Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War
- Thread starter Hrvatskiwi
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I can believe you're finally back!! Maybe now we can have a sucessful communist revolution in Brazil lol
Chapter 80: No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 1)
Since 1932, southern Europe's Atlantic outpost of Portugal had been governed by the Novo Estado regime of António de Oliviera Salazar. By 1960, this was the oldest right-wing authoritarian government in Europe. The Salazar government had never seriously considered aligning with the Axis powers, both due to economic dependency on Britain and major ideological differences between the traditionalist Catholic and assimilationist views of the Salazar regime and the race-obsessed Nazi government in Germany. After the Second World War, the Estado Novo was embraced with open arms by NATO despite some misgivings about its anti-democratic governance due to its staunch anti-communism. From the beginning of the 1950s, Salazar began to promote the national character of Portugal as pluricontinentalism, that is, the idea that Portugal as a nation was a product of overseas expansion during the Age of Exploration, and as such that the overseas possessions of Portugal were just as much a legitimate part of the nation as the metropole. The legacy of the once-lucrative spice trade that took the caravels of Portugal around the Cape of Good Hope and all the way to the Far East and back remained in the form of a handful of colonial possessions: Goa had been annexed by India, but Macao, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde remained under Lisbon's authority. By the 1960s, however, this grip was tenuous. All of these territories began to see political organisation amongst their small educated indigenous class and Salazar had come under intensifying diplomatic pressure from Washington to follow the same decolonisation process in their sub-Saharan African colonies as the British and French had done. A failed coup attempt, the Botelho Moniz coup, was mounted in 1961 with the tacit support of Washington. Consolidating power after this failed putsch, Salazar ramped up the commitment to retaining Portuguese control in the far-flung colonies.
The struggle for independence in Portugal's West African holdings of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was headed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC), established in 1956. Initially seeking self-determination through peaceful dialogue with the Salazar regime, it rapidly became apparent that Lisbon would not part ways with the territory without violence. The Pidjiguiti Massacre of 1959 was a major turning point for the Bissau-Guinean nationalists; fifty protesting dockworkers were killed by Portuguese troops. This event outraged the indigenous population of the colony and provided a great deal of propaganda value for the PAIGC. Preparing for armed resistance, PAIGC started to establish camps across the border in Guinea-Conakry. In March 1962, PAIGC operatives mounted an abortive attack on the Cape Verdean capital of Praia. Portuguese control of the seaways meant that there would be no further attacks on Cape Verde by PAIGC-aligned militants, but they would have a significant clandestine presence on the island. Many of PAIGC's leaders, including Amílcar and Luís Cabral, were Cape Verdean creoles and maintained strong links with the community. As such, there was a fairly extensive network of informants and saboteurs operating on the archipelago on their behalf.
In early 1963, hostilities on the Guinea-Bissau mainland commenced. PAIGC militants began to ambush Portuguese patrols. Whilst being poorly-equipped, the raids gradually allowed them to begin accumulating arms and ammunition. The Portuguese troops were taken somewhat by surprise. They had prepared for cross-border raids originating from the camps in Guinea-Conakry, but the initial attacks instead came from within the territory. Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, had ensured that the national liberation forces had ingratiated themselves with the rural peasantry. A trained agronomist who had encountered anti-colonial ideology whilst at university in Lisbon, Cabral ensured that his troops were trained in modern agricultural techniques so that they could give advice to rural farmers, garnering goodwill. They were also ordered that when not engaging in combat operations, to assist with labour on the local plantations, thus earning their food, rather than requisitioning produce by force, an action which would almost certainly turn the population against them. As the war went on, Cabral would also orchestrate a programme of roving markets and hospitals, ensuring that the rural peasantry would have access to goods and medical services that would have been prohibitively expensive if purchased from the colonial-run general stores. PAIGC initially avoided engagement with any Portuguese force beyond platoon level, but nevertheless had consolidated its position in the southern littoral and gained a modest foothold in the north. Initially the independence PAIGC cells were organised around tribal relationships, and as such engaged in occasional abuse when interacting with peasants of neighbouring groups. This horrifies the PAIGC leadership, which recognised how this jeopardised their entire campaign. In 1964, PAIGC held the Cassaca Congress, which restructured the PAIGC cells, bringing them under a central command. The armed rebels were organised into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo, FARP). This change immediately improved discipline amongst the insurgents. All FARP units would be under joint command from both a military commander and a political commissar in order to combat what the PAIGC referred to as "commandism". This made FARP relatively unique amongst national liberation movements in the Third World, where it was typical that the brutalising nature of asymmetrical warfare would precipitate a descent into brigandage.
In 1964 FARP opened a new front in the north of the country as they consolidated further control of the south. After occupying the estuary island of Como in the south, FARP came under attack from a combined armed offensive from the Portuguese, Operação Tridente, involving all three branches of the Portuguese military. Poor coordination between the branches resulted in slow progress for the Portuguese counteroffensive. A particularly embarassing incident during this battle was the bombing of Portuguese troops by their own planes, which had misidentified them. Some reports suggest that barracks brawls occurred between soldiers and airmen in the aftermath, although these reports cannot be verified. After the recapture of Como, Portuguese forces redeployed to support the besieged garrisons on the peninsulas of Cantanhez and Quitafine. In 1965 the war had spread to the country's east; FARP would have less control over this area than the rest of the country due to the close relationship between the colonial government and the local Fulbe chiefs. Fulbe were also overrepresented in the Portuguese army. In the same year, FARP took action against the only other armed group of any note on the territory, the Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea (Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné, FLING). Unlike PAIGC, FLING solely sought independence for Guinea-Bissau, disregarding the Cape Verdean self-determination movement. It maintained close links with the national trade union federation and was largely comprised of Manjak people. Their funding largely originated from the Manjak diaspora in Senegal, Gambia and France. Having rebuffed attempts by the Organisation of African Unity to join a united front with PAIGC, FLING came under attack from PAIGC and was largely crushed, their leaders fleeing to other West African nations such as Cote d'Ivoire. Amílcar Cabral, who had a past as an asset of the Czechoslovak State Security Bureau (StB) also managed to acquire shipments of relatively modern weaponry form the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
By 1968, when António de Spínola arrived in Portuguese Guinea from Angola, he immediately began to implement a more modern approach to counter-insurgency. At the time of his arrival, PAIGC had by then taken control of two-thirds of the territory. Spínola commenced a construction and infrastrucure-building campaign in order to improve economic development in the hopes that this would begin to improve the Portuguese reputation in the eyes of native peoples. Spínola did, however, also oversee the introduction of new weapons to the conflict; Portuguese bombers started to drop napalm on suspected FARP positions; and the dense forests were attacked with chemical defoliants to limit ambush opportunities for the rebels. Spínola also began the process of "Africanisation" of the Portuguese fighting force in Guinea. Two elite forces comprised of indigenous Africans was established: the Special African Marines and the African Commandoes. The Special African Marines were tasked with riverine operations in order to harass and interdict FARP activity. The African Commandoes were used in 'search-and-destroy' missions and deep-insertion missions. The commandoes were notable for their effectiveness, but also their ruthlessness.
Improved battlefield performance bolstered operational confidence; Portuguese troops started engaging in bolder actions, including air cavalry infiltration raids and most notably Operation Green Sea: an amphibious raid on the capital of neighbouring Guinea. Operation Green Sea had a couple of objectives, the foremost of which was to free Portuguese POWs who were being held in Conakry. The secondary objectives were, if given the opportunity, to capture Amílcar Cabral and/or Sékou Touré. On the night of 22 November 1970, the Portuguese soldiers landed from several unmarked ships and quickly fanned out to seize several points throughout the capital, facing only ineffectual resistance from local militia. The attackers were unable to locate Sékou Touré, who was hiding in the Presidential Palace, or Amílcar Cabral, who was in Eastern Europe at the time. Half of the raiders then withdrew, a small force of around 200 staying around for some hours afterwards, apparently expecting an uprising by locals against the Sekou-Toure government. When it became clear that such an uprising wasn't coming, this force also withdrew. Almost immediately after Operation Green Sea, Sékou Touré's government started to purge suspected defectors or sympathisers with the opposition, becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a coup with Portuguese backing. The Portuguese raid was condemned by the United Nations and the Soviets responded by increasingly the provision of advanced armaments to the FARP forces and to the Guinean military, including four Ilyushin Il-4 bombers which were provided to the Bissau-Guinean separatists. Additionally, a permanent Soviet naval force, the West Africa Squadron, was stationed in Conakry to ensure that Portuguese operations in Guinea-Bissau didn't spill over to neighbouring states.
Between August and November 1972, PAIGC held elections in the "liberated zones" to establish regional councils, whose representatives would then elect a National Assembly. Despite only PAIGC candidates being eligible for election, this process was still the most democratic to occur in Guinea-Bissau's history. Previous elections held by the Portuguese had limited suffrage to a mere few thousand who met tax and literacy requirements. By contrast, the 1972 elections saw 78,000 participants. On 20th January 1973, Amílcar Cabral survived an assassination attempt by FARP naval commander Inocêncio Kani (with the assistance of the PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) who intended to start a coup [182]. Kano would be executed along with ten other conspirators. On 24th September 1973, PAIGC unilaterally declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which was recognised by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Amílcar Cabral would be the first President of the infant nation.
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[182] IOTL, Amílcar Cabral was killed and his brother Luís would become President of the new republic.
The struggle for independence in Portugal's West African holdings of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was headed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC), established in 1956. Initially seeking self-determination through peaceful dialogue with the Salazar regime, it rapidly became apparent that Lisbon would not part ways with the territory without violence. The Pidjiguiti Massacre of 1959 was a major turning point for the Bissau-Guinean nationalists; fifty protesting dockworkers were killed by Portuguese troops. This event outraged the indigenous population of the colony and provided a great deal of propaganda value for the PAIGC. Preparing for armed resistance, PAIGC started to establish camps across the border in Guinea-Conakry. In March 1962, PAIGC operatives mounted an abortive attack on the Cape Verdean capital of Praia. Portuguese control of the seaways meant that there would be no further attacks on Cape Verde by PAIGC-aligned militants, but they would have a significant clandestine presence on the island. Many of PAIGC's leaders, including Amílcar and Luís Cabral, were Cape Verdean creoles and maintained strong links with the community. As such, there was a fairly extensive network of informants and saboteurs operating on the archipelago on their behalf.
Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC
In early 1963, hostilities on the Guinea-Bissau mainland commenced. PAIGC militants began to ambush Portuguese patrols. Whilst being poorly-equipped, the raids gradually allowed them to begin accumulating arms and ammunition. The Portuguese troops were taken somewhat by surprise. They had prepared for cross-border raids originating from the camps in Guinea-Conakry, but the initial attacks instead came from within the territory. Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, had ensured that the national liberation forces had ingratiated themselves with the rural peasantry. A trained agronomist who had encountered anti-colonial ideology whilst at university in Lisbon, Cabral ensured that his troops were trained in modern agricultural techniques so that they could give advice to rural farmers, garnering goodwill. They were also ordered that when not engaging in combat operations, to assist with labour on the local plantations, thus earning their food, rather than requisitioning produce by force, an action which would almost certainly turn the population against them. As the war went on, Cabral would also orchestrate a programme of roving markets and hospitals, ensuring that the rural peasantry would have access to goods and medical services that would have been prohibitively expensive if purchased from the colonial-run general stores. PAIGC initially avoided engagement with any Portuguese force beyond platoon level, but nevertheless had consolidated its position in the southern littoral and gained a modest foothold in the north. Initially the independence PAIGC cells were organised around tribal relationships, and as such engaged in occasional abuse when interacting with peasants of neighbouring groups. This horrifies the PAIGC leadership, which recognised how this jeopardised their entire campaign. In 1964, PAIGC held the Cassaca Congress, which restructured the PAIGC cells, bringing them under a central command. The armed rebels were organised into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo, FARP). This change immediately improved discipline amongst the insurgents. All FARP units would be under joint command from both a military commander and a political commissar in order to combat what the PAIGC referred to as "commandism". This made FARP relatively unique amongst national liberation movements in the Third World, where it was typical that the brutalising nature of asymmetrical warfare would precipitate a descent into brigandage.
In 1964 FARP opened a new front in the north of the country as they consolidated further control of the south. After occupying the estuary island of Como in the south, FARP came under attack from a combined armed offensive from the Portuguese, Operação Tridente, involving all three branches of the Portuguese military. Poor coordination between the branches resulted in slow progress for the Portuguese counteroffensive. A particularly embarassing incident during this battle was the bombing of Portuguese troops by their own planes, which had misidentified them. Some reports suggest that barracks brawls occurred between soldiers and airmen in the aftermath, although these reports cannot be verified. After the recapture of Como, Portuguese forces redeployed to support the besieged garrisons on the peninsulas of Cantanhez and Quitafine. In 1965 the war had spread to the country's east; FARP would have less control over this area than the rest of the country due to the close relationship between the colonial government and the local Fulbe chiefs. Fulbe were also overrepresented in the Portuguese army. In the same year, FARP took action against the only other armed group of any note on the territory, the Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea (Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné, FLING). Unlike PAIGC, FLING solely sought independence for Guinea-Bissau, disregarding the Cape Verdean self-determination movement. It maintained close links with the national trade union federation and was largely comprised of Manjak people. Their funding largely originated from the Manjak diaspora in Senegal, Gambia and France. Having rebuffed attempts by the Organisation of African Unity to join a united front with PAIGC, FLING came under attack from PAIGC and was largely crushed, their leaders fleeing to other West African nations such as Cote d'Ivoire. Amílcar Cabral, who had a past as an asset of the Czechoslovak State Security Bureau (StB) also managed to acquire shipments of relatively modern weaponry form the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
FARP guerrillas pose for a photo, Guinea-Bissau (note the Soviet weapons)
By 1968, when António de Spínola arrived in Portuguese Guinea from Angola, he immediately began to implement a more modern approach to counter-insurgency. At the time of his arrival, PAIGC had by then taken control of two-thirds of the territory. Spínola commenced a construction and infrastrucure-building campaign in order to improve economic development in the hopes that this would begin to improve the Portuguese reputation in the eyes of native peoples. Spínola did, however, also oversee the introduction of new weapons to the conflict; Portuguese bombers started to drop napalm on suspected FARP positions; and the dense forests were attacked with chemical defoliants to limit ambush opportunities for the rebels. Spínola also began the process of "Africanisation" of the Portuguese fighting force in Guinea. Two elite forces comprised of indigenous Africans was established: the Special African Marines and the African Commandoes. The Special African Marines were tasked with riverine operations in order to harass and interdict FARP activity. The African Commandoes were used in 'search-and-destroy' missions and deep-insertion missions. The commandoes were notable for their effectiveness, but also their ruthlessness.
