The British will still have a fairly strong hand, as long as Germany believes the price of dealing with them is not worth another war. They still have the biggest navy, a significant economy, and significant financial resources.

The question for the Germans won't be "Can we beat the British?", but "would the effort it takes to beat them (which would still be a massive undertaking, since it'll be years till they can challenge them at sea) be worth it, relative to the price of appeasing them?". The answer to that will likely be no, unless the British go apeshit and start demanding too much. Germany not annexing Channel Ports is a reasonable demand, and a Germany that doesn't have the naval lobby of OTL wouldn't even care that much.
Well the British Navy while big is not that much usefull in this situation due to Russia and the USA so a blockade is not possible and the British financial resources will not be in good place if they support the French and Austrian war effort and while you are right that appeasing the UK will be in German interest if such effort is not linked to a too high price, the big problem is that, what will be considered a 'too high price'.
I say that because after such type of war, Germany and Italy main objective will be please their pubblic opinion and not London due to pure internal reason and too much British pressure can make any of their request gone in 'too high price' territory regardless of their effective cost in geopolitical term.
 
As far as I can tell from the story, Harrisburg was under the gun from October 1913 when the Confederates were stopped there until the York Offensive in Late March 1914.

:p
Which works out to a timeline of a month or two in which the Confederates:
1. Have substantial artillery assets in-theater.
2. Are not using them to try to prosecute a cross-river offensive.
3. Are not using them to defend against a US offensive.

It’s just not that easy to use limited supplies of ammunition to destroy manufacturing machinery in that era. Even in WWII the US and Britain routinely bombed factories in Germany to rubble only to discover workers using the machine tools and equipment or removing them intact for use elsewhere, and that was with easily 20x the ordinance under discussion here.
 
Russia should still be a premier naval power to worry the UK; even with the disaster that was Tsushima they were building back and had 14" armed BCs in construction by the time WW1 begun IOTL, without it and with a better industrial and economical situation they should be futher along.
 
Russia should still be a premier naval power to worry the UK; even with the disaster that was Tsushima they were building back and had 14" armed BCs in construction by the time WW1 begun IOTL, without it and with a better industrial and economical situation they should be futher along.
Speaking of Russia, it will be interesting to see how populous Russia will be without the post-Great War demographic catastrophes.

The Russian Empire had about 9% of the world's population in 1914 (170 million to 1.8 billion worldwide).
 
On the topic of Britain, I might sound perhaps a bit to brash but think they might spend the first few few years drying their tears with their money. They are still one of the largest empires in the world with one of the biggest navies, in fact while German hegemony is not good well if France's hold on the colonies is shaky you might see the Union Jack look to fill in the void as the world continues to spin.

I don't think they will accept German hegemony forever, in fact would not be terribly surprised if Britain begins probing before the new lines are fully drawn but for a combination of factors think Britain will protest the status quo but be willing to enter the ring for a long while.

Ireland will be the major stumbling block, building up a major army for a continental war rapidly will require demanding sacrifices from the general population that's a bit hard to justify unless Germany providing a lot of convenient excuses or begin say recruiting ideologically committed British imperialists into militias to form a nucleus of a bigger army. The latter though just got a lot harder as many of them either have softly been purged and side-lined or fought in Ireland.

Think you might see a push for Britain to develop a larger army but think they will see France's move and avoid rash actions but in turn get's absorbed into other matters. A bigger British army would be good in theory for overthrowing German hegemony but also the present realties of a increasingly hard to govern India, a Ottoman empire that seems to trying to be independent ect.
 
On the topic of Britain, I might sound perhaps a bit to brash but think they might spend the first few few years drying their tears with their money. They are still one of the largest empires in the world with one of the biggest navies, in fact while German hegemony is not good well if France's hold on the colonies is shaky you might see the Union Jack look to fill in the void as the world continues to spin.
Very much agree. Wars are expensive as hell, and the immediate post-war period will find Britain in a better position than everyone else. Germany might dominate continental Europe, but a war-torn Europe is not gonna yield a profit immediately. In the meantime they'll be saddled with war debt, destruction and occupation costs, while the British will not have any of these issues.
 
