Well at this point Makhno is the only truly independent military movement in Ukraine as there's either a German puppet or the Bolsheviks and Ukrainian nationalists and SRs do not have a serious military presence, so I can see him allying himself with them.
Its probably a super unlikely outcome where Ukraine actually sees the establishment of the first anarchist "state" in the world, but if I was writing a timeline trying to work in the Rule of Cool, that's what I would go with. Even if Skoropadskyi's German garrisons clear out the Black Army from the Dnieper, if Makhno has managed to ally with, or gain some position of preeminence over, formerly Bolshevik and/or Left SR territories that he could flee to, we might see the survival of communism-with-anarchist-characteristics in areas that were just too far for the Kaiser's armies to march to. Between the Blacks and the Whites, the peasantry would choose the former every time, though Makhno could never be an existential threat to Kolchak's regime.
Honestly trying a negotiation after Caporetto (that already was the most bestest sceanario possible for the CP) will be more difficult as any government know that if they don't get something there will be a revolution, so France peace feelers or not there is no incentive to negotiate behind their back with the CP, is more probable that Orlando will go directly to our allies and ask explanation.
It is counterintuitive that suffering a crushing defeat on the battlefield makes a nation less, not more, likely to negotiate with the enemy, but I suppose odder things have happened in history. In the same vein, wouldn't the government be headed by Boselli, not Orlando? The former's government only fell and got replaced by the latter's as a result of the disaster at Caporetto, if I am not mistaken. Boselli was a conservative where Orlando was a liberal, but far-left and far-right forces in the country would have made life hard for any elected Italian government, I think.
In 1915 Wien offered Trentino (but retaining control of the strategic border point so as in the words of Conrad they can take it back in 24 hours and Italy will also need to pay a monetary compensation to A-H), the west side of the Isonzo (that was not a good position to defend), the island of Pelagosa and some cultural rights to the italians minority (like an italian university in Trieste) and finally accepting italian control of Albania.
While i agree that Germany will not drop his ally at this stage and with them going behind their back i don't see them also going above and beyond in protecting their interest.
The negotiation will probably go this way:
- Italy ask what offered by the Treaty of London
- A-H answer that they will refuse and offer pre-war status quo with Albania neutral
- Germany step inn and tell Wien to be serious that the occasion is too good and that the last italian offensive almost broke them
-The italian government is really scared that Paris and London decide to peace out and also drop the bluff
- What Italy get in the end (in a very generous agreement) is Trentino (no monetary compensation and Italy get control of the strategic border point), the west side of the Isonzo, the island of Pelagosa and control of Albania, plus some cultural and political right in Trieste (the university) and Fiume (a reistallament of the local government). A point of contention can be Gorizia (and Monfalcone) that Italy control now and are both politically relevant if they keep it and give to Italy a better border if Orlando and Sonnino insist it's very probable that they can get it
I see, this was informative. I think these terms are fairly reasonable; even Franz Josef prior to his death had moved sufficiently on Trentino that he could countenance ceding it to Italy, [1] and Italian control of Albania as compensation for Italian irredentist claims had been proposed by Austro-Hungarian diplomats since 1914. [2] What I found the most intriguing was that Cadorna himself allegedly delivered peace terms from Victor Emmanuel III straight to the Habsburgs that asked only for Trentino and "Aquilea," [3] which I can accept as being the territory west of the Isonzo River you describe, possibly including Gorizia. Would the Italian Parliament consent to the King circumventing their authority in this way? Boselli and Cadorna were conservatives, but what did the party composition of the Italian Parliament look like in late 1917 OTL? Could they dare to deny or denounce the generous agreement?
[1] Rauchensteiner,
End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 372.
[2] Rauchensteiner,
End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 367.
[3] Rauchensteiner,
End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 899.
This book was taken from the
thread I linked in
Post #51 of the thread, which covers in extensive detail the, well, end of the Habsburg Monarchy. Comes with useful maps to help me visualize!
Rauchensteiner, Manfried. The First World War and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy. Translated by Alex J. Kay and Anna Güttel-Bellert. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2014.
Cadorna career post war will be...not good, the man was hardly loved by anyone, from the politicians to his officers and if he try to launch some coup/act of force is more probable that the soldiers shoot to him and later go for a round of wine offered by the King. Most probable outcome is to be kicked outstair with some title and used as scapegoat for the army failure when things go more quiet.
Oh, I don't mean that Cadorna would try to seize power through a coup, but by going into politics legally. ITTL, he would have been the commander-in-chief who defeated the Strafexpedition, conquered Gorizia from the Habsburgs, and drove Austria-Hungary to the breaking point right before the whistle blew on the war. Sure, there'd be plenty of soldiers who disdain the man for his martinet discipline or hate him for his brutal tactics, yet Cadorna won for all intents and purposes in a Peace Kite scenario, and victory forgives a lot of sins. Without Caporetto, I don't see Cadorna's reputation being any worse than, say, Haig's was after WWI, and Haig had plenty of apologists willing to argue that he did what was necessary to win the Western Front. IMO, Italy would need national heroes after such a messy conflict that saw strikes, hunger, and civil unrest wrack the country, and given how Diaz was feted as a great general after Vittorio Veneto, its not impossible that Cadorna gets a similarly sympathetic treatment from at least some quarters of Italian society. IIRC, it was Cadorna's father who captured Rome during the Risorgimento, and that's why he couldn't be sacked easily; in a timeline where he presides over an Italian conquest of Trentino and the west bank of the Isonzo, couldn't he parley that into the basis of a popular political campaign? Especially if it was Cadorna's contacts that helped to seal the deal?
