers to come together and talk things out. The easiest POD in my mind would be for Villalobar to make clear to the British that a free Belgium was on the table, thus inducing the September 24th Cabinet meeting to vote in favour of opening a discreet channel to Berlin, hence leading the French to follow suit using their existing contacts such as Briand and von Lancken. Another possibility is that Ribot and Briand do not allow their personal feud to get in the way of affairs of state, so the Boulogne meeting of September 25th results in the French convincing Lloyd George that peace is indeed an option. Once the ball gets rolling on proper negotiations, other secret communications like those involving Czernin could also be included as the Entente tries to pressure Germany on the one hand and the Central Powers attempt to uphold a united front on the other. The sentiment for peace, at least in Germany, Britain, and France's civilian governments, was present; they only needed someone to take the first step.
I believe that the military situation in autumn 1917 pointed favourably towards the Entente seeking peace as well. American troops had not yet fought in any battles or even arrived in the trenches, and Kerensky's Provisional Government was in its death throes after the failure of his namesake offensive and the abortive Kornilov Affair. In October, the Battle of Caporetto would see the Italians routed with massive loss of life and territory as the Isonzo deadlock was decisively broken by a combined German/Austro-Hungarian attack (and indeed, if Germany and Austria-Hungary could come to terms with Britain and France over Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, the greatest obstacle to peace would be Italy's intransigence over its Treaty of London claims on Habsburg lands, which might mean that OHL provides more units for the Caporetto offensive that sees the Italian lines collapse harder still, perhaps to the extent originally anticipated by the Italian government and high command themselves). Come November, the Bolsheviks seizing power in Moscow and Petrograd should absolutely terrify the Entente with the spectre of a unilateral Russian withdrawal from the war (as indeed happened), further motivating French and British diplomats to come to terms with their German counterparts. These developments did not lead to a compromise peace OTL, but in the context of ongoing and potentially fruitful negotiations, they would be powerful and very persuasive factors to consider.
So what was Kühlmann actually offering, and could they lead to said fruitful negotiations? As stated, Kühlmann was willing to restore to Belgium its political and territorial sovereignty - most pertinently to Britain's interests, this included Germany dropping any claim to the Belgian coastline and explicitly giving up the idea of naval bases in the Low Countries, a key security concern which has motivated British continental diplomacy since the Napoleonic Wars. In return, Kühlmann seemed to expect the Entente to recognize Germany's pre-war borders (in line with the Reichstag's Peace Resolution), overseas colonies included. Lloyd George was not opposed to reconsidering the status of Germany's colonies, even at the possible cost of alienating South Africa if German South West Africa is returned, but a far larger stickling point would have been Alsace-Lorraine. Bethmann-Hollweg and Michaelis after him appeared to have at least pondered minor commercial, economic, and even territorial concessions in A-L, yet this would have been a far cry from French demands for the entire province. Worsening the odds of untangling this deadlock was the fact that IOTL, after the British rejected Villalobar's entreaties, Kühlmann himself declared to the Reichstag that there would be no compromise on the matter of A-L. The only "saving grace" for a possible negotiated peace lies in three factors: 1) the British refusal to commit themselves to an unconditional reconquest of A-L in full, as opposed to partitioning the province or providing security guarantees to Germany such as a demilitarized zone or free access to its mines (some pessimistic French observers went as far as to say Lloyd George was supportive of a plebiscite!); 2) the Austro-Hungarian push for A-L to be returned to France in exchange for peace, on the basis of which Czernin was musing that Austrian Galicia might be ceded to the German-dominated Kingdom of Poland in a territory swap straight out of the 18th century; and 3) the French civilian leadership's own fanciful projects to regain A-L by granting colonial concessions, with Painlevé in particular being allegedly willing to strike a "reasonable understanding" (again drawing on the 1914-1918 Encyclopedia, he offered the Belgian Congo and French Indochina?!). Any agreement on A-L would involve a lot of give-and-take from every party, though not to an impossible degree IMO.