Very much agree. Wars are expensive as hell, and the immediate post-war period will find Britain in a better position than everyone else. Germany might dominate continental Europe, but a war-torn Europe is not gonna yield a profit immediately. In the meantime they'll be saddled with war debt, destruction and occupation costs, while the British will not have any of these issues.
Isn't Britain more dependent on international trade, making it more vulnerable to the damage that large-scale wars, such as the Central European War, can cause to its economy than a power more oriented towards industrial production like Germany?
 
Isn't Britain more dependent on international trade, making it more vulnerable to the damage that large-scale wars, such as the Central European War, can cause to its economy than a power more oriented towards industrial production like Germany?
Well, there will obviously be disruptions, but Britain should still be able to trade with all belligerents, and whatever they lose in trade is more than offset by the lack of war-related expenses. And Germany was also an export oriented economy, arguably even more dependent on international markets since they lacked a huge domestic market like the US or captive markets in the form of colonies like the UK or France.
 
Second Wave: The Postwar Progressive Revolution of 1917-31
"...veritable who's who of the American progressive movement. There were politicians of all three major parties present, with not only Shafroth for Democrats but also men like George Norris and Gil Hitchcock, as well as Ole Hanson (a Liberal with an idiosyncratic record) and Ed Boyce, the Irish-born Idaho Socialist. Racial advocates such as WEB DuBois and the Confederate-born anti-lynching campaigner Ida Wells were joined by social reformers such as Richard Ely, and all three dined with inventors and scientists well-known in that day.

The Colorado Springs Conference of February 1919 is often held up as one of the most seminal moments in American progressivism, as important as Saratoga Springs was for the suffragette movement, though that perhaps misstates its goals and achievements. In hosting a wide collection of leading luminaries of the day at the Grand Hotel, Shafroth's hope was rather to chart out a "common course," deliberately mimicking Hearstian language from a decade earlier, for progressive activists of all stripes at all levels. It did so, and more. Not only is Colorado Springs to this day the site of a major annual confab of progressive activists and groups - the Colorado Policy Conference, which awards a "Shafroth Prize" by the eponymous foundation - but its legend lies in many of the ideas proposed there for the first time. It was at the ballroom of the Grand Hotel that it was proposed to at long last end barriers to voting, not just in prohibitions on women's ballot (an uncontroversial subject in a state among the first to grant women the franchise) but to curtail impediments such as the levying of poll taxes or the more common new method used in New England (and some Western states, to Shafroth's embarrassment) of literacy tests, ostensibly in the interest of "an informed ballot" but in practice used to prevent naturalized citizens who could speak decent English but perhaps not read as well from voting. Shafroth himself took the temperature of the room on an effort to repeal the electoral college; though modern analysis tends to suggest that this was out of a sense of fairness, it was rather that he viewed it as the logical next step of the efficiency movement and the outspring of the progressive push for primary elections to select candidates, and saw it as archaic and with little value any longer in a day and age where states were considerably less influential and the President enjoyed broader powers than the Founders would have ever anticipated. Other amendments proposed were enshrining labor rights in the constitution, or a ban on child labor in honor of the late Senator John Kern; no idea was too bold or radical, no suggestion laughed out of the room.

As the conference wound down after six days of lively debate, the contours of the legislative agenda that would define the Democratic 1920s was visible, and the seventy-odd attendees were now all on first-name bases with one another. It linked and intermixed people of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, different faiths, and different political parties and persuasions; the Colorado Springs Conference may not have led to a definitive agenda or an electoral manifesto, but as a gathering for the airing of ideas as a bold new Democratic Congress was seated in Philadelphia and the Root administration slouched into its lame-duck back half, it was a smashing success to which all its participants would look back with fondness..."

- Second Wave: The Postwar Progressive Revolution of 1917-31
 
Well the British Navy while big is not that much usefull in this situation due to Russia and the USA so a blockade is not possible and the British financial resources will not be in good place if they support the French and Austrian war effort and while you are right that appeasing the UK will be in German interest if such effort is not linked to a too high price, the big problem is that, what will be considered a 'too high price'.
I say that because after such type of war, Germany and Italy main objective will be please their pubblic opinion and not London due to pure internal reason and too much British pressure can make any of their request gone in 'too high price' territory regardless of their effective cost in geopolitical term.
The British trying to 2:1 ratio any two of Germany, Russia or USA postwar will... probably not end well. Especially since there won't be a WNT and Russia will likely want multiple dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts in all three of her major fleet groups (Baltic, Black, Pacific) and could give two shits what the UK says about it.
Which works out to a timeline of a month or two in which the Confederates:
1. Have substantial artillery assets in-theater.
2. Are not using them to try to prosecute a cross-river offensive.
3. Are not using them to defend against a US offensive.

It’s just not that easy to use limited supplies of ammunition to destroy manufacturing machinery in that era. Even in WWII the US and Britain routinely bombed factories in Germany to rubble only to discover workers using the machine tools and equipment or removing them intact for use elsewhere, and that was with easily 20x the ordinance under discussion here.
Agreed
Russia should still be a premier naval power to worry the UK; even with the disaster that was Tsushima they were building back and had 14" armed BCs in construction by the time WW1 begun IOTL, without it and with a better industrial and economical situation they should be futher along.
Right idea, though I'd caution that 1919 Russia is probably more like OTL 1904-05ish Russia in terms of its economy and industrialization. So it is emerging and has plenty of ships in the pipeline, but it is very much playing catchup to the CEW quartet and Britain.
How long is Jix going to be prime minister for, 7-8 years>
Something like that, though I'll evade specifics.

he did die in 1933 OTL, after all, so there's a limit on how long he can realistically be in office.
Speaking of Russia, it will be interesting to see how populous Russia will be without the post-Great War demographic catastrophes.

The Russian Empire had about 9% of the world's population in 1914 (170 million to 1.8 billion worldwide).
With Asia and Africa's massive population boom not having occurred yet in 1914, Russia's proportion is fairly a bit smaller than that. Also, I've spoiled a bit that certain parts of the Russian Empire don't quite... remain Russian. How exactly that border falls I will try not to spoil.

But my headcanon for the area constituting the "core" Russian Empire (YMMV on what exactly that constitutes) is probably about 550 million by present day (with that number variant depending on what exactly is inside those lines), and with a GDP per capita similar to OTL Greece. So it'd be a top five economy, for sure.
On the topic of Britain, I might sound perhaps a bit to brash but think they might spend the first few few years drying their tears with their money. They are still one of the largest empires in the world with one of the biggest navies, in fact while German hegemony is not good well if France's hold on the colonies is shaky you might see the Union Jack look to fill in the void as the world continues to spin.

I don't think they will accept German hegemony forever, in fact would not be terribly surprised if Britain begins probing before the new lines are fully drawn but for a combination of factors think Britain will protest the status quo but be willing to enter the ring for a long while.

Ireland will be the major stumbling block, building up a major army for a continental war rapidly will require demanding sacrifices from the general population that's a bit hard to justify unless Germany providing a lot of convenient excuses or begin say recruiting ideologically committed British imperialists into militias to form a nucleus of a bigger army. The latter though just got a lot harder as many of them either have softly been purged and side-lined or fought in Ireland.

Think you might see a push for Britain to develop a larger army but think they will see France's move and avoid rash actions but in turn get's absorbed into other matters. A bigger British army would be good in theory for overthrowing German hegemony but also the present realties of a increasingly hard to govern India, a Ottoman empire that seems to trying to be independent ect.
Very much agree. Wars are expensive as hell, and the immediate post-war period will find Britain in a better position than everyone else. Germany might dominate continental Europe, but a war-torn Europe is not gonna yield a profit immediately. In the meantime they'll be saddled with war debt, destruction and occupation costs, while the British will not have any of these issues.
Britain not being a debtor to the United States but rather holding a lot of US war debt as well as financing the war on the continent is a huge boost to the British economy, too, if only in the finance sector... though that also makes the City even more disproportionately critical to global finance and "too big to fail," a term I use purposefully.
Isn't Britain more dependent on international trade, making it more vulnerable to the damage that large-scale wars, such as the Central European War, can cause to its economy than a power more oriented towards industrial production like Germany?
Well, there will obviously be disruptions, but Britain should still be able to trade with all belligerents, and whatever they lose in trade is more than offset by the lack of war-related expenses. And Germany was also an export oriented economy, arguably even more dependent on international markets since they lacked a huge domestic market like the US or captive markets in the form of colonies like the UK or France.
As @1962strat points out, British trade was hugely important (go figure, it's an island) but it was not as export-driven an economy as Germany was (indeed, Britain's weakness was its reliance on imports) so in this alt-WW1 scenario where Britain is A) not participating and thus B) has no risks to its freedom of maritime movement, its immediate disruptions are minimized, a fair bit.
Didn’t Britain earlier have sort of land reform or something under the good chamberlain
That's correct, mid-1890s or thereabouts. It was fairly limited, of course, but more than anything pursued OTL. (I don't have any specifics on that beyond "Joe does land reform" lol)
 
Britain not being a debtor to the United States but rather holding a lot of US war debt as well as financing the war on the continent is a huge boost to the British economy, too, if only in the finance sector... though that also makes the City even more disproportionately critical to global finance and "too big to fail," a term I use purposefully.
The big problem is that whatever sum loaned to the French and Austrian is at high risk to be lost forever in the aftermath of the war, due to revolution, dissolution and the pure and simple impossibility to pay back the loan
 
The big problem is that whatever sum loaned to the French and Austrian is at high risk to be lost forever in the aftermath of the war, due to revolution, dissolution and the pure and simple impossibility to pay back the loan
I doubt the sum is really that big though. France was OTL a very strong financial power in this period, ahead of Germany in fact. They are better off for now, so there's not reason to suspect they've incurred in a large amount of British debt. Austria was likely in the receiving end of all the French credit that OTL went to Russia, so again, unlikely to owe much to the British. I could see the significant British financing in Italy, given that it was one of the Great Powers who needed it the most for development, and German financial capacity at this point wasn't on par with France or Britain, or the US.
 
I doubt the sum is really that big though. France was OTL a very strong financial power in this period, ahead of Germany in fact. They are better off for now, so there's not reason to suspect they've incurred in a large amount of British debt. Austria was likely in the receiving end of all the French credit that OTL went to Russia, so again, unlikely to owe much to the British. I could see the significant British financing in Italy, given that it was one of the Great Powers who needed it the most for development, and German financial capacity at this point wasn't on par with France or Britain, or the US.
No war in Libya mean a huge bone to the italian economy due to the direct cost of the war and all the money spent later to replenish the equipment lost, plus more political stability will help the general economy and sure that Paris will be forced to get a large amount of debt because even if France is better off they dont' have the kind of money to finance the war, almost nobody had that kind of war...even the British not involved in the war and taking the part of the OTL americans will be capable to finance only a part of it (OTL 1915 USA/UK loan amount at 2 billion of franc and in 1915 at 7,5 billion of francs). OTL the French financed just a fifth of the foreign loan of Russia (in war time, there were a lot of pre existing debt) the bulk was British
Modern warfare are extremely destructive and costly, for this reason i keep saying that the ITTL USA will have serious postwar economic problem and will be poorer than OTL one, regardless of the limited phisical destruction and the limited addition that the south gave to the economy in OTL.
Just for example, Italy spent for the four years of WWI the double of the entire budget of the state from the official declaration of the Kingdom of Italy to the declaration of of war against Austria-Hungary in 1915...and the number don't take in consideration the pension for the veteran and disabled
 
No war in Libya mean a huge bone to the italian economy due to the direct cost of the war and all the money spent later to replenish the equipment lost, plus more political stability will help the general economy and sure that Paris will be forced to get a large amount of debt because even if France is better off they dont' have the kind of money to finance the war, almost nobody had that kind of war...even the British not involved in the war and taking the part of the OTL americans will be capable to finance only a part of it (OTL 1915 USA/UK loan amount at 2 billion of franc and in 1915 at 7,5 billion of francs). OTL the French financed just a fifth of the foreign loan of Russia (in war time, there were a lot of pre existing debt) the bulk was British
Modern warfare are extremely destructive and costly, for this reason i keep saying that the ITTL USA will have serious postwar economic problem and will be poorer than OTL one, regardless of the limited phisical destruction and the limited addition that the south gave to the economy in OTL.
Just for example, Italy spent for the four years of WWI the double of the entire budget of the state from the official declaration of the Kingdom of Italy to the declaration of of war against Austria-Hungary in 1915...and the number don't take in consideration the pension for the veteran and disabled

Not to mention the demographic catastrophe of millions of deaths and injuries and, of course, the plummeting fertility rates.


Fertility Rate in 1913:

Screenshot_20240503-210712.png


Fertility Rate in 1919:

Screenshot_20240503-210806.png
 
I do like the idea of Colorado Springs, which until very very recently OTL was a bastion of conservativism and the religious right, being a modern hotbed of the left here.
 
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