At least, it seems to me that Cadorna's worst traits were only shown at Caporetto and its aftermath - the sheer number of casualties, the swathes of territory lost, his running away from the field, his decimation of troops that he himself mismanaged, etc. I think you've persuaded me that Caporetto could plausibly be avoided, but that leads to new divergences which must be tackled. Its all the more interesting to speculate on since Italy would be a hotbed of socialism and fascism alike going into the 1920s. Would there still be proponents of a Mutilated Victory, or a sense that Britain and France have betrayed their ally? If its true that Caporetto improved national unity, then Italy is in for interesting times without that rally-around-the-flag effect.
This would be letting some German companies working with Belgian government and companies open mines and other wise work economically in the Congo? Belgium still gets a cut, taxes, tariffs, some such money from German companies working in the Congo to help with reparations in some way. Germany could help build a Railway for example to help bring the raw and finished material from the interior out to where it can be shipped abroad.
Yep, that's about what I had in mind. Both France and Belgium were willing to play around with their colonies for gains in Europe, and this commercial colonization would not alarm Britain the way that German Askaris and naval ports on the Indian Ocean do. The idea with German railways in Belgian territory could also be applied in Europe as a veiled compromise that appeals to Germany and Britain at the same time - the one to integrate Belgian infrastructure and logistics, the other to see Belgium given proper restitution for damages dealt during the war.
Thanks for the website link.
Definitely not a source I would have found by myself. I'll spend the next few days going through what it has to say.
I hope you don't mind if I beg to differ. For what I was able to find on own research regarding this you might
have look at this.
Especially of intererst IMHO ist the developemnt the 'public and official' turnout developed over the years : almost every colonys defizits were getting lowwer and lower. What these statistics don't show are what profits the importers in and to Germany proper (and other countries) actually made as these weren't accounted for the colony they came from but appeard/vanished in the 'homelands' statistics without reference to their origin - if accounted at all.
I don't mind at all! Are
these the statistic books you took the data tables from by any chance? I wish I understood what's going on, but I can't read German and all the numbers are blending together - there's a reason I studied History in undergrad and not Math or Statistics, lol. Which column/row specifically talks about the amount of money invested into a given colony, and how much of a profit was returned from them?
In the context of Kühlmann's peace, the majority of the German overseas empire likely isn't getting returned simply because that was part of the "trade" envisioned by Lloyd George: African colonies in exchange for Eastern Europe. [3] German Samoa and Tsingtao were obviously indefensible on a strategic level, while Britain and its Dominions had their own designs on both East Africa and South West Africa (and the French wanted to eat Kamerun). Togoland just happens to be the smallest, least threatening, and also most efficient colony that could be restored to Germany at the table. Since the Reich would be turning its focus to Russia regardless, any colonies they could unexpectedly hold on to in Africa would only be the cherry on the top.
[4] Fest, "War Aims and Peace Feelers," 308.
Some critical comment of your friebndly shared sourse of Mr. Mabo of Kenya.
I actually couldn't find any comment regarding the economical situations of the german colonies in the work cited by you, neither on the page you named nor on any other part concerned with the colonies esp. post 1900.
Also:
Mambo rather sole source regarding Mittelafrica is the work (if it can be named as such) of a by him framed "... quasi-geographer and explorer in his political-economic work ..." Emil Zimmermann of 1917. As it seems he was as 'edicated' about the african colonies as Karl May was of the Ottoman Empire or the north american 'Wild West' or whatever region he placed his adventure stories.
A war time propaganda pamphlet of mere 51 pages of text mainly aimed against ... Britain (ofc). Some his few numbers about the german colonies unfortunatly dont even match with the source I used. However even Zimmermann doesn't make any mentions of the german colonies economical turn-around but rather 'imagine' some possible - or rather wished for - economical possibilities based on pre-war numbers of foreign colonies as far these were (probably far from sufficient comprehension) available in Germany foe a dreamed of post-victory continent spanning colonial realm.
Also:
Mambo - on p.175 - calls Solf "entertaining and condonning imperialstic dream in Africa." and again names said Zimmermann pamphlet as his source. ... only that Zimmermann mentions and cites Solf just one time from a letter musing rather generally over the colonial issue as such and how war might impact it.
Solf is many more times named within the introduction of the english 'translation'. ... as much a work of propagande of 1918 as the german original. Its introduction is even a page longer tha the actual translation of Zimmernann work, 64 pages.
Oops, you're right, the quote I was thinking of was not on pg. 174, but pg. 175, namely:
Apart from the Togo possession which the Germans themselves regarded as a model colony (musterkolonie), the German record as concerned African subjects left much to be desired.
[5] Mambo, "Mittelafrika," 175.
Though on a second read-through, this quote appears to be describing how the Germans viewed and treated the natives in their colonies (badly) rather than a statement on the fiscal security of the German colonial empire. And if nothing else, you've persuaded me that Mambo's article deserves another scholar's perspective to serve as counterweight to what he wrote. Would you know of any authors that I might look into? I do think I'm mostly settled on the idea that Germany is losing most of its colonies, just due to how the Peace Kite's premise is laid out in late 1917.