Given all this information, here's my very back-of-the-napkin sketch for what a Kühlmann Peace Kite might look like in practice:
Historians question if Kühlmann's offer was ever really a genuine olive branch extended by the German government or just the State Secretary's cynical attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and France as 1917 came to a close. However, the 1914-1918 Encyclopedia describes Kühlmann's attempt at peace to be "very serious", and for the purposes of this discussion, I'd like to presume that there was indeed a window of time for the Entente and Central Powers to come together and talk things out. The easiest POD in my mind would be for Villalobar to make clear to the British that a free Belgium was on the table, thus inducing the September 24th Cabinet meeting to vote in favour of opening a discreet channel to Berlin, hence leading the French to follow suit using their existing contacts such as Briand and von Lancken. Another possibility is that Ribot and Briand do not allow their personal feud to get in the way of affairs of state, so the Boulogne meeting of September 25th results in the French convincing Lloyd George that peace is indeed an option. Once the ball gets rolling on proper negotiations, other secret communications like those involving Czernin could also be included as the Entente tries to pressure Germany on the one hand and the Central Powers attempt to uphold a united front on the other. The sentiment for peace, at least in Germany, Britain, and France's civilian governments, was present; they only needed someone to take the first step.
I believe that the military situation in autumn 1917 pointed favourably towards the Entente seeking peace as well. American troops had not yet fought in any battles or even arrived in the trenches, and Kerensky's Provisional Government was in its death throes after the failure of his namesake offensive and the abortive Kornilov Affair. In October, the Battle of Caporetto would see the Italians routed with massive loss of life and territory as the Isonzo deadlock was decisively broken by a combined German/Austro-Hungarian attack (and indeed, if Germany and Austria-Hungary could come to terms with Britain and France over Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, the greatest obstacle to peace would be Italy's intransigence over its Treaty of London claims on Habsburg lands, which might mean that OHL provides more units for the Caporetto offensive that sees the Italian lines collapse harder still, perhaps to the extent originally anticipated by the Italian government and high command themselves). Come November, the Bolsheviks seizing power in Moscow and Petrograd should absolutely terrify the Entente with the spectre of a unilateral Russian withdrawal from the war (as indeed happened), further motivating French and British diplomats to come to terms with their German counterparts. These developments did not lead to a compromise peace OTL, but in the context of ongoing and potentially fruitful negotiations, they would be powerful and very persuasive factors to consider.
So what was Kühlmann actually offering, and could they lead to said fruitful negotiations? As stated, Kühlmann was willing to restore to Belgium its political and territorial sovereignty - most pertinently to Britain's interests, this included Germany dropping any claim to the Belgian coastline and explicitly giving up the idea of naval bases in the Low Countries, a key security concern which has motivated British continental diplomacy since the Napoleonic Wars. In return, Kühlmann seemed to expect the Entente to recognize Germany's pre-war borders (in line with the Reichstag's Peace Resolution), overseas colonies included. Lloyd George was not opposed to reconsidering the status of Germany's colonies, even at the possible cost of alienating South Africa if German South West Africa is returned, but a far larger stickling point would have been Alsace-Lorraine. Bethmann-Hollweg and Michaelis after him appeared to have at least pondered minor commercial, economic, and even territorial concessions in A-L, yet this would have been a far cry from French demands for the entire province. Worsening the odds of untangling this deadlock was the fact that IOTL, after the British rejected Villalobar's entreaties, Kühlmann himself declared to the Reichstag that there would be no compromise on the matter of A-L. The only "saving grace" for a possible negotiated peace lies in three factors: 1) the British refusal to commit themselves to an unconditional reconquest of A-L in full, as opposed to partitioning the province or providing security guarantees to Germany such as a demilitarized zone or free access to its mines (some pessimistic French observers went as far as to say Lloyd George was supportive of a plebiscite!); 2) the Austro-Hungarian push for A-L to be returned to France in exchange for peace, on the basis of which Czernin was musing that Austrian Galicia might be ceded to the German-dominated Kingdom of Poland in a territory swap straight out of the 18th century; and 3) the French civilian leadership's own fanciful projects to regain A-L by granting colonial concessions, with Painlevé in particular being allegedly willing to strike a "reasonable understanding" (again drawing on the 1914-1918 Encyclopedia, he offered the Belgian Congo and French Indochina?!). Any agreement on A-L would involve a lot of give-and-take from every party, though not to an impossible degree IMO.