Improved battlefield performance bolstered operational confidence; Portuguese troops started engaging in bolder actions, including air cavalry infiltration raids and most notably Operation Green Sea: an amphibious raid on the capital of neighbouring Guinea. Operation Green Sea had a couple of objectives, the foremost of which was to free Portuguese POWs who were being held in Conakry. The secondary objectives were, if given the opportunity, to capture Amílcar Cabral and/or Sékou Touré. On the night of 22 November 1970, the Portuguese soldiers landed from several unmarked ships and quickly fanned out to seize several points throughout the capital, facing only ineffectual resistance from local militia. The attackers were unable to locate Sékou Touré, who was hiding in the Presidential Palace, or Amílcar Cabral, who was in Eastern Europe at the time. Half of the raiders then withdrew, a small force of around 200 staying around for some hours afterwards, apparently expecting an uprising by locals against the Sekou-Toure government. When it became clear that such an uprising wasn't coming, this force also withdrew. Almost immediately after Operation Green Sea, Sékou Touré's government started to purge suspected defectors or sympathisers with the opposition, becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a coup with Portuguese backing. The Portuguese raid was condemned by the United Nations and the Soviets responded by increasingly the provision of advanced armaments to the FARP forces and to the Guinean military, including four Ilyushin Il-4 bombers which were provided to the Bissau-Guinean separatists. Additionally, a permanent Soviet naval force, the West Africa Squadron, was stationed in Conakry to ensure that Portuguese operations in Guinea-Bissau didn't spill over to neighbouring states.
Portuguese troops on parade through a colonist settlement, Guinea-Bissau, 1962
Between August and November 1972, PAIGC held elections in the "liberated zones" to establish regional councils, whose representatives would then elect a National Assembly. Despite only PAIGC candidates being eligible for election, this process was still the most democratic to occur in Guinea-Bissau's history. Previous elections held by the Portuguese had limited suffrage to a mere few thousand who met tax and literacy requirements. By contrast, the 1972 elections saw 78,000 participants. On 20th January 1973, Amílcar Cabral survived an assassination attempt by FARP naval commander Inocêncio Kani (with the assistance of the PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) who intended to start a coup [182]. Kano would be executed along with ten other conspirators. On 24th September 1973, PAIGC unilaterally declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which was recognised by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Amílcar Cabral would be the first President of the infant nation.
---
[182] IOTL, Amílcar Cabral was killed and his brother Luís would become President of the new republic.
Amazing chapter, hoping the rest of Portuguese Africa can free itself from colonial rule and that will serve as inspiration for the ANC in South Africa to keep resisting. Super glad seeing this amazing TL back as well!
Thanks Kurt! Will definitely be posting more regularly, now that my work situation has changed a bit.
Always great to have you along for the ride!
Chapter 81: The One Who Throws the Stone Forgets; The One Who is Hit Remembers Forever - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 2)
Unlike the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, Angola's war of independence was characterised by the factionalism of the resistance movements. The three primary parties involved, the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, were notable not only for their willingness to fight each other rather than just the colonial occupiers, but also their tendency to shift their patronage constantly, limiting their ability to maintain a strong relationship with overseas backers. Furthermore, the discovery of large off-shore oil reserves partway through the war ensured that the meddling of foreign powers was everpresent.
Recognising a higher degree of unrest amongst the native traditional rulers of Angola, in 1951 the Portuguese government changed the status of the territory, from a formal "colony" of Lisbon into a "overseas province". Despite this shift, governance of Angola remained under the control of a white-operated government bureaucracy, with only local input required from traditional native leaders. This was seen as a particular affront in the northwest of Angola, in the territories that had once made up the Kingdom of Kongo. In 1954, the União dos Povos do Norte de Angola (Union of Peoples of Northern Angola, UPA) was established under the leadership of Holden Roberto, a descendant of Bakongo royalty. Despite the name, the UPA was almost entirely comprised of Bakongo people, seeking to resurrect their independence from Portugal, with little consideration for the other Angolan peoples. Two years later, the Angolan Communist Party and the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola merged to form the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA). The MPLA drew its ranks primarily from Luanda's urban intelligentsia and the Ambundu people who lived on territories centred around Luanda and the Cuanza river. These Ambundu were the historical heirs to the legacy of the Ndongo Kingdom, but the MPLA promoted a message of unity between the various peoples of Angola, including (at least rhetorically) a willingness to accept Angolans of European descent into their organisation.
On January 3, 1961, the tensions that were building up in Angola came to a head. Agricultural workers employed by Belgian-Portuguese cotton plantation operation Cotonang staged a protest in Baixa de Cassanje demanding an improvement in working conditions. The demonstrators would go as far as beating Portuguese traders that were onsite. Spontaneous shows of support broke out in nearby settlements, and was suppressed by a Portuguese terror-bombing campaign which targeted twenty surrounding villages. The MPLA claimed that the death toll was 10,000, and while this is most likely an exaggeration, historical estimates range between 400 and 7,000 dead native Angolans. A couple of days later, the Portuguese liner Santa Maria was seized by operatives of the Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Directorate (DRIL) operating under the command of Henrique Galvão, a military officer and general secretary of DRIL's Portuguese branch. Intending to establish an opposition Portuguese government in Angola, he was instead forced to redirect to Brazil, liberating the crews and passengers in exchange for political asylum. Between the fourth and tenth of January, a number of armed incidents took place in Luanda. Whilst the exact details are unclear, with several parties having given contradictory accounts, there were a number of attacks on police by black militants armed with machetes, followed by a police response in black-majority neighbourhoods in the city. Some claim that the police response was also accompanied by lynchmobs of white settlers, whereas others claim this to be a fabrication intended to strain relations between the communities. Responsibility for the initial attacks was claimed by the MPLA, although the Portuguese secret police claimed that a local nationalist priest was behind the incident.
On March 15, the UPA staged a major uprising in the Bakongo territories; farmers and coffee plantation workers took up arms and what ensued was a slaughter. A thousand white settlers were killed, along with thousands more native workers, mostly ethnic Ovimbundu people from the central highlands, who were in the north as contract labourers. Arson attacks were carried out on police stations, plantations, ferries and many other targets. Journalists published images of raped and mutilated white settlers in newspapers in the metropole and throughout the rest of the colony, manufacturing consent for a heavy-handed response from the military. Later testimony also claimed that some UPA forces engaged in cannibalism of killed Portuguese soldiers. Whilst there were plenty instances of farms and smaller hamlets being completely overrun, many of the Portuguese settlers in the area retreated into regional hubs and entrenched themselves, forming militias in order to rebuff the disorganised assaults from the untrained insurrectionists. These militias would afterwards be organised into the Organização Provincial de Voluntários de Defesa Civil (OPVDC), a paramilitary force tasked with settlement defense and auxiliary support for the Portuguese regular military. This caught Roberto and the rest of the UPA leadership by surprise, as they expected the white settler population of the region to flee in panic. It is worth noting that this revolt wasn't simply an anti-colonial rebellion; it was an attempt by the UPA leadership to reassert political and economic authority over the northern regions. Attacking Ovimbundu contract workers with the same savagery as white colonists, the UPA insurrectionists sought to create conditions of Bakongo supremacy in the former Kongo territories.
On July 10, after having reoccupied some of the smaller northern towns, the Portuguese military commenced Operação Viriato to conquer the town of Nambuangongo, which had become the UPA headquarters. Converging on the town along three axes, the Portuguese occupied the town a month after the commencement of the operation. The Portuguese also captured the village of Quipedro to interdict the UPA's line of retreat from Nambuangongo. The attack on Quipedro was achieved through an airborne assault which took the revolters by suprise and resulted in the capture of the village without effective resistance. Attempting to provide a carrot to go along with the stick, on August 6 the Novo Estado adopted the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola & Mozambique, giving all indigenes equal citizenship rights and obligations as ethnic Portuguese. On 16th September, the UPA's last base in northern Angola, Pedra Verde, was captured by Portuguese troops in Operação Esmeralda. The UPA had no choice but to flee over the border to Congo, the Portuguese having killed 20,000 in this suppression campaign. Despite some misgivings about the UPA's refusal to adopt pan-Africanist ideology, Lumumba's government nevertheless allowed the UPA to establish bases on their side of the border in order to harass the Portuguese colonialists. The 9th October also saw a small incident that would have major consequences for the future of Angola: a UPA patrol took 21 MPLA personnel prisoner and executed them, precluding any chance of cooperation between the two resistance groups. After fleeing to Congo, the UPA merged with the Democratic Party of Angola and renamed itself the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA).
February 1962 saw the establishment of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) in Congo, with Holden Roberto as its President and Jonas Savimbi as Foreign Minister. Later that same year, an MPLA congress replaced General-Secretary Viriato da Cruz with Agostinho Neto. Da Cruz and Neto had clashed on several occasions, particularly on the subject of the racial composition of the party. Da Cruz, despite being of mixed ancestry himself, wanted to reserve a number of party seats for black African members. Whilst there was some diversity amongst MPLA ranks, the leadership, being drawn from the Luanda intelligentsia, was predominantly mestiço. In the enclave of Cabinda in the north, 1963 saw the merging of three nationalist groups into the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) which began low-level engagements with Portuguese security forces, mostly police. Their cause was bolstered diplomatically by the declaration of Cabinda as an independent state by the Organisation of African Unity. Nevertheless, they would pose very little threat to the Portuguese military. Dialogue did however, commence between the government of Congo and the FLEC.
In 1964, frustrated by Holden Roberto's unwillingness to spread the guerrilla operations of the FNLA outside of the Bakongo territories, his insistence on refusing support from the Soviet Union and China, and the lack of a political programme, Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA and relocated to China with some supporters. Meanwhile, the MPLA started slowly building up its strength, receiving armaments from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Relative to the more unified and effective FARP in Guinea-Bissau, the MPLA received only older surplus weaponry, particularly from the GDR. Whereas the image of the AK-47-toting militant may have been associated with the various national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it was far more common in Angola to see MPLA insurgents armed with old Mauser bolt-action rifles. In May of 1966, Daniel Chipenda of the MPLA established a new area of operations, the Eastern Front, almost doubling the MPLA's reach. Jonas Savimbi, returning from China, establishing the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) in a conference at Moxico province in the southeast on March 13. UNITA would commence armed operations on Christmas Day, derailing trains passing along the Benguela railway at Teixiera de Sousa, on the border with Rhodesia-Nyasaland. Immediately UNITA had an impact, with their forces being much better-led and trained than either FNLA or MPLA guerrillas. UNITA operations along this railway would especially frustrate the leadership of the neighbouring white-ruled Central African Federation, which relied on the Benguela railway to bring its copper exports to a port where it could reach foreign markets. The following year, UNITA would be successful in two more major derailings along this line, although increasing pressure from the Portuguese military in the region caused Savimbi to himself relocate to Cairo. Savimbi also established some contacts with Portuguese intelligence, where he would pass on information about the location of MPLA bases in order to undermine his pro-Soviet rivals.
May of 1968 saw FNLA fighters cross for the first time into Eastern Angola. By this time, it was clear that Eastern Angola would become an important battlefield, allowing any group which controlled this region to monopolise the control of blood diamonds in this area, as well as to interfere with the ability of their rival rebel groups to get support from their neighbours such as Congo and Rhodesia-Nyasaland. As may be expected by an organisation that was so strongly tied to one particular ethnic group, the FNLA operations in Eastern Angola were typically brutal, aimed at control of diamond production and with little care for the wellbeing of the local populations. In October, the Portuguese mounted Operação Vitória to root out MPLA bases in the east. Portuguese forces also managed to capture important documents that revealed the position of various other MPLA troops positions. For their part, the MPLA did also discreetly pass on the location of FNLA patrols to Portuguese troops. Despite the continued operation of the rebel forces, by this point in the war the momentum was clearly in the favour of the Portuguese. All separatist forces were secretly sending intel on their rivals to the Portuguese, and the colonial forces were also increasingly utilising the most modern counterinsurgency techniques. Whilst elements of the Portuguese command still distrusted African troops, there was an increase in recruitment of them, as other notable figures in the army such as Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes promoted their use, claiming that they're cheaper than European troops, more accustomed to the local climate and terrain and better able to develop relationships with local communities. The PIDE even established its own elite paramilitary force, the Flechas (Portuguese for Arrows) comprised predominantly of Khoisan bushmen. Specialising in covert operations, close quarters combat, desert warfare, jungle warfare, and virtually all other skillsets that would later come to be known as "black operations", these forces didn't operate under the command of the army but where entirely an instrument of the Portuguese secret police. They were particularly feared due to their brutality and their ability to sudden strike with no warning. Some of the more superstitous rebels even believed them to have supernatural powers garnered from black magic, a reputation that the PIDE didn't try to dispel. The regular military established Battle Group Sirocco, a highly mobile task force assisted by a dedicated air cavalry arm that would engage in rapid response operations throughout Eastern Angola. Whilst at the onset of the colonial war, the Portuguese forces had somewhat struggled to find their footing due to their initial composition as a component of overall NATO, and later LDO command, by the late 1960s they were well-versed in irregular combat in difficult terrain. In response, the rebel forces were forced to begin former larger squadrons in order to have any combat effectiveness at all. The MPLA began operating squadrons of 100 to 145 militants rather than the old platoon-sized cells. Armed with 60mm and 81mm mortars provided by the USSR, they were limited to attacks on small outposts and patrols, but were unable to make any real notable headway. To make matters worse for the MPLA, in 1972 South African Defense Force (SADF) units began engaging them in Moxico province with Portuguese consent. Operating through Rhodesia-Nyasaland, the SADF forces were there to take revenge for MPLA support for the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which operated in the territory of South-West Africa, which South Africa administered initially under trusteeship but had de facto annexed despite condemnation from the United Nations. The SADF campaign forced the MPLA out of Moxico province. The combined Portuguese and South African offensives in the east effectively pushed the MPLA out of that territory. This turn of events precipitated infighting amongst the leadership of the MPLA. Neto and 800 of his fighters retreated into Congo, whilst Chipenda began secret negotiations with the Soviets to shift their support away from Neto.
On 17th March, 1,000 FNLA fighters mutiny at camps in Kinkuzu within Congolese territory, but were suppressed by Congolese troops on behalf of FNLA leadership. In 1973, Daniel Chipenda left the MPLA, and forming a rival group, the Revolta do Leste (Eastern Revolt) with 1500 followers and covert Soviet and South African support (motivated by the desire to further undermine the MPLA). Despite Soviet support, he was privately wary of Soviet influence, and strongly opposed to the mestiço leadership of the MPLA. Later that year, Neto was invited to Moscow and told that Chipenda planned to assassinate him. These events have raised some speculation that Soviet support for the Eastern Revolt was part of a KGB operation seeking to maintain MPLA integrity by passing along information about rivals to Neto. China also shifted aid away from MPLA, sponsoring UNITA but also the FNLA, presumably in order to undermine the pro-Soviet MPLA. 1973 saw another split in MPLA, with founder Mário Pinto de Andrade clashing with Neto and establishing their own group, the Revolta Activa. Neto managed to reassert his authority soon thereafter, with Pinto de Andrade fleeing to Guinea-Bissau. The Revolta do Leste merged with FNLA. The internecine fighting amongst the rebel groups would have almost certainly lead to eventual victory for the Portuguese colonial forces, but events in the metropole changed the destiny of Angola and left the nation's future in the hands of these warring factions.
Disparities between the settler population and indigenous Africans was even more severe in Mozambique. Under the Estado Novo regime, indigenous farmer were compelled to produce cash crops such as cotton for export, forcing them in many instances to forage or to buy food at raised prices from ethnic Portuguese farmers, whilst selling their cash crops at reduced rates, despite living on arable land that would otherwise be able to sustain their nutritional needs without issue. Over a quarter of a million native Mozambicans also worked in Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa (in the latter, they comprised over 3/10s of underground miners) and were heavily taxed by the Mozambique colonial administration for their remittances. In 1950, out of a total indigenous Mozambican population of over 5 and a half million, a mere 4,000 or so natives possessed voting rights. Rates of ethnic intermixing were also the lowest in Mozambique of all the Portuguese colonies, by 1960 only numbering around 31,000. This number also underscores the vast degree of segregation between native and settler communities, which resembled the conditions in neighbouring South Africa more so than in Angola or Cabo Verde. The Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) was established in 1962 in Zanzibar [183] under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, a historian and sociologist who had briefly worked as a professor at New York's Syracuse University. FRELIMO had been created as a union of a number of smaller, disparate independence movements which had sprouted up, inspired by the pan-African liberation movements and the newfound independence of several states which had once been under British, French and Belgian rule. FRELIMO was initially completely reliant on support from friendly regimes, as the Estado Novo's ruthless intelligence apparatus had forced the Mozambique independence movement into exile. FRELIMO guerrillas were allowed to train (with Chinese assistance) and operate from bases in southern Tangyanika. With only around 7,000 fighters, a conventional victory against the Portuguese was a hopeless proposition; but a protracted guerrilla war had potential to force Lisbon to the negotiating table.
1964 saw the first FRELIMO attacks in Mozambique, negotiations with the Portuguese having proven fruitless. FRELIMO guerrillas, with assistance from the local population, attacked the administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado province. The monsoon season and the poor infrastructure and rough terrain of Northern Mozambique posed severe difficulties for colonial troops pursuing the guerrillas. After the initial attacks were confined to the north, FRELIMO began to mount attacks in Central Mozambique too, around Tete and Niassa. Guerrilla actions by FRELIMO were typically mounted by units no larger than 15 men, and widely dispersed in order to prevent the Portuguese from concentrating their forces. These widespread actions were largely able to be accomplished utilising the Ruvuma and Lugenda rivers to redeploy and supply units throughout the north. Lake Malawi, however, was largely off-limits due to the hostility of Rhodesia-Nyasaland to the Mozambique self-determination struggle [184]. In 1965, with popular support for FRELIMO growing and a successful recruiting drive, FRELIMO strike teams began to increase in size. The insurgents also began to lay landmines behind them as they withdrew after strikes, pulling pursuing forces into minefields. This had the impact of increasing casualty rates as well as demoralising the colonial forces.
By 1967, FRELIMO had de facto control of vast swathes of the north, comprising one-fifth of the total landmass of Mozambique and containing one-seventh of the population. Mondlane began looking for more foreign support, the success of the guerrilla movement now requiring more guns, ammunition and training for new recruits. He secured support from the Soviets, Chinese and East Germans, who predominantly sent WWII-vintage weapons, along with some tactical rocket batteries. One of the Portuguese responses to the growing insurgency was an increase in rural development, seeking to turn local support in their favour by improving infrastructure. The most notable of these infrastructure projects was the Cahora Bossa Dam, construction of which began in 1969. Aside from its practical functions, the dam was also intended to symbolise the permanence of the Portuguese colonial project. Three thousand troops and a million landmines were sent to defend the construction site. This proved sufficient to defend the project from multiple attacks from FRELIMO forces, although the guerrillas had occasional success at interdicting supply convoys, delaying construction somewhat.
In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a mailbomb sent to his office in Dar Es Salaam. The assassination is believed to have been orchestrated by Aginter Press, the Portuguese branch of the Gladio system of stay-behind networks in Western Europe. Lazaro Kavandame, the FRELIMO commander of Cabo Delgado province who had been openly critical of Mondlane, was suspected to be involved. He handed himself in to the Portuguese in order to prevent execution by his former allies. After a short period of internal discord, Samora Machel would be appointed the new president of the organisation. Under Machel, FRELIMO would continue its leftward political shift at an accelerated pace. A change in the command situation of the Portuguese forces, with General Kaúlza de Arriaga taking over from General António Augusto dos Santos in 1970 marked a profound shift in Portuguese strategy. de Arriaga had little faith in the effectiveness of African soldiers under colonial command, and as such largely replaced them with regular Portuguese troops from the metropole, with small numbers of native auxiliaries. This approach didn't prove any more effective than dos Santos' tactics, and under pressure from his subordinates, most notably his second-in-command General Francisco da Costa Gomes, authorised the use of native flecha units. Costa Gomes believed that the indigenisation of the Portuguese colonial army was necessary in order to win the "hearts and minds" of the indigenous population, and would help limit the issues of adaption to local conditions which many draftees from the metropole experienced. During the early 1970s, FRELIMO's combat actions also spread to urban centres, further broadening the scope of the anticolonial insurgency. June 1970 saw the most major offensive of the war, Operation Gordian Knot. Involving some 35,000 Portuguese troops, the seven-month operation targeted cross-border infiltration routes and insurgent bases in the north. To this day, the effectiveness of Operation Gordian Knot is a matter of debate. At the time it was seen as a failure, with the monsoon season and a lack of effective cooperation between ground and air forces seeing the Operation fall short of its expected results. Nevertheless, it did severely weaken the ability of FRELIMO to hold many territories long-term and significantly weakened the offensive potency of FRELIMO guerrillas. On December 16, 1972, the massacre of the entire civilian population of the village of Wiriyamu by Portuguese forces started to shift public opinion in the metropole about the war in Mozambique. By this point, the various wars in the Portuguese colonies were taking up 40% of Portuguese GDP and as such was applying major stress to the already (by Western European standards) weak Portuguese economy. Whilst FRELIMO forces also sometimes engaged in brutality against native villages, none of their atrocities compared to the slaughter at Wiriyamu.
By 1973 the Portuguese were attempting to sever FRELIMO from their local support networks by establishing resettlement villages. FRELIMO had adopted a completely opposite policy towards Portuguese settlers. Whilst Mondlane had promoted a policy of mercy for European settlers, Machel had a far harsher views towards the white population. Despite the fact that the Portuguese were still in control of the majority of Mozambican territory, the difficult situation for the Portuguese was summed up by comments from a Portuguese journalist: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against FRELIMO, the war between the army and the secret police, and between the central government [and the settlers]". The spiralling situation in the colonial possessions contributed to the unrest in the Portuguese home territories which would eventually result in the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire on mainland Africa.
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[183] Historically, this organisation was founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. ITTL, where Tangyanika and Zanzibar are separate nations, this organisation was founded instead in Zanzibar.
[184] IOTL, FRELIMO was able to utilise Lake Malawi for movement and resupply due to Malawi's support of the movement. ITTL, Malawi (Nyasaland) is still a part of the Central African Federation.
Recognising a higher degree of unrest amongst the native traditional rulers of Angola, in 1951 the Portuguese government changed the status of the territory, from a formal "colony" of Lisbon into a "overseas province". Despite this shift, governance of Angola remained under the control of a white-operated government bureaucracy, with only local input required from traditional native leaders. This was seen as a particular affront in the northwest of Angola, in the territories that had once made up the Kingdom of Kongo. In 1954, the União dos Povos do Norte de Angola (Union of Peoples of Northern Angola, UPA) was established under the leadership of Holden Roberto, a descendant of Bakongo royalty. Despite the name, the UPA was almost entirely comprised of Bakongo people, seeking to resurrect their independence from Portugal, with little consideration for the other Angolan peoples. Two years later, the Angolan Communist Party and the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola merged to form the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA). The MPLA drew its ranks primarily from Luanda's urban intelligentsia and the Ambundu people who lived on territories centred around Luanda and the Cuanza river. These Ambundu were the historical heirs to the legacy of the Ndongo Kingdom, but the MPLA promoted a message of unity between the various peoples of Angola, including (at least rhetorically) a willingness to accept Angolans of European descent into their organisation.
On January 3, 1961, the tensions that were building up in Angola came to a head. Agricultural workers employed by Belgian-Portuguese cotton plantation operation Cotonang staged a protest in Baixa de Cassanje demanding an improvement in working conditions. The demonstrators would go as far as beating Portuguese traders that were onsite. Spontaneous shows of support broke out in nearby settlements, and was suppressed by a Portuguese terror-bombing campaign which targeted twenty surrounding villages. The MPLA claimed that the death toll was 10,000, and while this is most likely an exaggeration, historical estimates range between 400 and 7,000 dead native Angolans. A couple of days later, the Portuguese liner Santa Maria was seized by operatives of the Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Directorate (DRIL) operating under the command of Henrique Galvão, a military officer and general secretary of DRIL's Portuguese branch. Intending to establish an opposition Portuguese government in Angola, he was instead forced to redirect to Brazil, liberating the crews and passengers in exchange for political asylum. Between the fourth and tenth of January, a number of armed incidents took place in Luanda. Whilst the exact details are unclear, with several parties having given contradictory accounts, there were a number of attacks on police by black militants armed with machetes, followed by a police response in black-majority neighbourhoods in the city. Some claim that the police response was also accompanied by lynchmobs of white settlers, whereas others claim this to be a fabrication intended to strain relations between the communities. Responsibility for the initial attacks was claimed by the MPLA, although the Portuguese secret police claimed that a local nationalist priest was behind the incident.
On March 15, the UPA staged a major uprising in the Bakongo territories; farmers and coffee plantation workers took up arms and what ensued was a slaughter. A thousand white settlers were killed, along with thousands more native workers, mostly ethnic Ovimbundu people from the central highlands, who were in the north as contract labourers. Arson attacks were carried out on police stations, plantations, ferries and many other targets. Journalists published images of raped and mutilated white settlers in newspapers in the metropole and throughout the rest of the colony, manufacturing consent for a heavy-handed response from the military. Later testimony also claimed that some UPA forces engaged in cannibalism of killed Portuguese soldiers. Whilst there were plenty instances of farms and smaller hamlets being completely overrun, many of the Portuguese settlers in the area retreated into regional hubs and entrenched themselves, forming militias in order to rebuff the disorganised assaults from the untrained insurrectionists. These militias would afterwards be organised into the Organização Provincial de Voluntários de Defesa Civil (OPVDC), a paramilitary force tasked with settlement defense and auxiliary support for the Portuguese regular military. This caught Roberto and the rest of the UPA leadership by surprise, as they expected the white settler population of the region to flee in panic. It is worth noting that this revolt wasn't simply an anti-colonial rebellion; it was an attempt by the UPA leadership to reassert political and economic authority over the northern regions. Attacking Ovimbundu contract workers with the same savagery as white colonists, the UPA insurrectionists sought to create conditions of Bakongo supremacy in the former Kongo territories.
On July 10, after having reoccupied some of the smaller northern towns, the Portuguese military commenced Operação Viriato to conquer the town of Nambuangongo, which had become the UPA headquarters. Converging on the town along three axes, the Portuguese occupied the town a month after the commencement of the operation. The Portuguese also captured the village of Quipedro to interdict the UPA's line of retreat from Nambuangongo. The attack on Quipedro was achieved through an airborne assault which took the revolters by suprise and resulted in the capture of the village without effective resistance. Attempting to provide a carrot to go along with the stick, on August 6 the Novo Estado adopted the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola & Mozambique, giving all indigenes equal citizenship rights and obligations as ethnic Portuguese. On 16th September, the UPA's last base in northern Angola, Pedra Verde, was captured by Portuguese troops in Operação Esmeralda. The UPA had no choice but to flee over the border to Congo, the Portuguese having killed 20,000 in this suppression campaign. Despite some misgivings about the UPA's refusal to adopt pan-Africanist ideology, Lumumba's government nevertheless allowed the UPA to establish bases on their side of the border in order to harass the Portuguese colonialists. The 9th October also saw a small incident that would have major consequences for the future of Angola: a UPA patrol took 21 MPLA personnel prisoner and executed them, precluding any chance of cooperation between the two resistance groups. After fleeing to Congo, the UPA merged with the Democratic Party of Angola and renamed itself the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA).
February 1962 saw the establishment of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) in Congo, with Holden Roberto as its President and Jonas Savimbi as Foreign Minister. Later that same year, an MPLA congress replaced General-Secretary Viriato da Cruz with Agostinho Neto. Da Cruz and Neto had clashed on several occasions, particularly on the subject of the racial composition of the party. Da Cruz, despite being of mixed ancestry himself, wanted to reserve a number of party seats for black African members. Whilst there was some diversity amongst MPLA ranks, the leadership, being drawn from the Luanda intelligentsia, was predominantly mestiço. In the enclave of Cabinda in the north, 1963 saw the merging of three nationalist groups into the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) which began low-level engagements with Portuguese security forces, mostly police. Their cause was bolstered diplomatically by the declaration of Cabinda as an independent state by the Organisation of African Unity. Nevertheless, they would pose very little threat to the Portuguese military. Dialogue did however, commence between the government of Congo and the FLEC.
In 1964, frustrated by Holden Roberto's unwillingness to spread the guerrilla operations of the FNLA outside of the Bakongo territories, his insistence on refusing support from the Soviet Union and China, and the lack of a political programme, Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA and relocated to China with some supporters. Meanwhile, the MPLA started slowly building up its strength, receiving armaments from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Relative to the more unified and effective FARP in Guinea-Bissau, the MPLA received only older surplus weaponry, particularly from the GDR. Whereas the image of the AK-47-toting militant may have been associated with the various national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it was far more common in Angola to see MPLA insurgents armed with old Mauser bolt-action rifles. In May of 1966, Daniel Chipenda of the MPLA established a new area of operations, the Eastern Front, almost doubling the MPLA's reach. Jonas Savimbi, returning from China, establishing the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) in a conference at Moxico province in the southeast on March 13. UNITA would commence armed operations on Christmas Day, derailing trains passing along the Benguela railway at Teixiera de Sousa, on the border with Rhodesia-Nyasaland. Immediately UNITA had an impact, with their forces being much better-led and trained than either FNLA or MPLA guerrillas. UNITA operations along this railway would especially frustrate the leadership of the neighbouring white-ruled Central African Federation, which relied on the Benguela railway to bring its copper exports to a port where it could reach foreign markets. The following year, UNITA would be successful in two more major derailings along this line, although increasing pressure from the Portuguese military in the region caused Savimbi to himself relocate to Cairo. Savimbi also established some contacts with Portuguese intelligence, where he would pass on information about the location of MPLA bases in order to undermine his pro-Soviet rivals.
May of 1968 saw FNLA fighters cross for the first time into Eastern Angola. By this time, it was clear that Eastern Angola would become an important battlefield, allowing any group which controlled this region to monopolise the control of blood diamonds in this area, as well as to interfere with the ability of their rival rebel groups to get support from their neighbours such as Congo and Rhodesia-Nyasaland. As may be expected by an organisation that was so strongly tied to one particular ethnic group, the FNLA operations in Eastern Angola were typically brutal, aimed at control of diamond production and with little care for the wellbeing of the local populations. In October, the Portuguese mounted Operação Vitória to root out MPLA bases in the east. Portuguese forces also managed to capture important documents that revealed the position of various other MPLA troops positions. For their part, the MPLA did also discreetly pass on the location of FNLA patrols to Portuguese troops. Despite the continued operation of the rebel forces, by this point in the war the momentum was clearly in the favour of the Portuguese. All separatist forces were secretly sending intel on their rivals to the Portuguese, and the colonial forces were also increasingly utilising the most modern counterinsurgency techniques. Whilst elements of the Portuguese command still distrusted African troops, there was an increase in recruitment of them, as other notable figures in the army such as Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes promoted their use, claiming that they're cheaper than European troops, more accustomed to the local climate and terrain and better able to develop relationships with local communities. The PIDE even established its own elite paramilitary force, the Flechas (Portuguese for Arrows) comprised predominantly of Khoisan bushmen. Specialising in covert operations, close quarters combat, desert warfare, jungle warfare, and virtually all other skillsets that would later come to be known as "black operations", these forces didn't operate under the command of the army but where entirely an instrument of the Portuguese secret police. They were particularly feared due to their brutality and their ability to sudden strike with no warning. Some of the more superstitous rebels even believed them to have supernatural powers garnered from black magic, a reputation that the PIDE didn't try to dispel. The regular military established Battle Group Sirocco, a highly mobile task force assisted by a dedicated air cavalry arm that would engage in rapid response operations throughout Eastern Angola. Whilst at the onset of the colonial war, the Portuguese forces had somewhat struggled to find their footing due to their initial composition as a component of overall NATO, and later LDO command, by the late 1960s they were well-versed in irregular combat in difficult terrain. In response, the rebel forces were forced to begin former larger squadrons in order to have any combat effectiveness at all. The MPLA began operating squadrons of 100 to 145 militants rather than the old platoon-sized cells. Armed with 60mm and 81mm mortars provided by the USSR, they were limited to attacks on small outposts and patrols, but were unable to make any real notable headway. To make matters worse for the MPLA, in 1972 South African Defense Force (SADF) units began engaging them in Moxico province with Portuguese consent. Operating through Rhodesia-Nyasaland, the SADF forces were there to take revenge for MPLA support for the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which operated in the territory of South-West Africa, which South Africa administered initially under trusteeship but had de facto annexed despite condemnation from the United Nations. The SADF campaign forced the MPLA out of Moxico province. The combined Portuguese and South African offensives in the east effectively pushed the MPLA out of that territory. This turn of events precipitated infighting amongst the leadership of the MPLA. Neto and 800 of his fighters retreated into Congo, whilst Chipenda began secret negotiations with the Soviets to shift their support away from Neto.
On 17th March, 1,000 FNLA fighters mutiny at camps in Kinkuzu within Congolese territory, but were suppressed by Congolese troops on behalf of FNLA leadership. In 1973, Daniel Chipenda left the MPLA, and forming a rival group, the Revolta do Leste (Eastern Revolt) with 1500 followers and covert Soviet and South African support (motivated by the desire to further undermine the MPLA). Despite Soviet support, he was privately wary of Soviet influence, and strongly opposed to the mestiço leadership of the MPLA. Later that year, Neto was invited to Moscow and told that Chipenda planned to assassinate him. These events have raised some speculation that Soviet support for the Eastern Revolt was part of a KGB operation seeking to maintain MPLA integrity by passing along information about rivals to Neto. China also shifted aid away from MPLA, sponsoring UNITA but also the FNLA, presumably in order to undermine the pro-Soviet MPLA. 1973 saw another split in MPLA, with founder Mário Pinto de Andrade clashing with Neto and establishing their own group, the Revolta Activa. Neto managed to reassert his authority soon thereafter, with Pinto de Andrade fleeing to Guinea-Bissau. The Revolta do Leste merged with FNLA. The internecine fighting amongst the rebel groups would have almost certainly lead to eventual victory for the Portuguese colonial forces, but events in the metropole changed the destiny of Angola and left the nation's future in the hands of these warring factions.
Disparities between the settler population and indigenous Africans was even more severe in Mozambique. Under the Estado Novo regime, indigenous farmer were compelled to produce cash crops such as cotton for export, forcing them in many instances to forage or to buy food at raised prices from ethnic Portuguese farmers, whilst selling their cash crops at reduced rates, despite living on arable land that would otherwise be able to sustain their nutritional needs without issue. Over a quarter of a million native Mozambicans also worked in Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa (in the latter, they comprised over 3/10s of underground miners) and were heavily taxed by the Mozambique colonial administration for their remittances. In 1950, out of a total indigenous Mozambican population of over 5 and a half million, a mere 4,000 or so natives possessed voting rights. Rates of ethnic intermixing were also the lowest in Mozambique of all the Portuguese colonies, by 1960 only numbering around 31,000. This number also underscores the vast degree of segregation between native and settler communities, which resembled the conditions in neighbouring South Africa more so than in Angola or Cabo Verde. The Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) was established in 1962 in Zanzibar [183] under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, a historian and sociologist who had briefly worked as a professor at New York's Syracuse University. FRELIMO had been created as a union of a number of smaller, disparate independence movements which had sprouted up, inspired by the pan-African liberation movements and the newfound independence of several states which had once been under British, French and Belgian rule. FRELIMO was initially completely reliant on support from friendly regimes, as the Estado Novo's ruthless intelligence apparatus had forced the Mozambique independence movement into exile. FRELIMO guerrillas were allowed to train (with Chinese assistance) and operate from bases in southern Tangyanika. With only around 7,000 fighters, a conventional victory against the Portuguese was a hopeless proposition; but a protracted guerrilla war had potential to force Lisbon to the negotiating table.
1964 saw the first FRELIMO attacks in Mozambique, negotiations with the Portuguese having proven fruitless. FRELIMO guerrillas, with assistance from the local population, attacked the administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado province. The monsoon season and the poor infrastructure and rough terrain of Northern Mozambique posed severe difficulties for colonial troops pursuing the guerrillas. After the initial attacks were confined to the north, FRELIMO began to mount attacks in Central Mozambique too, around Tete and Niassa. Guerrilla actions by FRELIMO were typically mounted by units no larger than 15 men, and widely dispersed in order to prevent the Portuguese from concentrating their forces. These widespread actions were largely able to be accomplished utilising the Ruvuma and Lugenda rivers to redeploy and supply units throughout the north. Lake Malawi, however, was largely off-limits due to the hostility of Rhodesia-Nyasaland to the Mozambique self-determination struggle [184]. In 1965, with popular support for FRELIMO growing and a successful recruiting drive, FRELIMO strike teams began to increase in size. The insurgents also began to lay landmines behind them as they withdrew after strikes, pulling pursuing forces into minefields. This had the impact of increasing casualty rates as well as demoralising the colonial forces.
By 1967, FRELIMO had de facto control of vast swathes of the north, comprising one-fifth of the total landmass of Mozambique and containing one-seventh of the population. Mondlane began looking for more foreign support, the success of the guerrilla movement now requiring more guns, ammunition and training for new recruits. He secured support from the Soviets, Chinese and East Germans, who predominantly sent WWII-vintage weapons, along with some tactical rocket batteries. One of the Portuguese responses to the growing insurgency was an increase in rural development, seeking to turn local support in their favour by improving infrastructure. The most notable of these infrastructure projects was the Cahora Bossa Dam, construction of which began in 1969. Aside from its practical functions, the dam was also intended to symbolise the permanence of the Portuguese colonial project. Three thousand troops and a million landmines were sent to defend the construction site. This proved sufficient to defend the project from multiple attacks from FRELIMO forces, although the guerrillas had occasional success at interdicting supply convoys, delaying construction somewhat.
In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a mailbomb sent to his office in Dar Es Salaam. The assassination is believed to have been orchestrated by Aginter Press, the Portuguese branch of the Gladio system of stay-behind networks in Western Europe. Lazaro Kavandame, the FRELIMO commander of Cabo Delgado province who had been openly critical of Mondlane, was suspected to be involved. He handed himself in to the Portuguese in order to prevent execution by his former allies. After a short period of internal discord, Samora Machel would be appointed the new president of the organisation. Under Machel, FRELIMO would continue its leftward political shift at an accelerated pace. A change in the command situation of the Portuguese forces, with General Kaúlza de Arriaga taking over from General António Augusto dos Santos in 1970 marked a profound shift in Portuguese strategy. de Arriaga had little faith in the effectiveness of African soldiers under colonial command, and as such largely replaced them with regular Portuguese troops from the metropole, with small numbers of native auxiliaries. This approach didn't prove any more effective than dos Santos' tactics, and under pressure from his subordinates, most notably his second-in-command General Francisco da Costa Gomes, authorised the use of native flecha units. Costa Gomes believed that the indigenisation of the Portuguese colonial army was necessary in order to win the "hearts and minds" of the indigenous population, and would help limit the issues of adaption to local conditions which many draftees from the metropole experienced. During the early 1970s, FRELIMO's combat actions also spread to urban centres, further broadening the scope of the anticolonial insurgency. June 1970 saw the most major offensive of the war, Operation Gordian Knot. Involving some 35,000 Portuguese troops, the seven-month operation targeted cross-border infiltration routes and insurgent bases in the north. To this day, the effectiveness of Operation Gordian Knot is a matter of debate. At the time it was seen as a failure, with the monsoon season and a lack of effective cooperation between ground and air forces seeing the Operation fall short of its expected results. Nevertheless, it did severely weaken the ability of FRELIMO to hold many territories long-term and significantly weakened the offensive potency of FRELIMO guerrillas. On December 16, 1972, the massacre of the entire civilian population of the village of Wiriyamu by Portuguese forces started to shift public opinion in the metropole about the war in Mozambique. By this point, the various wars in the Portuguese colonies were taking up 40% of Portuguese GDP and as such was applying major stress to the already (by Western European standards) weak Portuguese economy. Whilst FRELIMO forces also sometimes engaged in brutality against native villages, none of their atrocities compared to the slaughter at Wiriyamu.
By 1973 the Portuguese were attempting to sever FRELIMO from their local support networks by establishing resettlement villages. FRELIMO had adopted a completely opposite policy towards Portuguese settlers. Whilst Mondlane had promoted a policy of mercy for European settlers, Machel had a far harsher views towards the white population. Despite the fact that the Portuguese were still in control of the majority of Mozambican territory, the difficult situation for the Portuguese was summed up by comments from a Portuguese journalist: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against FRELIMO, the war between the army and the secret police, and between the central government [and the settlers]". The spiralling situation in the colonial possessions contributed to the unrest in the Portuguese home territories which would eventually result in the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire on mainland Africa.
===
[183] Historically, this organisation was founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. ITTL, where Tangyanika and Zanzibar are separate nations, this organisation was founded instead in Zanzibar.
[184] IOTL, FRELIMO was able to utilise Lake Malawi for movement and resupply due to Malawi's support of the movement. ITTL, Malawi (Nyasaland) is still a part of the Central African Federation.
As always, I'm glad seeing you uploading again, hopefully Angola and Mozambique manage to win their independence and further surround South Africa with anti Apartheid regimes.
Chapter 82: Quem Brinca com Fogo, Quiema-se - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 3)
With a lack of economic growth at home; expensive commitments to conflicts in the far-flung colonial empire; and growing discontent at the conscription of young men from the middle and lower classes of the population to fight in tropical backwaters, the Estado Novo regime was buckling under the stresses of multiple concurrent crises. Since 1968, when Salazar had suffered a stroke that left him incapable of governing, Marcelo Caetano had taken the post of Prime Minister at an unenviable time. Western Europe was in a time of transition; democracy had been snuffed out in France, uncertainty loomed about the future of the government of aging Francisco Franco in neighbouring Spain, and plans of an abortive coup by the Italian elite in the piano solo scandal had deepened the ever present divides in that country. Caetano was a loyalist of Salazar, sure, but he hoped that he would be able to steer Portugal towards sustained economic growth. The key to this, in his mind, was the effective exploitation of the underdeveloped resources in the African colonies, most notably Angola. Offshore oil reserves could, in theory, be exploited to achieve energy independence, or something approaching it, and prevent future oil shocks (like the ones that briefly shook Western economies during the fall of the Saudi kingdom and the nationalisation of ARAMCO) from retarding Portuguese economic growth. With this rational, it was never optional that Portugal retain control of Angola and Mozambique, no matter the cost. There were political reasons for maintaining control of the colonies also; under Salazar a corporatist economic policy had been pursued. This left many major industries in the hands of a few well-connected and very wealthy families. Much of this industry was fuelled by the sale or use of raw materials from the colonies. Cash crops such as bananas, cashews, coconuts and specialist timber were produced in the African colonies, as well as industrially-useful metals, diamonds and even cement. The loss of these resources would disproportionately impact the large conglomerates, and anger the well-off and politically-connected elites. They could prove a dangerous enemy indeed, and had in the past been amongst the most ardent supporters of the Estado Novo. The military were another pillar of the Estado Novo which couldn't tolerate failure in Africa. As is typical of militaries, the esteem of their upper echelons was largely dependent on military success. The nationalistic tendencies of the old guard at the top, as well as their anti-communist paranoia, made them a steadfast supporter of the Estado Novo in the past, but any admission of defeat in Africa would quickly turn them against whoever held power. It is for these reasons that despite some softening of his predecessor's policies, such as the introduction of a monthly pension to rural labourers, loosening of restrictions on the press and the authorisation of the first democratic labour union since the 1920s, Caetano committed, by 1974, a full 40% of the national budget to the colonial conflagrations. As the country had become politically polarised, particularly after the Wiriyamu Massacre, thousands of left-wing and anti-war Portuguese fled abroad, primarily to the United States, establishing a notable diaspora centred around Connecticut [185].
Whilst the brain drain caused by the exodus of anti-government middle class Portuguese wasn't ideal, a much more serious threat to the regime emerged: the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; MFA). The MFA was an organisation of junior officers who had been alienated by the Caetano government. There were a couple of major points of contention with government policy; whilst many were disillusioned with the overall policies of the regime, the major catalyst for the establishment of the MFA was a change to military recruitment policy, where local militia officers in the colonies were given the same status as military academy graduates when it came to promotions. This policy had been adopted by the Novo Estado regime on the advice of the leaders of Rhodesia-Nyasaland, as a method to reduce costs for the military. Resented by the academy graduates for obvious careerist reasons, it was also risky in that it could result in an officer corps without the theoretical and technical knowledge required should a wider war break out in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The principal aims of the MFA was a retreat from the losing wars in Africa, the introduction of free elections and the disestablishment of the secret police, the PIDE.
The MFA would finally see its opportunity come in February 1974; Prime Minister Caetano relieved General António de Spínola from command of Portuguese forces in Guinea. This decision was prompted by de Spínola's criticism of the government's colonial policy and officer recruitment approach. The publication of de Spínola's book Portugal and the Future was poorly received by Caetano, who began to see de Spínola's public commentary as akin to insubordination. This was highly controversial, and the MFA began to prepare for a coup. On the night of 24 April, the coup began, with MFA-aligned military units seizing key points around the country. With most of the non-MFA aligned military overseas, there was little resistance. Politically-centrist officers who weren't members of the MFA quickly threw in their lot with the coup. Despite radio broadcasts from the MFA leaders asking citizens to stay at home, spontaneous demonstrations in support of the coup popped up throughout the capital. Lisbon's flower market was a central focal point of these demonstrations. The sight of soldiers with carnations in their gun barrels inspired the name "Carnation Revolution". Seeing popular support for the insurgents, the Caetano government capitulated. Prime Minister Caetano and President Tomás were exiled to Brazil.
Portuguese soldiers during Carnation Revolution
Events moved quickly after the fall of Caetano; whilst de Spínola believed the overthrow of the government was supposed to be a 'renovation', various groups quickly seized the opportunity to further their own agendas. The coercive apparatuses of the Novo Estado were abolished, but suddenly shops were occupied by workers, hospitals by lower-level employees and nurses, and even private farmlands were in some places occupied by labourers. This raised the spectre of a potential socialist revolution in the minds of more centrist and conservative-leaning people. Even government offices were occupied by disaffected bureaucrats. Leftist political elements sought to manipulate the outcome of the revolution. Mário Soares of the Socialist Party and Álvaro Cunhal of the pro-Soviet Communist Party returned from exile. At this time who actually governed Portugal was unclear. de Spínola headed a provisional government as interim president, choosing a broad-based provisional government which would nominally rule. The prime minister of this provisional government was the moderate independent Adelino da Palma Carlos who was selected as not to favour any of the constituent parties: the centre-left Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party, PPD), the Socialist Party and the Portuguese Communist Party. Other organisations also wielded considerable power in the immediate post-revolution, however. One of these groups was the National Salvation Junta, comprised of high-ranking, moderate military officers. The Junta worked alongside a coordinating committee that was made up of decidedly more radical junior officers. The most powerful group that emerged was the MFA itself, which established the Continental Operations Command (COPCON), a 5,000 strong elite force headed by Colonel Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. COPCON was the most powerful security force in metropolitan Portugal, and was strongly under the command of the left-wing Col. Otelo (as he was known to the public due to his unusual first name, taken from the Shakespeare character Othello). Alarm bells began ringing in Washington, Paris and Madrid, as it appeared a matter of time before the Communist Party would attempt to seize power via COPCON.
General Antonio de Spínola addressing media
Mid-July saw the appointment of another provisional government by de Spínola, who appointed Colonel Vasco Gonçalves as Prime Minister. Gonçalves would head four provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975, and whilst starting out as a moderate, would gradually be influenced by leftist elements and would get more and more radical. de Spínola was forced to accept the independence of the African colonies, despite his writings having encouraged a pluricontinentalist Portugal. The first of the African colonies to achieve independence was Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in early September. In late September, de Spínola tried to seize power but was blocked by COPCON and resigned. General Francisco da Costa Gomes would succeed de Spínola as president. Portuguese politics continued its leftward drift, with the MFA dominating the provisional government and the Communist Party consolidating control over trade unions. Having appealed to the 'silent majority', de Spínola attempted an abortive counter-revolution on 11 March 1975. With the failure of this coup, de Spínola fled to Brazil, leading the far-right paramilitary Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Army of Liberation of Portugal, ELP) from exile. Using de Spínola's failed putsch as an excuse, the Junta of National Salvation was abolished and the Council of the Revolution was formed as the most powerful governing body. The new government implemented a broad nationalisation plan, including the banks and large conglomerates. This nationalisation wave was so extensive that it 70% of GDP came to be produced under government-owned businesses.
Elections were held on 25 April 1975. The most successful party in the elections was the Socialist Party, which won 38% of the vote. The PPD received 26%. By contrast, the Communist Party won only 12% of the vote, much lower than was expected by the communists or their supporters in the MFA. These results showed an overwhelming preference for moderate, democratic parties amongst the Portuguese electorate. Whilst the majority of the military were in favour of democratic governance, the more radical elements of the MFA forced the PPD and Socialist Party to maintain certain policies regardless of the electoral outcomes. The immediate aftermath of the elections saw violence in the countryside, especially in the southern Alentejo region. Landless labours seized the large agricultural estates of the region, transforming them into collective farms. The north saw attempts at the same actions, but were repulsed by the conservative smallholders of the region, which established armed militias who engaged in violent retribution against leftists and labour agitators. ELP cells in the north took advantage of the situation, bombing the offices of trade unions and the Socialist and Communist parties. In mid-July the PPD and the Socialist Party withdrew from the government in protest to the ultimatums of the radical wing of the MFA, taking all popular legitimacy from the fourth provisional government. As their hold over government began to ever slightly slip away as a result of the electoral success of the liberal democratic parties, the Communist Party began to hold democracy in open contempt. They maintained control over the largest trade union confederation in the country, Intersindical, and began to prepare for a seizure of power. Over the border, Spanish forces started preparing for a potential intervention to prevent a bolshevik-style takeover, and the French regime starting sending small tank and commando units across Spain in an attempt to augment such an intervention force, under the pretense of maintaining the Alliance Fraternelle des Nations Occidentales (Fraternal Alliance of Western Nations, FAWN), colloquially known as the 'Paris Pact', of which Portugal had been a founding member. US financial assistance for the democratic parties also began trickling in through clandestine channels. Increasing differences of opinion within the MFA would bring down the fifth provisional government, and Gonçalves with it. A sixth provisional government was formed, led by Admiral José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo. This government did include the Socialists and PPD as well as representatives from the Communist Party. Mozambique and Angola were granted independence, finally ending the colonial wars (or at least, Portugal's involvement in them). Stability was not achieved quite yet, however. Under the pretense of a left-wing takeover of a radio station, a coup by military units under Col. Otelo was mounted on the 25th November. They sought to outflank and surround leftist military units in the capital, but COPCON had received warning ahead of time and mounted an ambush and counter-attacked that pushed Otelo's forces to a cordon outside of Lisbon [186]. 1st December saw Franco-Spanish forces cross the border to intervene in Portugal. Meeting no resistance until their arrival at the capital, French tank units broke through the improvised defensive lines around Lisbon in a matter of hours. Spanish troops largely maintained a cordon outside of Lisbon, with military units commanded by right-wing Portuguese officers and French commandoes entering the city centre and securing a COPCON surrender in exchange for criminal amnesty. The COPCON military units were dissolved and its officers stripped of their ranks and titles, but there were not reprisal killings. The most notable violence occurred when demonstrators from Intersindical were engaged in demonstrations against the intervention, and, after a molotov cocktail was thrown at a French tank by a particularly bold demonstrator, a volley of gunfire was fired over the heads of the unionists to scatter them. A handful of ricochets off of nearby buildings injured 3 demonstrators. No soldiers were injured in the molotov attack.
Portuguese soldier loyal to putschists overlooking demonstrators in Lisbon, 1975
A new constitution was promulgated and a new provisional government established under de Spínola. The new consitution committed to the return of nationalised property to its owners, the disestablishment of non-government sponsored trade unions, and outlawing of the Communist Party. Multiparty democracy was nominally allowed, however the President would maintain broad executive powers including the ability to veto any bill before it passes into law. Portugal's commitment to the Paris Pact was also reiterated. At the far-western end of continental Europe, a glimmer of hope for democracy had shone briefly, but was extinguished by the intervention of foreign powers, for whom Portugal was merely a small piece of their far grander designs.
===
[185] This diaspora does exist OTL, and has been augmented by Brazilians moving to the area also, but ITTL, it is larger as a result of none of the left-wing activists fleeing to France due to the military junta in power there.
[186] Historically, this encirclement attempt was successful and COPCON surrendered without a real fight.
Whilst the brain drain caused by the exodus of anti-government middle class Portuguese wasn't ideal, a much more serious threat to the regime emerged: the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; MFA). The MFA was an organisation of junior officers who had been alienated by the Caetano government. There were a couple of major points of contention with government policy; whilst many were disillusioned with the overall policies of the regime, the major catalyst for the establishment of the MFA was a change to military recruitment policy, where local militia officers in the colonies were given the same status as military academy graduates when it came to promotions. This policy had been adopted by the Novo Estado regime on the advice of the leaders of Rhodesia-Nyasaland, as a method to reduce costs for the military. Resented by the academy graduates for obvious careerist reasons, it was also risky in that it could result in an officer corps without the theoretical and technical knowledge required should a wider war break out in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The principal aims of the MFA was a retreat from the losing wars in Africa, the introduction of free elections and the disestablishment of the secret police, the PIDE.
The MFA would finally see its opportunity come in February 1974; Prime Minister Caetano relieved General António de Spínola from command of Portuguese forces in Guinea. This decision was prompted by de Spínola's criticism of the government's colonial policy and officer recruitment approach. The publication of de Spínola's book Portugal and the Future was poorly received by Caetano, who began to see de Spínola's public commentary as akin to insubordination. This was highly controversial, and the MFA began to prepare for a coup. On the night of 24 April, the coup began, with MFA-aligned military units seizing key points around the country. With most of the non-MFA aligned military overseas, there was little resistance. Politically-centrist officers who weren't members of the MFA quickly threw in their lot with the coup. Despite radio broadcasts from the MFA leaders asking citizens to stay at home, spontaneous demonstrations in support of the coup popped up throughout the capital. Lisbon's flower market was a central focal point of these demonstrations. The sight of soldiers with carnations in their gun barrels inspired the name "Carnation Revolution". Seeing popular support for the insurgents, the Caetano government capitulated. Prime Minister Caetano and President Tomás were exiled to Brazil.
Portuguese soldiers during Carnation Revolution
General Antonio de Spínola addressing media
Mid-July saw the appointment of another provisional government by de Spínola, who appointed Colonel Vasco Gonçalves as Prime Minister. Gonçalves would head four provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975, and whilst starting out as a moderate, would gradually be influenced by leftist elements and would get more and more radical. de Spínola was forced to accept the independence of the African colonies, despite his writings having encouraged a pluricontinentalist Portugal. The first of the African colonies to achieve independence was Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in early September. In late September, de Spínola tried to seize power but was blocked by COPCON and resigned. General Francisco da Costa Gomes would succeed de Spínola as president. Portuguese politics continued its leftward drift, with the MFA dominating the provisional government and the Communist Party consolidating control over trade unions. Having appealed to the 'silent majority', de Spínola attempted an abortive counter-revolution on 11 March 1975. With the failure of this coup, de Spínola fled to Brazil, leading the far-right paramilitary Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Army of Liberation of Portugal, ELP) from exile. Using de Spínola's failed putsch as an excuse, the Junta of National Salvation was abolished and the Council of the Revolution was formed as the most powerful governing body. The new government implemented a broad nationalisation plan, including the banks and large conglomerates. This nationalisation wave was so extensive that it 70% of GDP came to be produced under government-owned businesses.
Elections were held on 25 April 1975. The most successful party in the elections was the Socialist Party, which won 38% of the vote. The PPD received 26%. By contrast, the Communist Party won only 12% of the vote, much lower than was expected by the communists or their supporters in the MFA. These results showed an overwhelming preference for moderate, democratic parties amongst the Portuguese electorate. Whilst the majority of the military were in favour of democratic governance, the more radical elements of the MFA forced the PPD and Socialist Party to maintain certain policies regardless of the electoral outcomes. The immediate aftermath of the elections saw violence in the countryside, especially in the southern Alentejo region. Landless labours seized the large agricultural estates of the region, transforming them into collective farms. The north saw attempts at the same actions, but were repulsed by the conservative smallholders of the region, which established armed militias who engaged in violent retribution against leftists and labour agitators. ELP cells in the north took advantage of the situation, bombing the offices of trade unions and the Socialist and Communist parties. In mid-July the PPD and the Socialist Party withdrew from the government in protest to the ultimatums of the radical wing of the MFA, taking all popular legitimacy from the fourth provisional government. As their hold over government began to ever slightly slip away as a result of the electoral success of the liberal democratic parties, the Communist Party began to hold democracy in open contempt. They maintained control over the largest trade union confederation in the country, Intersindical, and began to prepare for a seizure of power. Over the border, Spanish forces started preparing for a potential intervention to prevent a bolshevik-style takeover, and the French regime starting sending small tank and commando units across Spain in an attempt to augment such an intervention force, under the pretense of maintaining the Alliance Fraternelle des Nations Occidentales (Fraternal Alliance of Western Nations, FAWN), colloquially known as the 'Paris Pact', of which Portugal had been a founding member. US financial assistance for the democratic parties also began trickling in through clandestine channels. Increasing differences of opinion within the MFA would bring down the fifth provisional government, and Gonçalves with it. A sixth provisional government was formed, led by Admiral José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo. This government did include the Socialists and PPD as well as representatives from the Communist Party. Mozambique and Angola were granted independence, finally ending the colonial wars (or at least, Portugal's involvement in them). Stability was not achieved quite yet, however. Under the pretense of a left-wing takeover of a radio station, a coup by military units under Col. Otelo was mounted on the 25th November. They sought to outflank and surround leftist military units in the capital, but COPCON had received warning ahead of time and mounted an ambush and counter-attacked that pushed Otelo's forces to a cordon outside of Lisbon [186]. 1st December saw Franco-Spanish forces cross the border to intervene in Portugal. Meeting no resistance until their arrival at the capital, French tank units broke through the improvised defensive lines around Lisbon in a matter of hours. Spanish troops largely maintained a cordon outside of Lisbon, with military units commanded by right-wing Portuguese officers and French commandoes entering the city centre and securing a COPCON surrender in exchange for criminal amnesty. The COPCON military units were dissolved and its officers stripped of their ranks and titles, but there were not reprisal killings. The most notable violence occurred when demonstrators from Intersindical were engaged in demonstrations against the intervention, and, after a molotov cocktail was thrown at a French tank by a particularly bold demonstrator, a volley of gunfire was fired over the heads of the unionists to scatter them. A handful of ricochets off of nearby buildings injured 3 demonstrators. No soldiers were injured in the molotov attack.
Portuguese soldier loyal to putschists overlooking demonstrators in Lisbon, 1975
===
[185] This diaspora does exist OTL, and has been augmented by Brazilians moving to the area also, but ITTL, it is larger as a result of none of the left-wing activists fleeing to France due to the military junta in power there.
[186] Historically, this encirclement attempt was successful and COPCON surrendered without a real fight.
Yes, this is too much. I demand that Soviet tanks reach Paris!
Actually quite an interesting point. However, in OTL, Soviet pop culture was very Euro-oriented. In particular, the French and British had a huge influence - if you watch Soviet films (or for example Polish ones) of the sixties, you will notice a huge wave under the influence of Italian neorealism (except that it has a more romantic mood). It played a role here that, for example, American films were expensive in terms of distribution and they had to be replaced with European ones. Also the fact that in France and Italy there were very strong communist parties, which were also involved in establishing cultural ties (and there was a huge cultural field around the Italian Communist Party - right down to their beauty contests). Here, far-right dictatorships are breeding all over Europe, which of course limits cultural contacts.
Actually quite an interesting point. However, in OTL, Soviet pop culture was very Euro-oriented. In particular, the French and British had a huge influence - if you watch Soviet films (or for example Polish ones) of the sixties, you will notice a huge wave under the influence of Italian neorealism (except that it has a more romantic mood). It played a role here that, for example, American films were expensive in terms of distribution and they had to be replaced with European ones. Also the fact that in France and Italy there were very strong communist parties, which were also involved in establishing cultural ties (and there was a huge cultural field around the Italian Communist Party - right down to their beauty contests). Here, far-right dictatorships are breeding all over Europe, which of course limits cultural contacts.
Definitely less Western European influence in Soviet cinema. Not entirely gone, but the other part is that theres simply less French and Italian cinema which reaches international audience that is artistic and/or innovative due to the right-wing regimes cracking down on 'dissident' art. Something I'll definitely have to do more research on, since the bulk of my posts are focused more on politics and statecraft than culture.
Next update definitely isn't going to be a Europe-wide war. But there are nevertheless interesting developments stemming from the Portuguese exit in Africa, stuff I dont think many readers will anticipate.
Considering how many Italian cultural figures were associated with the PCI, I expect a mass migration. Even Sofia Loren - considering that she starred in a Soviet film:
Sunflower (1970 film) - Wikipedia
Glad seeing another chapter and sadly Portugal doesn't go red but it was impossible with a right wing Spain right next to it, at least the colonies are free and can hopefully sow the seeds for the downfall of the Apartheid regimes.
Chapter 83: The More Changes, the More Stays the Same - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 4)
Posturing and positioning between the various factions of the Angolan conflict began before the ink had even dried on the agreement for independence. July 1975 saw the expulsion of FNLA-aligned fighters from Luanda by the MPLA. All sides acknowledged that the force that controlled the capital would have the strongest claim to leadership. The Alvor Accords, which had been signed in January and had encouraged the creation of a coalition government, was thrown on the pyre before it ever had a chance to be honoured. By August, the MPLA controlled 11 of 15 provincial capitals, although the FNLA and UNITA remained in control of wide swathes of the countryside. Angered by MPLA support for the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and concerned about the possible establishment of Soviet military bases in Angola in the event of a total MPLA victory, South African forces intervened on 23 October. The bulk of South African forces were in Task Force Zulu composed of Combat Group Alpha which, alongside South African special forces, also included detachments of formerly Portuguese-commanded flechas, the "Caprivi Bushman" battalion of Khoisan troops from South West Africa, armoured cars, a mortar platoon and a 140mm artillery battalion; and Combat Group Bravo under the command of Biafran War veteran Jan Breytenbach which included a battalion of forces loyal to Daniel Chipenda, whose Eastern Revolt had defected to the FNLA, as well as armoured cars and 25mm and 140mm howitzers. Alongside Task Force Zulu the South Africans also deployed three independent combat groups: Foxbat, the bulk of which was made up of several hundred UNITA infantrymen, alongside armoured cars, 3 anti-tank missile vehicles and two .50 cal machine gun-equipped Landrovers; Orange, which had a UNITA battalion, a South African motorised infantry company, a South African medium machine gun platoon, 140mm artillery and an armoured car squadron; and X-Ray, the most lightly-armed of the combat groups, with one UNITA battalion, a SADF infantry company and supporting armoured cars without artillery support.
SADF artilleryman posing with howitzers during Operation Savannah
Crossing into Angola from near the Cubango river, Task Force Zulu drove north through FNLA and UNITA territory, heading north to Menongue and then west to Capelongo, before heading south and capturing Ondjiva with no resistance. Zulu then drove northwest, entering Lubango and then driving westward towards the coast, to Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre. Zulu had now taken virtually the whole south of Angola without having to engage in battle with the MPLA forces, which had withdrawn north and avoided battle against the well-trained and equipped South African-led forces. Task Force Zulu returned to Lubango before marching north towards Benguela. Task Force Zulu first met enemy resistance at the town of Catengue, on the road southeast of Benguela. MPLA defenses were quickly broken and Zulu entered Benguela on 5 November. A day later they entered Lobito to the north of Benguela, linking up with Foxbat. Combat Group Foxbat had been deployed deep into UNITA-held territory at the beginning of the South African intervention, and had been tasked with defending Nova Lisboa. It repulsed an MPLA offensive and then countered, seizing Balombo and moving west where it rendezvoused with Task Force Zulu. Meanwhile, in the northern enclave of Cabinda, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) with the assistance of Biafran mercenaries, mounted an assault on the besieged MPLA garrison. Managing to repulse the initial attack, the MPLA garrison survived, and the FLEC were suddenly swept up by a cross-border incursion by Congo to aid the MPLA [187]. The FNLA, concerned at Congo's cross-border intervention in Cabinda, and feeling cornered between the socialist giant to the north and the MPLA to the south, redoubled their efforts to push south and link up with UNITA and South African forces. On 10 November, FNLA forces struck south from Caxito along the highway towards Luanda. Entrenched MPLA forces met the FNLA forces at the bridge at Quifangondo. The FNLA forces were personally commanded by Holden Roberto, who sought a triumpant entry into the capital. His troops were supported by a handful of medium artillery pieces manned by South African crews. A squadron of SADF English Electric Canberra medium bombers provided air support for the FNLA. Whilst the initial artillery barrage and bombing runs against the defenders were ineffective, the FNLA troops did manage to take the bridge, albeit with fairly heavy casualties which slowed their advance towards Luanda[188]. Despite victory in the battle, almost all of the FNLA vehicles were destroyed, and the defenders were successful in delaying the FNLA long enough for the independence date to be reached with Neto's MPLA still in control of Luanda. At 6 P.M, Portuguese high commissioner Leonel Alexandre Gomes Cardoso announced that Portugal was transferring sovereignty to "the Angolan people" and departed Luanda by sea. At midnight, Neto announced the independence of the "People's Republic of Angola"(República Popular de Angola, RPA) which was immediately recognised by several nations, including the Soviet Union, Congo and many non-aligned nations. In response, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto mounted a joint declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Angola (República Popular Democrática de Angola, RPDA). No nations recognised the RPDA immediately, not even their allies in South Africa and the Central African Federation.
As the fighting had raged at Quifangondo, Task Force Zulu continued their drive up the coast, capturing Novo Redondo on November 13th. By this time FNLA troops had reached the outskirts of Luanda, but were having difficulty making any headway. Their artillery was of limited use, and the dug-in MPLA forces were better-equipped with superior small arms procured from the Warsaw Pact nations. The MPLA forces were also equipped with BM-21 "Grad" 122mm rocket launchers, the spiritual successor to the famed Katyusha mounted rocket batteries of the 'Great Patriotic War'. These rockets were effective at damaging soft targets like enemy infantry as they attempted to push into Luanda using ineffectual and poorly-coordinated human wave attacks. Their morale waning after a number of unsuccessful pushes, FNLA forces established a cordon to the north of Luanda, deciding to wait to link up with South African and UNITA forces. Roberto would have preferred to take Luanda himself so as to establish himself as the senior of himself and Savimbi, but he couldn't risk his offensive turning into a rout. Roberto's position was made more tenuous as, without announcement, Congolese troops crossed the border at two points: Noqui and Maquela do Zombo on November 19th. Riverine forces of the Congo also captured Soyo at the estuary of the Congo river. Marching south rapidly, Congolese motorised infantry met only mild resistance as they captured M'banza Congo, one of the most significant cities of the north and the traditional capital for the Kongo people in Angola. In an attempt to delay the South African advance until the Congolese intervention could take pressure off Luanda, MPLA forces at several points inland made probing attacks into UNITA territory, which were repulsed by combat groups Foxbat and X-Ray. Foxbat then pushed northward parallel with Task Force Zulu's advance along the coast, seizing Ebo [189], then Gabela, then Quilenda. Combat Group Orange would cover Foxbat's eastern flank, taking Quibala and Conde before linking up with Foxbat again north at Dondo on the Cuanza river. Task Force Zulu took Port Amboim, before swinging inland to Mumbundo to enable support for the independent combat groups if necessary. Foxbat and Orange once again pushed north, this time seeking to take Vila Salazar, opening the roads to the FNLA territory in the north and isolating Luanda from the MPLA's inland territory. Here South African-led forces would experience the most dogged resistance yet; MPLA forces which had been stationed around Malange had pushed west to support the defense of Luanda (or, if possible, to mount a counter-attack into FNLA territory) and to prevent potential isolate by the fast-moving South African combat groups. It appeared that a decisive phase of the conflict was looming; whoever was in control of Vila Salazar would have the upper hand in the battle for the capital; but for the FNLA-UNITA-SADF forces, this victory needed to be quick. By this point Congolese forces had reached the outskirts of Carmona. By the new year, they would certainly be at Luanda, threatening a complete annihilation of FNLA forces. If Vila Salazar was taken, it would be possible for South African forces to stabilise the front at Vista Alegre and prevent a Congolese outflanking of FNLA troops. If the MPLA successfully rebuffed the South Africans, Roberto's only hope would be a retreat via Catete, where his troops would be harassed and vulnerable until linking up with SADF-UNITA forces. This would also require a complete abandonment of the traditional Kongo territory to Congolese occupation, without even the capture of Luanda to show for it. FNLA as a military force would be preserved, but its political influence would be severely reduced, and Holden Roberto would have to kiss his dreams of the presidency goodbye in that scenario, accepting having to play second fiddle to Savimbi. The Congolese intervention had turned the reality of the conflict on its head; from a near certain victory over an MPLA which was under attack on all sides, Roberto now found himself increasingly cornered. As any boxer will tell you, often the best course of action when cornered is a massive, decisive, fully-committed attack.
In the inland eastern regions of Angola, UNITA had failed in several attacks to seize territory from the MPLA. The relative low intensity of the conflict in the east relative to the hotly-contested western coastal regions enabled the lightly-equipped combat group X-Ray to play a key role in proceedings. Seeing that the UNITA forces were unable to mount effective offensive action in this sector, X-Ray was committed to an attack on Vila Luso, which it captured with little issue. X-Ray and UNITA troops continued their advance to the east and north. UNITA forces with some difficulty managed to capture Henrique de Carvalho [190], whilst X-Ray seized the only useful crossing from Congo into eastern Angola at Teixiera de Sousa. X-Ray would remain in eastern Angola for the rest of its deployment, keeping surveillance on the border with Congo and engaging in small-scale skirmishes with MPLA militants. Back in the west, the fighting at Vila Salazar raged. The initial attack by the joint combat groups of X-Ray and Orange inflicted heavy casualties but were unable to dislodge the MPLA militants from Vila Salazar in the initial assault. Instead they wheeled around to the east of the town, intercepting and engaging with MPLA forces attempting to reinforce Vila Salazar. This succeeded in keeping much of the MPLA reinforcements from reaching the more defensible township. With the arrival of Task Force Zulu, the town was eventually taken after being softened up with artillery and air bombardment. As this fighting was going on, Holden Roberto's FNLA forces had driven east. Leaving some forces outside of Luanda, the bulk of FNLA forces redeployed to Vista Alegre where a tense stand-off occurred upon the arrival of Congolese troops marching south from Quitexe.
FNLA troops in training
As a new year commenced, there was a temporary halt in the fighting as diplomats flew back and forth between capitals attempting to prevent a major regional war. South African involvement in the Angolan civil war had become obvious to the outside world, and the already internationally-unpopular white supremacist government in South Africa was receiving criticism for their intervention. The US State Department and intelligence services were split on policy; the intelligence services seeking to support the apartheid regime as a means to prevent socialist or communist black African-led governments from taking over the whole of Southern Africa, whereas the State Department saw white minority rule in South Africa as highly-problematic for the United States' international reputation. It wasn't long since segregation had been outlawed in the United States; supporting an openly racist white supremacist state wasn't a good look when espousing the values of liberty and equality. The Congolese and South African interests in the conflict were both fundamentally realpolitik in motivation, however. South Africa wanted to cut off support for the SWAPO. Congo didn't want another right-wing nation threatening its southern border; Rhodesia-Nyasaland was already positioned uncomfortably close to the valuable Katanga province. A temporary ceasefire was brokered as negotiations were underway between representatives of the three Angolan factions, the Congolese, South Africa and with the United States who sought to act as mediators. It was agreed that peace in Angola necessitated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, but neither of the major interventionist states would withdraw without the other also doing so as well as guaranteeing that certain preconditions were met: the Congolese government wanted the expatriation of members of ABAKO-R (Alliance des Bakongo - Résistance), a fringe splinter group from ABAKO which sought the secession of Bakongo regions from the DRC as well as free elections, which they believed that MPLA would win. The South Africans claimed that they would be willing to cease involvement in the internal affairs of Angola if assistance to SWAPO ended.
Flag of Angola after Moroni Accords, chosen as not to favour any one of the major parties
By April 1976, a temporary solution was achieved with the Moroni Accords. All parties agreed in principle that free elections would occur in the future after a vague "period of stabilisation". Congolese and South African troops would be withdrawn from the country. The 200 or so ABAKO-R operatives in northern Angola would be sent back to Congo and support for SWAPO would cease immediately. Any SWAPO operatives attempting to cross the border into Angola were to be arrested and immediately turned over to South African authorities. A provisional government would be established with a weak executive branch, with a presidency which would be turned over after a mere two years as long as free elections had not yet been held. According to the agreement, Neto would be the first president, to be followed by Roberto in 1978 and Savimbi in 1980. One of the biggest bones of contention, about the interior minister position, was papered over by a poor short-term solution: Nito Alves, a notable MPLA leader who had been active in organising "popular power" committees in the slums of Luanda, was assigned to the position. In order to convince Savimbi and Roberto to agree, both the FNLA and UNITA were allowed to maintain their armed militia forces and de facto governance of the territories they held prior to the foreign interventions. A number of key issues were left unaddressed, most notably how exactly free elections were supposed to be held in a country with three separate parties which maintained armed militia forces. The primary concern was putting a halt to the immediate threat of escalation and a regional conflict, which it can be said was partially successful.
The fragile peace in Angola would be again tested, this time by internecine power struggles within MPLA. Having seen Nito Alves slowly accumulate more influence within the party, Agostinho Neto sought to limit his power by suspending him in October 1976, accusing Alves and Chief of Staff José Van-Dunem of "fractionalism". Alves was an ultra-left figure within the MPLA, but had actively suppressed the Maoist Organisation of Angolan Communists and promoted partnerships with the Soviet Union. Where he had been outspoken and broke with the consensus amongst other leading MPLA members was his hostility towards white and mestizo Angolans, even going so far as to state that mestizos should have to apply for citizenship, and that whites should only be given membership if they had been voluntarily part of the independence struggle (like Van-Dunem's wife). Alves and Van-Dunem claimed that a commission of enquiry should be created around the issue of "fractionalism" so that they could plead their case that the suspensions had been unjust. José Eduardo Dos Santos, another leading MPLA figure, headed the commission of enquiry and drew out the proceedings. After 12 hours of debate, it was decided that Alves and Van-Dunem's suspensions would stand. Alves and Van-Dunem immediately began plotting a seizure of power in secret. In the early morning of 27 May 1977, forces of the 8th Brigade commanded by Jacobo Caetano and loyal to Alves seized key points throughout Luanda, including the radio station, presidential palace and a prison, where supporters of Alves were freed. Caetano's forces expected to find Neto in the palace, but concerned about the possibility of a coup, he had moved his operations to the Ministry of Defence building. 8th Brigade troops, after executing a number of political figures they had captured in their initial attack immediately besieged the Ministry of Defence building[191]. Neto was captured after attempting to escape through secret tunnels built underneath the Ministry of Defence building. On threat of harm being done to his family, Neto was forced to make a phony public confession to being a "counter-revolutionary, a bourgeois nationalist and a traitor to the international revolutionary struggle". Neto would be shot in the head immediately after the broadcast finished. The putschists made calls over the radio to the people of Luanda, encouraging them to take to the streets to support the coup and referring to themselves as the "MPLA Action Committee". Dos Santos, seeing the writing on the wall, made an unprompted public statement in support of the Action Committee, and falsely claiming that his past political moves against Alves were made under duress from Neto and his supporters. This transparent opportunism likely saved his life, however, and he would be granted the position of Vice President after the declaration of a new government with Alves as President of the Republic. As news of the coup spread throughout the country, the FNLA and UNITA were on edge. But peace prevailed, at least until April 1978, when Roberto was supposed to, according to the Moroni Accords, take office as President. Alves refused to relinquish power, essentially daring the FNLA to march once again on Luanda. Since the end of the post-independence hostilities, the national army (which was entirely composed of MPLA forces) had gradually strengthened itself with the import of Soviet weaponry. Whilst lacking some of the more advanced weapons held by the USSR's European allies, the Angolan army had been provided with two state of the art Mil Mi-24 'Hind' attack helicopters. A handful of pilots had also been trained in the Soviet Union to allow for the deployment of these extremely useful military assets. The small arms of MPLA-aligned forces also tended to be of a higher quality, and they had greater stockpiles of ammunition and other key supplies. Knowing that his forces would be unsuccessful in an unsupported attack on MPLA forces, Roberto reached out to Savimbi's UNITA. After some deliberation with their South African patrons (who told Savimbi that they would consider a renewed intervention in the event of an MPLA-initiated attack on UNITA, but would not in the event of a UNITA-FNLA offensive action), UNITA refused to join in on a march on Luanda, and as such an enraged Roberto stood down. Frustrated by South Africa's intransigence and clear favouritism for UNITA, Roberto began to send feelers out to pro-Western states in the Gulf of Guinea for future support.
Nito Alves, President of Angola after the ousting and murder of Agostinho Neto
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[187] Historically, the FLEC was supported by Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Congo, which sought to take control of the offshore oil resources of Cabinda. IOTL, the FLEC was supported by Zairean mercenaries. ITTL, a left wing Congo isn't opposed to the MPLA like Mobutu was, but they will likely still seek recompense for their support.
[188] There are a couple of reasons for the different outcome of the Battle of Quifangondo ITTL. The first is that there was no Cuban intervention, and as such the MPLA defenders weren't assisted by Cuban advisors. Additionally, and more importantly, IOTL Holden Roberto kept his most reliable and strongest units in reserve in Zaire, rather than committing them to battle in Angola. As such, despite the FNLA nominally maintaining the largest armed force of the three Angolan combatant groups (despite being probably the least well-trained and organised), their forces weren't as strongly committed. Why did Roberto keep his strongest units in Zaire? Its uncertain. My thoughts is that he probably felt in the case of a loss in Angola he could live in exile there and that his private army would be an effective bargaining chip with Mobutu, able to be used to suppress Mobutu's political enemies and making it less likely for Mobutu to outright kill him if his relationship with the Zairean dictator soured. But ITTL, without a friendly Zaire to reside in, more of the FNLA's forces (and the better elements of it) being "in-country" lead them to be committed to the push to Luanda.
[189] IOTL, the advance on Ebo was repulsed due to Cuban troops bolstering the defenders.
[190] IOTL, the MPLA was able to prevent the UNITA attack due to being reinforced by the Katangese Tigers, the armed wing of the Congolese National Liberation Front, which opposed Mobutu and was comprised of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie. ITTL, this group is not present as a result of aforementioned butterflies from no Mobutu in Congo.
[191] IOTL the coup was suppressed by Cuban troops. They really came in clutch for Neto a LOT IOTL.
SADF artilleryman posing with howitzers during Operation Savannah
Crossing into Angola from near the Cubango river, Task Force Zulu drove north through FNLA and UNITA territory, heading north to Menongue and then west to Capelongo, before heading south and capturing Ondjiva with no resistance. Zulu then drove northwest, entering Lubango and then driving westward towards the coast, to Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre. Zulu had now taken virtually the whole south of Angola without having to engage in battle with the MPLA forces, which had withdrawn north and avoided battle against the well-trained and equipped South African-led forces. Task Force Zulu returned to Lubango before marching north towards Benguela. Task Force Zulu first met enemy resistance at the town of Catengue, on the road southeast of Benguela. MPLA defenses were quickly broken and Zulu entered Benguela on 5 November. A day later they entered Lobito to the north of Benguela, linking up with Foxbat. Combat Group Foxbat had been deployed deep into UNITA-held territory at the beginning of the South African intervention, and had been tasked with defending Nova Lisboa. It repulsed an MPLA offensive and then countered, seizing Balombo and moving west where it rendezvoused with Task Force Zulu. Meanwhile, in the northern enclave of Cabinda, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) with the assistance of Biafran mercenaries, mounted an assault on the besieged MPLA garrison. Managing to repulse the initial attack, the MPLA garrison survived, and the FLEC were suddenly swept up by a cross-border incursion by Congo to aid the MPLA [187]. The FNLA, concerned at Congo's cross-border intervention in Cabinda, and feeling cornered between the socialist giant to the north and the MPLA to the south, redoubled their efforts to push south and link up with UNITA and South African forces. On 10 November, FNLA forces struck south from Caxito along the highway towards Luanda. Entrenched MPLA forces met the FNLA forces at the bridge at Quifangondo. The FNLA forces were personally commanded by Holden Roberto, who sought a triumpant entry into the capital. His troops were supported by a handful of medium artillery pieces manned by South African crews. A squadron of SADF English Electric Canberra medium bombers provided air support for the FNLA. Whilst the initial artillery barrage and bombing runs against the defenders were ineffective, the FNLA troops did manage to take the bridge, albeit with fairly heavy casualties which slowed their advance towards Luanda[188]. Despite victory in the battle, almost all of the FNLA vehicles were destroyed, and the defenders were successful in delaying the FNLA long enough for the independence date to be reached with Neto's MPLA still in control of Luanda. At 6 P.M, Portuguese high commissioner Leonel Alexandre Gomes Cardoso announced that Portugal was transferring sovereignty to "the Angolan people" and departed Luanda by sea. At midnight, Neto announced the independence of the "People's Republic of Angola"(República Popular de Angola, RPA) which was immediately recognised by several nations, including the Soviet Union, Congo and many non-aligned nations. In response, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto mounted a joint declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Angola (República Popular Democrática de Angola, RPDA). No nations recognised the RPDA immediately, not even their allies in South Africa and the Central African Federation.
As the fighting had raged at Quifangondo, Task Force Zulu continued their drive up the coast, capturing Novo Redondo on November 13th. By this time FNLA troops had reached the outskirts of Luanda, but were having difficulty making any headway. Their artillery was of limited use, and the dug-in MPLA forces were better-equipped with superior small arms procured from the Warsaw Pact nations. The MPLA forces were also equipped with BM-21 "Grad" 122mm rocket launchers, the spiritual successor to the famed Katyusha mounted rocket batteries of the 'Great Patriotic War'. These rockets were effective at damaging soft targets like enemy infantry as they attempted to push into Luanda using ineffectual and poorly-coordinated human wave attacks. Their morale waning after a number of unsuccessful pushes, FNLA forces established a cordon to the north of Luanda, deciding to wait to link up with South African and UNITA forces. Roberto would have preferred to take Luanda himself so as to establish himself as the senior of himself and Savimbi, but he couldn't risk his offensive turning into a rout. Roberto's position was made more tenuous as, without announcement, Congolese troops crossed the border at two points: Noqui and Maquela do Zombo on November 19th. Riverine forces of the Congo also captured Soyo at the estuary of the Congo river. Marching south rapidly, Congolese motorised infantry met only mild resistance as they captured M'banza Congo, one of the most significant cities of the north and the traditional capital for the Kongo people in Angola. In an attempt to delay the South African advance until the Congolese intervention could take pressure off Luanda, MPLA forces at several points inland made probing attacks into UNITA territory, which were repulsed by combat groups Foxbat and X-Ray. Foxbat then pushed northward parallel with Task Force Zulu's advance along the coast, seizing Ebo [189], then Gabela, then Quilenda. Combat Group Orange would cover Foxbat's eastern flank, taking Quibala and Conde before linking up with Foxbat again north at Dondo on the Cuanza river. Task Force Zulu took Port Amboim, before swinging inland to Mumbundo to enable support for the independent combat groups if necessary. Foxbat and Orange once again pushed north, this time seeking to take Vila Salazar, opening the roads to the FNLA territory in the north and isolating Luanda from the MPLA's inland territory. Here South African-led forces would experience the most dogged resistance yet; MPLA forces which had been stationed around Malange had pushed west to support the defense of Luanda (or, if possible, to mount a counter-attack into FNLA territory) and to prevent potential isolate by the fast-moving South African combat groups. It appeared that a decisive phase of the conflict was looming; whoever was in control of Vila Salazar would have the upper hand in the battle for the capital; but for the FNLA-UNITA-SADF forces, this victory needed to be quick. By this point Congolese forces had reached the outskirts of Carmona. By the new year, they would certainly be at Luanda, threatening a complete annihilation of FNLA forces. If Vila Salazar was taken, it would be possible for South African forces to stabilise the front at Vista Alegre and prevent a Congolese outflanking of FNLA troops. If the MPLA successfully rebuffed the South Africans, Roberto's only hope would be a retreat via Catete, where his troops would be harassed and vulnerable until linking up with SADF-UNITA forces. This would also require a complete abandonment of the traditional Kongo territory to Congolese occupation, without even the capture of Luanda to show for it. FNLA as a military force would be preserved, but its political influence would be severely reduced, and Holden Roberto would have to kiss his dreams of the presidency goodbye in that scenario, accepting having to play second fiddle to Savimbi. The Congolese intervention had turned the reality of the conflict on its head; from a near certain victory over an MPLA which was under attack on all sides, Roberto now found himself increasingly cornered. As any boxer will tell you, often the best course of action when cornered is a massive, decisive, fully-committed attack.
In the inland eastern regions of Angola, UNITA had failed in several attacks to seize territory from the MPLA. The relative low intensity of the conflict in the east relative to the hotly-contested western coastal regions enabled the lightly-equipped combat group X-Ray to play a key role in proceedings. Seeing that the UNITA forces were unable to mount effective offensive action in this sector, X-Ray was committed to an attack on Vila Luso, which it captured with little issue. X-Ray and UNITA troops continued their advance to the east and north. UNITA forces with some difficulty managed to capture Henrique de Carvalho [190], whilst X-Ray seized the only useful crossing from Congo into eastern Angola at Teixiera de Sousa. X-Ray would remain in eastern Angola for the rest of its deployment, keeping surveillance on the border with Congo and engaging in small-scale skirmishes with MPLA militants. Back in the west, the fighting at Vila Salazar raged. The initial attack by the joint combat groups of X-Ray and Orange inflicted heavy casualties but were unable to dislodge the MPLA militants from Vila Salazar in the initial assault. Instead they wheeled around to the east of the town, intercepting and engaging with MPLA forces attempting to reinforce Vila Salazar. This succeeded in keeping much of the MPLA reinforcements from reaching the more defensible township. With the arrival of Task Force Zulu, the town was eventually taken after being softened up with artillery and air bombardment. As this fighting was going on, Holden Roberto's FNLA forces had driven east. Leaving some forces outside of Luanda, the bulk of FNLA forces redeployed to Vista Alegre where a tense stand-off occurred upon the arrival of Congolese troops marching south from Quitexe.
FNLA troops in training
As a new year commenced, there was a temporary halt in the fighting as diplomats flew back and forth between capitals attempting to prevent a major regional war. South African involvement in the Angolan civil war had become obvious to the outside world, and the already internationally-unpopular white supremacist government in South Africa was receiving criticism for their intervention. The US State Department and intelligence services were split on policy; the intelligence services seeking to support the apartheid regime as a means to prevent socialist or communist black African-led governments from taking over the whole of Southern Africa, whereas the State Department saw white minority rule in South Africa as highly-problematic for the United States' international reputation. It wasn't long since segregation had been outlawed in the United States; supporting an openly racist white supremacist state wasn't a good look when espousing the values of liberty and equality. The Congolese and South African interests in the conflict were both fundamentally realpolitik in motivation, however. South Africa wanted to cut off support for the SWAPO. Congo didn't want another right-wing nation threatening its southern border; Rhodesia-Nyasaland was already positioned uncomfortably close to the valuable Katanga province. A temporary ceasefire was brokered as negotiations were underway between representatives of the three Angolan factions, the Congolese, South Africa and with the United States who sought to act as mediators. It was agreed that peace in Angola necessitated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, but neither of the major interventionist states would withdraw without the other also doing so as well as guaranteeing that certain preconditions were met: the Congolese government wanted the expatriation of members of ABAKO-R (Alliance des Bakongo - Résistance), a fringe splinter group from ABAKO which sought the secession of Bakongo regions from the DRC as well as free elections, which they believed that MPLA would win. The South Africans claimed that they would be willing to cease involvement in the internal affairs of Angola if assistance to SWAPO ended.
Flag of Angola after Moroni Accords, chosen as not to favour any one of the major parties
By April 1976, a temporary solution was achieved with the Moroni Accords. All parties agreed in principle that free elections would occur in the future after a vague "period of stabilisation". Congolese and South African troops would be withdrawn from the country. The 200 or so ABAKO-R operatives in northern Angola would be sent back to Congo and support for SWAPO would cease immediately. Any SWAPO operatives attempting to cross the border into Angola were to be arrested and immediately turned over to South African authorities. A provisional government would be established with a weak executive branch, with a presidency which would be turned over after a mere two years as long as free elections had not yet been held. According to the agreement, Neto would be the first president, to be followed by Roberto in 1978 and Savimbi in 1980. One of the biggest bones of contention, about the interior minister position, was papered over by a poor short-term solution: Nito Alves, a notable MPLA leader who had been active in organising "popular power" committees in the slums of Luanda, was assigned to the position. In order to convince Savimbi and Roberto to agree, both the FNLA and UNITA were allowed to maintain their armed militia forces and de facto governance of the territories they held prior to the foreign interventions. A number of key issues were left unaddressed, most notably how exactly free elections were supposed to be held in a country with three separate parties which maintained armed militia forces. The primary concern was putting a halt to the immediate threat of escalation and a regional conflict, which it can be said was partially successful.
The fragile peace in Angola would be again tested, this time by internecine power struggles within MPLA. Having seen Nito Alves slowly accumulate more influence within the party, Agostinho Neto sought to limit his power by suspending him in October 1976, accusing Alves and Chief of Staff José Van-Dunem of "fractionalism". Alves was an ultra-left figure within the MPLA, but had actively suppressed the Maoist Organisation of Angolan Communists and promoted partnerships with the Soviet Union. Where he had been outspoken and broke with the consensus amongst other leading MPLA members was his hostility towards white and mestizo Angolans, even going so far as to state that mestizos should have to apply for citizenship, and that whites should only be given membership if they had been voluntarily part of the independence struggle (like Van-Dunem's wife). Alves and Van-Dunem claimed that a commission of enquiry should be created around the issue of "fractionalism" so that they could plead their case that the suspensions had been unjust. José Eduardo Dos Santos, another leading MPLA figure, headed the commission of enquiry and drew out the proceedings. After 12 hours of debate, it was decided that Alves and Van-Dunem's suspensions would stand. Alves and Van-Dunem immediately began plotting a seizure of power in secret. In the early morning of 27 May 1977, forces of the 8th Brigade commanded by Jacobo Caetano and loyal to Alves seized key points throughout Luanda, including the radio station, presidential palace and a prison, where supporters of Alves were freed. Caetano's forces expected to find Neto in the palace, but concerned about the possibility of a coup, he had moved his operations to the Ministry of Defence building. 8th Brigade troops, after executing a number of political figures they had captured in their initial attack immediately besieged the Ministry of Defence building[191]. Neto was captured after attempting to escape through secret tunnels built underneath the Ministry of Defence building. On threat of harm being done to his family, Neto was forced to make a phony public confession to being a "counter-revolutionary, a bourgeois nationalist and a traitor to the international revolutionary struggle". Neto would be shot in the head immediately after the broadcast finished. The putschists made calls over the radio to the people of Luanda, encouraging them to take to the streets to support the coup and referring to themselves as the "MPLA Action Committee". Dos Santos, seeing the writing on the wall, made an unprompted public statement in support of the Action Committee, and falsely claiming that his past political moves against Alves were made under duress from Neto and his supporters. This transparent opportunism likely saved his life, however, and he would be granted the position of Vice President after the declaration of a new government with Alves as President of the Republic. As news of the coup spread throughout the country, the FNLA and UNITA were on edge. But peace prevailed, at least until April 1978, when Roberto was supposed to, according to the Moroni Accords, take office as President. Alves refused to relinquish power, essentially daring the FNLA to march once again on Luanda. Since the end of the post-independence hostilities, the national army (which was entirely composed of MPLA forces) had gradually strengthened itself with the import of Soviet weaponry. Whilst lacking some of the more advanced weapons held by the USSR's European allies, the Angolan army had been provided with two state of the art Mil Mi-24 'Hind' attack helicopters. A handful of pilots had also been trained in the Soviet Union to allow for the deployment of these extremely useful military assets. The small arms of MPLA-aligned forces also tended to be of a higher quality, and they had greater stockpiles of ammunition and other key supplies. Knowing that his forces would be unsuccessful in an unsupported attack on MPLA forces, Roberto reached out to Savimbi's UNITA. After some deliberation with their South African patrons (who told Savimbi that they would consider a renewed intervention in the event of an MPLA-initiated attack on UNITA, but would not in the event of a UNITA-FNLA offensive action), UNITA refused to join in on a march on Luanda, and as such an enraged Roberto stood down. Frustrated by South Africa's intransigence and clear favouritism for UNITA, Roberto began to send feelers out to pro-Western states in the Gulf of Guinea for future support.
Nito Alves, President of Angola after the ousting and murder of Agostinho Neto
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[187] Historically, the FLEC was supported by Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Congo, which sought to take control of the offshore oil resources of Cabinda. IOTL, the FLEC was supported by Zairean mercenaries. ITTL, a left wing Congo isn't opposed to the MPLA like Mobutu was, but they will likely still seek recompense for their support.
[188] There are a couple of reasons for the different outcome of the Battle of Quifangondo ITTL. The first is that there was no Cuban intervention, and as such the MPLA defenders weren't assisted by Cuban advisors. Additionally, and more importantly, IOTL Holden Roberto kept his most reliable and strongest units in reserve in Zaire, rather than committing them to battle in Angola. As such, despite the FNLA nominally maintaining the largest armed force of the three Angolan combatant groups (despite being probably the least well-trained and organised), their forces weren't as strongly committed. Why did Roberto keep his strongest units in Zaire? Its uncertain. My thoughts is that he probably felt in the case of a loss in Angola he could live in exile there and that his private army would be an effective bargaining chip with Mobutu, able to be used to suppress Mobutu's political enemies and making it less likely for Mobutu to outright kill him if his relationship with the Zairean dictator soured. But ITTL, without a friendly Zaire to reside in, more of the FNLA's forces (and the better elements of it) being "in-country" lead them to be committed to the push to Luanda.
[189] IOTL, the advance on Ebo was repulsed due to Cuban troops bolstering the defenders.
[190] IOTL, the MPLA was able to prevent the UNITA attack due to being reinforced by the Katangese Tigers, the armed wing of the Congolese National Liberation Front, which opposed Mobutu and was comprised of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie. ITTL, this group is not present as a result of aforementioned butterflies from no Mobutu in Congo.
[191] IOTL the coup was suppressed by Cuban troops. They really came in clutch for Neto a LOT IOTL.
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Another great update, hopefully the MPLA can take control of the country proper and help with being yet another piece of pressure on the Apartheid regime
We'll see regarding taking control of the country enitrely, but they're definitely the strongest single faction in the country. They also did agree not to support SWAPO, but that was Neto, not Alves 😉.
My next chapter is going to be on the situation in Mozambique, which will finish off the "Portugal's colonial wars and their consequences" series of posts. There will still be plenty of content about these parts of Africa and so on, but yeah.
Chapter 84: The Crab Does Not Bite; it is it's Handshake that Hurts - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 5)
The poorly-organised Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique left major questions about the future of the country as independence loomed. It was clear that FRELIMO would be the dominant political force in the country, and it had long espoused an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and left-wing political programme. But what would the contours of a FRELIMO-governed Mozambique look like? What would happen to the newly vulnerable white settler population in the country? Would they be allowed to stay and contribute to economic development, even if their prior political dominance was stripped away? Would FRELIMO allow the election of representatives from different parties, or establish a one-party Marxist state? These questions were quickly answered on independence day, the 25th June 1975. FRELIMO notable Armando Guebeza announced the 24/20 order, giving Portuguese settlers 24 hours to leave the country, and with only 20 kilograms of luggage. All of their other possessions would be nationalised. In the next few hours, a contingency plan was activated; Rhodesian troops crossed the border, pushing east as fast as possible. Several of the major towns, such as Lourenço Marques, also saw uprisings by white settlers upon hearing news of the intervention. Supporting the Rhodesian forces was an auxiliary force of mercenaries, led by Mike Hoare. Facing ineffectual resistance from the FRELIMO forces, the interventionist forces halted their advance upon reaching the Zambezi. On 20th September 1975, self-proclaimed 'fascist idealist' Jorge Jardim announced the establishment of the "Free Republic of Zambézia", whose government would largely be comprised of members of FICO, a Portuguese settler organisation that was staunchly opposed to the Portuguese withdrawal and had unsuccessfully lobbied the Portuguese government to arm settlers prior to independence[192]. In the lead-up to independence, Jorge Jardim had established contacts in South Africa and Rhodesia-Nyasaland, and had successfully lobbied the latter to provide military assistance in the event of a FRELIMO persecution of the white settler community. He had also reached out to António Champalimaud, formerly the wealthiest industrialist in Portugal. Champalimaud's various assets had been largely seized after the Carnation Revolution, but he was promised a leading role in promoting economic development should be relocate to Zambézia.
Jorge Jardim, first President of the Free Republic of Zambézia
During the intervention, the Rhodesian forces focused on the destruction of camps inhabited by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) militants who had been operating out of remote FRELIMO-governed regions of Mozambique. This campaign was highly successful, driving the dispersed ZANU remnants across the Zambezi. Many would flee even further afield, taking refuge in Tanganyika. The Rhodesian intervention was widely condemned by the international community, but Salisbury perceived the increased security as a worthwhile trade. In the rump remainder of Mozambique, an increasingly insecure FRELIMO leadership began a campaign of terror, instituting effectively a police state, forcing many local inhabitants from their traditional villages into collective farms and re-education camps, and imprisoning political opposition. This had the effect of producing many small rebel groups opposed to FRELIMO. One of these groups was the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) which was effectively a Rhodesian proxy and lead by former FRELIMO dissident André Matsangaissa. RENAMO commenced armed resistance against FRELIMO in 1977. The other major opposition group challenging FRELIMO was the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique (PRM). The PRM was led by Amos Sumane. Sumane had been the founder of the Rumbezi African National Union (UNAR) which had itself broken off a FRELIMO splinter group active in northwest Mozambique during the war of independence. Sumane's group had been active in Zambezia Province (north of the Zambezi, not to be confused with the breakaway state that would occupy south of the Zambezi) where FRELIMO had little popular support. The UNAR was committed to the establishment of an independent state of Rumbezia between the Ruvuma and Zambezi rivers. UNAR itself would be dissolved after a short period of time, but Sumane would return to prominence after independence, establishing the PRM. The PRM was supported by Jardim, as well as by the Central African Federation, which allowed the PRM to mount cross-border raids from Nyasaland into northern Mozambique, which started in 1977. Sumane's forces were mostly composed of Lomué tribesmen who had been angered by FRELIMO's forced villagisation policy. FRELIMO's governance in the north was further challenged by the defection of Lázaro Nkavandame, a notable leader amongst the Maconde ethnic group, to RENAMO. The Maconde, who were concentrated in the north, comprised a disproportionately large share of FRELIMO membership as a consequence of the initial resistance in the war of independence being limited to the north until Portuguese control over other territories waned. FRELIMO was becoming increasingly reliant on shipments of weapons from China via Tanganyika.
The Free Republic of Zambézia (República Livre da Zambézia, RLZ) over the next couple of years started to establish itself as a somewhat functioning state. Whilst having a number of extremely unsavoury characteristics (keeping black voting rights extremely limited, outlawing any party whose charter contained the words "decolonisation", "socialism" or "Africanism"), the degree of abuse of black subjects was not nearly to the same degree as in their South African ally. Instead, their internal development was more analogous to Rhodesia-Nyasaland, focusing on economic stabilisation, allowing a degree of privilege for African tribal leaders and their kin, and not outlawing interracial marriages (although it is notable that determining whether children from these unions were to be granted voting rights once reaching adulthood was a convoluted progress). Where the RLZ truly was bizarre was in its management of external economic links; cut off from direct trade with most foreign powers (only South Africa, Rhodesia-Nyasaland and France gave the breakaway state full diplomatic recognition) and with Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa being limited in their international trade due to the imposition of trading bans with a number of countries as a result of these countries' continued adherence to white minority rule, the leaders of RLZ had to get creative. Taking advantage of connections made in Brazil and France, the cunning Champalimaud was the architect of a convoluted blockade-busting system: goods would be imported and exported via shell companies in Comoros and Madagascar. These companies would then trade primarily with either Brazil (in the case of direct trade or requisition of products from the United States or Canada) or with France (in case of trade with Europe). Direct trade with Portugal was out of the question as they had opposed the RLZ and were unwilling to support it in case of irritating the United States and Britain, who they sought to maintain close ties with despite having aligned with the Paris Pact regarding collective security arrangements. Rhodesian forces would stay in RLZ until the early 1980s, but would focus their energies on training an RLZ military comprised of both black and white regular troops (although the officer class would be overwhelmingly white, the sole exceptions being the sons of certain tribal chiefs who had proven compliant) as well as flechas. The Cahora Bossa dam would have a permanent Rhodesian garrison, but would provide a great deal of value for the RLZ, who sold the power it generated to both South Africa and Rhodesia.
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[192] Historically, the Rhodesians did consider an intervention, but would only do so with South African support. The South Africans didn't support this idea, as at the time FRELIMO toned down their criticisms of South Africa, leaving Pretoria expecting a detente. This rhetoric would flare up again later, however. ITTL, the Rhodesians don't feel the need for South African support, as they are stronger ITTL, still holding Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi).
Jorge Jardim, first President of the Free Republic of Zambézia
During the intervention, the Rhodesian forces focused on the destruction of camps inhabited by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) militants who had been operating out of remote FRELIMO-governed regions of Mozambique. This campaign was highly successful, driving the dispersed ZANU remnants across the Zambezi. Many would flee even further afield, taking refuge in Tanganyika. The Rhodesian intervention was widely condemned by the international community, but Salisbury perceived the increased security as a worthwhile trade. In the rump remainder of Mozambique, an increasingly insecure FRELIMO leadership began a campaign of terror, instituting effectively a police state, forcing many local inhabitants from their traditional villages into collective farms and re-education camps, and imprisoning political opposition. This had the effect of producing many small rebel groups opposed to FRELIMO. One of these groups was the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) which was effectively a Rhodesian proxy and lead by former FRELIMO dissident André Matsangaissa. RENAMO commenced armed resistance against FRELIMO in 1977. The other major opposition group challenging FRELIMO was the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique (PRM). The PRM was led by Amos Sumane. Sumane had been the founder of the Rumbezi African National Union (UNAR) which had itself broken off a FRELIMO splinter group active in northwest Mozambique during the war of independence. Sumane's group had been active in Zambezia Province (north of the Zambezi, not to be confused with the breakaway state that would occupy south of the Zambezi) where FRELIMO had little popular support. The UNAR was committed to the establishment of an independent state of Rumbezia between the Ruvuma and Zambezi rivers. UNAR itself would be dissolved after a short period of time, but Sumane would return to prominence after independence, establishing the PRM. The PRM was supported by Jardim, as well as by the Central African Federation, which allowed the PRM to mount cross-border raids from Nyasaland into northern Mozambique, which started in 1977. Sumane's forces were mostly composed of Lomué tribesmen who had been angered by FRELIMO's forced villagisation policy. FRELIMO's governance in the north was further challenged by the defection of Lázaro Nkavandame, a notable leader amongst the Maconde ethnic group, to RENAMO. The Maconde, who were concentrated in the north, comprised a disproportionately large share of FRELIMO membership as a consequence of the initial resistance in the war of independence being limited to the north until Portuguese control over other territories waned. FRELIMO was becoming increasingly reliant on shipments of weapons from China via Tanganyika.
The Free Republic of Zambézia (República Livre da Zambézia, RLZ) over the next couple of years started to establish itself as a somewhat functioning state. Whilst having a number of extremely unsavoury characteristics (keeping black voting rights extremely limited, outlawing any party whose charter contained the words "decolonisation", "socialism" or "Africanism"), the degree of abuse of black subjects was not nearly to the same degree as in their South African ally. Instead, their internal development was more analogous to Rhodesia-Nyasaland, focusing on economic stabilisation, allowing a degree of privilege for African tribal leaders and their kin, and not outlawing interracial marriages (although it is notable that determining whether children from these unions were to be granted voting rights once reaching adulthood was a convoluted progress). Where the RLZ truly was bizarre was in its management of external economic links; cut off from direct trade with most foreign powers (only South Africa, Rhodesia-Nyasaland and France gave the breakaway state full diplomatic recognition) and with Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa being limited in their international trade due to the imposition of trading bans with a number of countries as a result of these countries' continued adherence to white minority rule, the leaders of RLZ had to get creative. Taking advantage of connections made in Brazil and France, the cunning Champalimaud was the architect of a convoluted blockade-busting system: goods would be imported and exported via shell companies in Comoros and Madagascar. These companies would then trade primarily with either Brazil (in the case of direct trade or requisition of products from the United States or Canada) or with France (in case of trade with Europe). Direct trade with Portugal was out of the question as they had opposed the RLZ and were unwilling to support it in case of irritating the United States and Britain, who they sought to maintain close ties with despite having aligned with the Paris Pact regarding collective security arrangements. Rhodesian forces would stay in RLZ until the early 1980s, but would focus their energies on training an RLZ military comprised of both black and white regular troops (although the officer class would be overwhelmingly white, the sole exceptions being the sons of certain tribal chiefs who had proven compliant) as well as flechas. The Cahora Bossa dam would have a permanent Rhodesian garrison, but would provide a great deal of value for the RLZ, who sold the power it generated to both South Africa and Rhodesia.
==
[192] Historically, the Rhodesians did consider an intervention, but would only do so with South African support. The South Africans didn't support this idea, as at the time FRELIMO toned down their criticisms of South Africa, leaving Pretoria expecting a detente. This rhetoric would flare up again later, however. ITTL, the Rhodesians don't feel the need for South African support, as they are stronger ITTL, still holding Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi).
A bit of a shorter chapter for you guys this time, but didn't really have much to stretch on it. If anyone wants more details or has any questions about the events in Mozambique, just let me know.
As always, Rhodesia, South Africa and France ruining everything, hopefully there will come a time when the black majority in the former two rebel and end their disgusting regimes