Given all this information, here's my very back-of-the-napkin sketch for what a Kühlmann Peace Kite might look like in practice:
- Belgian independence is restored and recognized by the Entente and Central Powers alike.
- Germany pays indemnities for damages dealt to Belgium OR Germany gains economic leverage over Belgium by rebuilding and integrating its infrastructure, depending on your POV.
- No indemnities are otherwise paid to or received by any party in the war.
- Alsace-Lorraine is returned to France with suitable commercial concessions in place for German business interests.
- Germany loses all its pre-war overseas colonies save for German East Africa, but gains the Belgian Congo and French Indochina.
- Austria-Hungary withdraws from Serbia and Montenegro, and cedes Galicia to the Kingdom of Poland.
- Bulgaria maintains its extant borders uti possidetis, specifically against Serbia.
- The Ottoman Empire cedes Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia to Britain and France.
- The Central Powers gain an effective free hand against Bolshevik Russia come the campaign season of 1918.
In which Germany is convinced to pay indemnities to Belgium under the guise of fostering closer economic ties (still a strategic objective for both Wilhelm II and Kühlmann), A-L is resolved by France giving colonies to Germany (which also made it easier to accept the occupation of German holdings in Africa and Asia), Austria-Hungary exits the war intact and spared from its final defeat at the Piave River (without the headache of having to figure out what to do with occupied Serbia), Bulgaria makes out like a bandit (having honestly pulled their weight and then some on the Salonika Front), and the Ottomans lose the Middle East though with an opportunity to recoup its losses by moving against Russia (something Enver Pasha might have preferred anyhow, given his OTL adventures in Bukhara). Of course, OHL is unlikely to be pleased by this measly ceasefire made by civilians and politicians, and to appease Hindenburg and Ludendorff's faction of hardcore militarists, it is very probable that Max Hoffmann's plan to institute a regime change in Russia would be greenlit in a colossal Drang nach Osten.
All this being said, what do people think about the idea of a Great War that is over by Christmas 1917? I like the Kühlmann POD because it is both rather underutilized in alternate history and neatly sidesteps many of the usual points of conflict discussed in these threads, while introducing new unresolved questions and tense uncertainties. There is likely no Brest-Litovsk, no Kiel Mutiny or German Revolution, and even the Fourteen Points are butterflied away. Germany has managed to retain at least some of its overseas colonies and is likely to gain more in Eastern Europe, French politics would be unrecognizable without Clemenceau while having to regularly negotiate with Germany over A-L, Wilson never gets to play the saviour of Europe but nor does he fall from such glittering heights, there is no Hundred Days Offensive to vindicate the operational and tactical triumph of the Entente, and an economic downturn might sweep across Europe with no indemnities extracted from or yielded to any nation in the war. The Spanish Flu could be butterflied away, or constrained only to America/China/Spain/etc., depending on where you think the pandemic originated from. Most importantly, millions of lives would be saved by the bloodshed being brought to an end one whole year earlier than IOTL.
If I appear too generous to the Central Powers in my thoughts, I probably overestimated the impact of the aforementioned military and political developments in October and November 1917 on any discussions for peace. I welcome any feedback and constructive criticism others have to offer! Since Belgium plays such a central role in this entire scenario, I would appreciate sources on what Albert himself thought of the possibility of a separate peace with Germany. Likewise, this concept is very Western Europe-centric, and how Italy and the Ottomans, two of the largest "losers" ITTL, would take Kühlmann's peace is something I am quite unsure about. What the Balkans and Eastern Europe will look like either on the map or in terms of domestic politics are also largely reliant on my spitballing. Would the US even go along with such a peace after having gone to the trouble of declaring war, or would most Americans be happy that they do not have to fight in the trenches? How about Lenin and Trotsky in Russia trying to convince their fellow Soviets that a humiliating surrender to the Kaiser would be infinitely better than to see the Revolution smothered by German stormtroopers? I look forward to hearing your thoughts, hopefully I have provided enough context and information to start an interesting conversation.
Some of the references I consulted while making this post were:
All this being said, what do people think about the idea of a Great War that is over by Christmas 1917? I like the Kühlmann POD because it is both rather underutilized in alternate history and neatly sidesteps many of the usual points of conflict discussed in these threads, while introducing new unresolved questions and tense uncertainties. There is likely no Brest-Litovsk, no Kiel Mutiny or German Revolution, and even the Fourteen Points are butterflied away. Germany has managed to retain at least some of its overseas colonies and is likely to gain more in Eastern Europe, French politics would be unrecognizable without Clemenceau while having to regularly negotiate with Germany over A-L, Wilson never gets to play the saviour of Europe but nor does he fall from such glittering heights, there is no Hundred Days Offensive to vindicate the operational and tactical triumph of the Entente, and an economic downturn might sweep across Europe with no indemnities extracted from or yielded to any nation in the war. The Spanish Flu could be butterflied away, or constrained only to America/China/Spain/etc., depending on where you think the pandemic originated from. Most importantly, millions of lives would be saved by the bloodshed being brought to an end one whole year earlier than IOTL.
If I appear too generous to the Central Powers in my thoughts, I probably overestimated the impact of the aforementioned military and political developments in October and November 1917 on any discussions for peace. I welcome any feedback and constructive criticism others have to offer! Since Belgium plays such a central role in this entire scenario, I would appreciate sources on what Albert himself thought of the possibility of a separate peace with Germany. Likewise, this concept is very Western Europe-centric, and how Italy and the Ottomans, two of the largest "losers" ITTL, would take Kühlmann's peace is something I am quite unsure about. What the Balkans and Eastern Europe will look like either on the map or in terms of domestic politics are also largely reliant on my spitballing. Would the US even go along with such a peace after having gone to the trouble of declaring war, or would most Americans be happy that they do not have to fight in the trenches? How about Lenin and Trotsky in Russia trying to convince their fellow Soviets that a humiliating surrender to the Kaiser would be infinitely better than to see the Revolution smothered by German stormtroopers? I look forward to hearing your thoughts, hopefully I have provided enough context and information to start an interesting conversation.
Some of the references I consulted while making this post were:
- Fest, W. B. “British War Aims and German Peace Feelers during the First World War (December 1916-November 1918).” The Historical Journal 15, no. 2 (1972): 285–308. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2638122.
- Stevenson, David. “The Failure of Peace by Negotiation in 1917.” The Historical Journal 34, no. 1 (1991): 65–86. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639708.
- Soutou, Georges-Henri. “War Aims and War Aims Discussions.” 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2017-04-06. DOI: 10.15463/ie1418.10240/1.1.
- Woodward, David R. “David Lloyd George. A Negotiated Peace with Germany, and the Kuhlmann Peace Kite of September, 1917.” Canadian Journal of History 6, no. 1 (1971): 75-94. https://doi.org/10.3138/cjh.6.1.75.
- Woodward, David R. “Britain's "Brass-Hats" and the Question of a Compromise Peace, 1916-1918.” Military Affairs 35, no. 2 (1971):63-68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1985047.
Last edited:
