Chapter 26: The Dirty War - Algeria and the Origins of the French Junta
The Dirty War: Algeria
As the winds of decolonisation blew many nations from the grip of their European overlords, France became caught in yet another war of national liberation, smarting already from the debacle in Indochina. From 1954 into the 1960s, the French military in Algeria battled the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a group expousing both socialism and Nasserist pan-Arabism. The war was a source of instability in metropolitan France itself, which saw domestic terrorism, constitutional change and a military junta as a result of the ongoing insurgency.
Algerian nationalism began to move beyond an embryonic state in the early twentieth-century, when members of the Algerian elite and intelligensia had seen during their studies in France political freedoms, economic prosperity and social acceptance made systematically unavailable to Algerians living under a French colonial regime. Whilst the Algerians had supported the allied cause in WWII, there were uprisings in the city of Setif on V-E Day, which were put down bloodily by French forces. At least 1,500 Muslim Algerians were killed. In 1947, the first Algerian nationalist paramilitary force was established, the Organisation Spéciale (OS), by Mohamed Balouizdad of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD). The OS begun preparations for armed struggle against France, reaching a peak membership of approximately 1800, but was dismantled by the French police in 1951 following widespread raids and the imprisonment of dissidents. Only the units in Aurès and Kabylie remained active. Nevertheless, the OS was significant in that many OS militants would go on to form the FLN. Amongst those captured in the mass arrests of Algerian dissidents was Ahmed Ben Bella, a WWII veteran who rejected an officer's commission in response to the Setif massacre. Ben Bella later became a founding member of OS. Ben Bella was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, but managed to escape from Blida prison, escaping first to Tunisia and then to Egypt. In Cairo, Ben Bella became one of the nine-man Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action) which metamorphosed into the FLN.
On November 1, 1954, FLN marquisards launched their first armed action, an attack on military and police targets. In the so-called Toussaint Rouge (Red All-Saints' Day), a handful of Pied-Noir (European Algerian) civilians were killed, along with two of the FLN fighters. In response to the attacks, Minister of the Interior François Mitterrand despatched two companies (600 men) of riot police to Algeria. Three companies of paratroopers also arrived overnight. Pierre Mendès France, the Prime Minister [95], declared in a speech to the National Assembly that "one does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic". Despite such rhetoric, it appears that the majority of Algerians were in favour of a relative status quo. Whilst radicals like Messali Hadj had helped formed the FLN, Ferhat Abbas, another Algerian activist, maintained a more moderate electoral strategy, hoping that the rights and privileges afforded to Frenchmen could be extended to Algerian Arabs and Berbers as well. At this early stage, the FLN had at their disposal less than 500 fellaghas (maquis/partisans).
In response to the FLN, a pro-French terrorist group, La Main Rouge (Red Hand) began to operate against Algerian nationalists. La Main Rouge was largely an instrument of the French state as opposed to a vigilante group, operated as it was by the Directorate-General for External Security. In 1952, La Main Rouge had assassinated Tunisian activist Farhat Hached and had been involved in attacks against North African activists for several years prior to the Algerian War's outbreak in 1954. In the first year of the war, Ferhat Abbas' UDMA; the ulama (Muslim scholars); and the Communists all maintained friendly neutrality with the FLN, neither outright supporting nor decrying their actions.
In April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo and joined the FLN. The FLN won significant prestige from their endorsement by the ulama shortly after. Shortly after, Abbas was imprisoned by the French after French Air Force fighters intercepted his DC-3 on a flight from Tunisia to Morocco. Whilst the FLN position seemed to improve tremendously in 1956, with the exception of Abbas' arrest, infighting amongst Algerian nationalists came increasingly commonplace with Messali Hadj's establishing of the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), which competed with the FLN. Whilst the MNA's guerrilla forces were fairly-quickly defeated in Algeria by the FLN, Hadj had a larger support network amongst Algerian communities in France itself. FLN attempts to root out this network resulted in the Cafe Wars, characterised by bombings and shootouts in the streets of France, focused particularly around the cafes which provided the de facto communal meeting places of the Algerian community. Both organisations resorted to mafiosi-style tactics, including gangland killings and extortion to secure funding and to intimidation expatriates with wavering loyalties to support their causes. The Cafe Wars continued until the MNA ceased operating in 1964 [96] as a political organisation. Nevertheless, both the MNA and FLN networks in France served as the foundation of their respective rival organised crime networks, which have continued to persist in their dominance of the French underworld. The Cafe Wars cost over 4,000 lives, with over 10,000 wounded as a result of bombings and failed assassinations. In Algeria itself, FLN violence stepped up against potential "interlocuterus valables", whose independent representation of the Muslim communities may be utilised by the French to secure a reformist environment with the French maintaining their hold on Algeria.
With an increase in FLN operations in the Algerian countryside, the Pieds-Noirs, Algerians of European (largely Italian, followed by French) descent began to sell their holdings which had been confiscated from Muslims earlier in the colonisation process and sought refuge in cities such as Algiers and Oran. This influx of hardliners into the cities (where their political demands could be more clearly heard) galvanised support for the French military in urban Algeria. Both the Pieds-Noirs and the urban French demanded a strong response. 'Colon' vigilante units began to carry out 'ratonnades' (rat-hunts) [97] against suspected FLN Algerian Arabs and Berbers in the cities. The complicity of the French authorities in the ratonnades alienated many moderate Muslim Algerians, who increasingly flocked to the FLN.
By 1955, Governor-General Jacques Soustelle was convinced that military action alone was insufficient for suppressing the Algerian national liberation movement. Soustelle wrote up an eponymous plan for improving the social, economic and political situation of Muslim Algerians, in the hope that a compromise solution would undermine support for the FLN and retain Algeria for France. Due to the ineffectiveness of the political process in the Fourth Republic, however, it was impossibel to implement many of Soustelle's initiatives. Furthermore, Soustelle abandoned his reformist strategy for harsher measures after the FLN began to move into urbanised areas, targeting for the first time civilians. The commander of the Constantine wilaya (operating region for an FLN 'army') directed attacks on towns and suburbs, where European civilians were massacred. Their bodies were often mutilated. Amongst the victims were women, children and the elderly, as well as able-bodied men. The brutality of the attacks shocked Soustelle. His harsh response, however, simply functioned to further alienate Algerians, who continued to flock to the FLN.
In 1956, Governor-General Lacoste (a socialist), attempted to abolish the Algerian Assembly. The Assembly, which had been composed half of Pieds-Noirs and half of Muslim and Jewish Algerians, disproportionately represented settler interests. Lacoste saw the Pieds-Noirs as problematic, given their unwavering commitment to the marginalisation of Muslim Algerians. Lacoste granted police extra powers and intensified military operations. Due to the interference of deputies in charge of the Algerian départements, this measure wasn't actually enforced until the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. By 1956, 400,000 French troops were based in Algeria. French troops continued to develop upon American helicopter doctrine used in the Chinese Expedition, including the use of helicopters as mobile weapons platforms.
In order to weaken FLN influence in the rural areas, the French Army established the Section Administrative Spécialisée (SAS). SAS officers, the képis bleus (blue caps) recruited and trained Muslim loyalists called harkis. The harkis employed by the French eventually number 180,000, significantly more than the number of actual FLN fellaghas. Armed with shotguns, harkis were primarily used in conventional formations, but were also included into specialised anti-insurgency units as scouts and guides. The French also recruited 'turned' FLN operatives, most of whom were coerced into working for the French by torture or threats against their families. As the Battle of Algiers raged in 1956-1957 (FLN operatives committed bombings and shootings throughout the city), FLN infighting increased exponentially. Although most guerrilla campaigns involve some level of infighting between rival commanders, turned FLN began to spread false rumours and plant evidence of foul play. The resulting conflict between FLN groups allowed the French to sit back whilst the FLN slaughtered each other. The French DST (domestic intelligence) also established the Organisation of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a counter-terrorist group tasked with false-flag attacks to quash any hopes of political compromise. It was not all one-sided, however. The FLN managed to infiltrate the French through a 1000-strong harki unit, 'Force K'. Although the ruse was uncovered by the French, 600 members of Force K managed to escape with French weapons and supplies to Tunisia, where they joined other FLN forces.
In late 1957, General Raoul Salan established the system of quadrillage, dividing French Algeria into districts occupied by a standing garrison. This system sharply reduced FLN activities, but tied down large numbers of French troops and was financially costly. The French also established a heavily-patrolled barrier system along the Algerian borders to minimise infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. They were largely successful, especially in preventing FLN forces in Tunisia from crossing into Algeria. Several attempts to break out failed miserably, with heavy losses for the FLN. The FLN further suffered from the French military's application of collective responsibility. Whilst ethically-undesirable, the harsh measures against populations suspected of harbouring or supporting FLN did much to cut support for the FLN amongst rural villagers. The French also introduced the system of regroupement (villagisation), relocating 2 million Algerians from their homes. By the end of 1958, there was a shift towards a policy of search and destroy, rather than quadrillage, as the FLN began to wither away.
Recurrent cabinet crises back home focused attention on the inherent instability of the Fourth Republic. The army and the Pieds-Noirs increasingly came to believe that the security of Algeria was being undermined by party politics which hamstrung the military's ability to respond to the evolving situation in Algeria. Many of the generals were particularly concerned, feeling that another Indochina was on the cards. These generals were infuriated at the prospect of French honour being once again sacrificed for political expediency. Jacques Soustelle returned to France to gather support for the return of Charles de Gaulle to power. De Gaulle was seen by many in the French military establishment as the only politician with enough backbone to maintain their presence in Algeria. When Pierre Pfimlin, a member of the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and Minister of Economy and Finance was approved as Prime Minister in May 1958, the generals put their plan into action.
On the night of 13th May, an army junta led by General Jacques Massu seized power in Algiers. General Salan assumed leadership of a 'Committee of Public Safety' formed to replace the civil authroity. Salan pressed demands that President René Coty allow de Gaulle to head a government of national unity invested with special powers to prevent withdrawal from Algeria. On May 17th, de Gaulle answers the call, stating that he is ready to "assume the powers of the Republic". A week later, paratroopers based in Algeria bloodlessly seized Corsica (Operation Corse) and prepare for "Operation Resurrection", the seizure of Paris by airborne troops in the event that the National Assembly rejected de Gaulle's accession, or if the Communists made a move to take power. Support for de Gaulle was quite high, although Jean-Paul Sartre, France's premier philosopher (and noted atheist) expressed dissatisfaction: "I would rather vote for God [than de Gaulle]". On the 29th, de Gaulle accepted Coty's offer of the Prime Minister-ship on the condition that a new constitution would be introduced, investing the President with significantly heightened powers and increasing presidential periods to seven years. De Gaulle further conditioned that he would be the first President under the new constitution, which established the Fifth Republic. All of the French colonies were offered a choice between the new constitution and immediate independence. With the exception of Guinea, which declared independence, all of France's colonies adopted the new constitution, which also dissolved the French Union and replaced it with the French Community.
De Gaulle raised the hopes of the military and Pieds-Noirs, proclaiming "Vive l'Algerie française" in a visit to Mostaganem. Hoping to win over Muslims, de Gaulle proposed social, political and economic reforms. The new constitution had made Algeria associated with, but not an integral part of France (as it was previously). In response, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) headed by Abbas (still in a French prison) and based in Tunis. The GPRA was quickly recognised by Morocco, Tunisia, China, Pakistan (which provided diplomatic passports to Algerian nationalist leaders), the UAR and several African and Asian countries. Notably, the Soviet Union failed to recognise the GPRA, despite support for the Algerian cause amongst the French Communist Party. Whilst the French put out feelers for a ceasefire and elections on self-determination, the FLN refused to accept a ceasefire and elections.
Whilst the French military was closer than ever to victory in 1958-1959, having crushed the FLN in many interests and inflicting irreversible losses, the FCP and several other French domestic political forces were pushing public opinion away from a continuation of the war. On September 16th, 1959, de Gaulle changed position, stating in a televised speech that self-determination was the preferable course for Algeria. Convinced that de Gaulle had betrayed them, European volunteers (Unites Territoriales) in Algiers led by student leaders Pierre Lagaillarde and Jean-Jacques Susini as well as cafe owner Joseph Ortiz and lawyer Jean-Baptiste Biaggi staged an insurrection on Jan 24 1960, known as "the week of barricades" (la semaine des barricades), directed by Col. Jean Garde of the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare division of French intelligence. The Fifth Bureau had been organised by Jean Ousset, a French representative of the Opus Dei syndicate of the Catholic Church. De Gaulle made a televised address calling on the army to remain loyal and stating that the Algerians will have the free choice of their destiny. Contrary to the expectations of the insurrectionists, the army did not support them (although they were civil in their treatment of the barricadists). On February 1st, Lagaillarde surrendered to General Challe. Many 'ultras' (hardline French and Pieds-Noirs) were imprisoned. Lagaillarde was paroled and fled to Spain, where he and Raoul Salan formed the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), a paramilitary force that proved problematic for the French military, who couldn't regulate their behaviour. In response to the uprising, de Gaulle reshuffled the French cabinet, expelling Soustelle as the Minister of Information. This decision would prove fateful. De Gaulle introduced a referendum on self-determination in Algeria on January 8, 1961, where 75% of voters approved allowing the Algerians to vote for or against self-determination. In Algeria, 69.51% of voters supported self-determination.
"De Gaulle has proven disappointing". Jouhard muttered, barely audible, sitting in a cloud of cigarette smoke. Challe spoke up "he was in a hurry to endorse us when we put him in the President's office. Now he wants to throw it all away!". Salan looked unusually haggard, his eyes faded, in contrast with Challe's empassioned glare. "We have been fighting here for too long to give up now. We have done too much for it to be all for nothing. The path is clear. There is only one thing we can do." "I've still got contacts amongst the tank commanders at Rambouillet. We can be assured of their support" Zeller quipped. The four men sat silently for a moment. The only sound was a vehicle backfiring somewhere outside the small apartment. They had decided on a place nondescript, somewhere unusual for men of such a position to be in. The peeling wallpaper seemed awfully fitting for the aging Zeller, Challe thought. It was more a depressing thought than an amusing one. The silence was shattered as the storm door flung open with a crash. General Massu swaggered in. He was 53 years old, but he had the manner of a man in his early thirties, perhaps younger. He was brash and macho, to the point where it was a little irritating. But he was a capable soldier, if occasionally cruel in victory. "We are doing this, huh?" The older men nodded. It was time. "Prepare Operation Resurrection".
Outraged by the decision to allow the Algerians self-determination, April 1961 saw a military putsch against de Gaulle's government. The so-called 'putsch des généraux' led by Maurice Challe (55, former Commander-in Chief of Algeria), Edmond Jouhaud (56, former Inspector-General of the Air Force), Andre Zeller (63, former Chief-of-Staff of the Army) and Raoul Salan (61, former Commander-in-Chief of Algeria) was also supported by General Jacques Massu, the most fanatical of French military commanders. On 22 April, the putschists seized Algiers. Commandant Helie de Saint Marc's forces, the 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment, seized Algiers' strategic points in three hours. The putschists announced that they rejected the legitimacy of the government, who they suggested had not fulfilled its mandate to protect the integrity of France. They claimed to be taking control to reinstate the Republican order. In Paris, de Gaulle was watching a theatrical performance at the Comédie-Française when he was informed of the coup by Jacques Foccart. Maurice Papon, head of the Parisian police (and director of the national police force) established a crisis cell in a room of the theatre.
On the afternoon of 21st April, the generals seized control of Algiers, Oran and Constantine [98]. Putschist forces, led by Col. Antoine Argoud, seized Parisian airfields and fanned out into the city. Whilst de Gaulle made frenzied calls for solidarity over television, armoured forces based at Rambouillet drove towards the city centre, rendezvousing with putschist commando forces. The majority of key strategic installations were captured by the 23rd, although a fierce firefight broke out as Sûreté Nationale (National Police) forces defending the Comédie-Française attempted to repel putschist paratroopers. Despite their brave stand, the police forces were outgunned by the putschists, who were reinforced by armoured vehicles which covered their advance into the building. De Gaulle was arrested inside the building, and although it is said that he spat at General Massu, who had come to oversee the seizure of the city. It is also rumoured that de Gaulle struck one of the parachutists, who tried to forcibly arrest him. De Gaulle walked out of the building with free hands. Nevertheless his escort of armed paratroopers suggested he was anything but free. The putsch had taken control of the city. Massive demonstrations by civilians, orchestrated by the Communist Party, were put down forcibly, in an incident that became known as 'Red Monday'. Communist activists had attempted to incite the crowd with had gathered under the Arc du Triomphe to violence, providing the military forces which surrounded them with a pretext to fire upon the protestors. Several hundred were caught in the crossfire, with 83 killed.
[95] Actually, 'President of the French Council of Ministers', but I have chosen to use the term Prime Minister because it is shorter and clearer in function to many English-speakers unfamiliar with French politics (like myself).
[96] Whilst historically, the FLN gained the upper hand and virtually-crushed the MNA, the Cafe Wars did continue until Algeria's independence. ITTL, with the failure of the Algerian independence movement, both devolve into organised-crime networks.
[97] 'Ratons' (rats) was a common slur for Algerian Muslims in French Algeria.
[98] Historically, the commanders at Oran and Constantine refused to join the coup. ITTL, that is not the case (different commanders due to butterflies).
BELOW: Jean Martin as General Massu in the film 'The Tale of Two Cities: The Battles for Paris and Algiers'.
As the winds of decolonisation blew many nations from the grip of their European overlords, France became caught in yet another war of national liberation, smarting already from the debacle in Indochina. From 1954 into the 1960s, the French military in Algeria battled the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), a group expousing both socialism and Nasserist pan-Arabism. The war was a source of instability in metropolitan France itself, which saw domestic terrorism, constitutional change and a military junta as a result of the ongoing insurgency.
Algerian nationalism began to move beyond an embryonic state in the early twentieth-century, when members of the Algerian elite and intelligensia had seen during their studies in France political freedoms, economic prosperity and social acceptance made systematically unavailable to Algerians living under a French colonial regime. Whilst the Algerians had supported the allied cause in WWII, there were uprisings in the city of Setif on V-E Day, which were put down bloodily by French forces. At least 1,500 Muslim Algerians were killed. In 1947, the first Algerian nationalist paramilitary force was established, the Organisation Spéciale (OS), by Mohamed Balouizdad of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD). The OS begun preparations for armed struggle against France, reaching a peak membership of approximately 1800, but was dismantled by the French police in 1951 following widespread raids and the imprisonment of dissidents. Only the units in Aurès and Kabylie remained active. Nevertheless, the OS was significant in that many OS militants would go on to form the FLN. Amongst those captured in the mass arrests of Algerian dissidents was Ahmed Ben Bella, a WWII veteran who rejected an officer's commission in response to the Setif massacre. Ben Bella later became a founding member of OS. Ben Bella was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, but managed to escape from Blida prison, escaping first to Tunisia and then to Egypt. In Cairo, Ben Bella became one of the nine-man Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action (Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action) which metamorphosed into the FLN.
On November 1, 1954, FLN marquisards launched their first armed action, an attack on military and police targets. In the so-called Toussaint Rouge (Red All-Saints' Day), a handful of Pied-Noir (European Algerian) civilians were killed, along with two of the FLN fighters. In response to the attacks, Minister of the Interior François Mitterrand despatched two companies (600 men) of riot police to Algeria. Three companies of paratroopers also arrived overnight. Pierre Mendès France, the Prime Minister [95], declared in a speech to the National Assembly that "one does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic". Despite such rhetoric, it appears that the majority of Algerians were in favour of a relative status quo. Whilst radicals like Messali Hadj had helped formed the FLN, Ferhat Abbas, another Algerian activist, maintained a more moderate electoral strategy, hoping that the rights and privileges afforded to Frenchmen could be extended to Algerian Arabs and Berbers as well. At this early stage, the FLN had at their disposal less than 500 fellaghas (maquis/partisans).
In response to the FLN, a pro-French terrorist group, La Main Rouge (Red Hand) began to operate against Algerian nationalists. La Main Rouge was largely an instrument of the French state as opposed to a vigilante group, operated as it was by the Directorate-General for External Security. In 1952, La Main Rouge had assassinated Tunisian activist Farhat Hached and had been involved in attacks against North African activists for several years prior to the Algerian War's outbreak in 1954. In the first year of the war, Ferhat Abbas' UDMA; the ulama (Muslim scholars); and the Communists all maintained friendly neutrality with the FLN, neither outright supporting nor decrying their actions.
In April 1956, Abbas flew to Cairo and joined the FLN. The FLN won significant prestige from their endorsement by the ulama shortly after. Shortly after, Abbas was imprisoned by the French after French Air Force fighters intercepted his DC-3 on a flight from Tunisia to Morocco. Whilst the FLN position seemed to improve tremendously in 1956, with the exception of Abbas' arrest, infighting amongst Algerian nationalists came increasingly commonplace with Messali Hadj's establishing of the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), which competed with the FLN. Whilst the MNA's guerrilla forces were fairly-quickly defeated in Algeria by the FLN, Hadj had a larger support network amongst Algerian communities in France itself. FLN attempts to root out this network resulted in the Cafe Wars, characterised by bombings and shootouts in the streets of France, focused particularly around the cafes which provided the de facto communal meeting places of the Algerian community. Both organisations resorted to mafiosi-style tactics, including gangland killings and extortion to secure funding and to intimidation expatriates with wavering loyalties to support their causes. The Cafe Wars continued until the MNA ceased operating in 1964 [96] as a political organisation. Nevertheless, both the MNA and FLN networks in France served as the foundation of their respective rival organised crime networks, which have continued to persist in their dominance of the French underworld. The Cafe Wars cost over 4,000 lives, with over 10,000 wounded as a result of bombings and failed assassinations. In Algeria itself, FLN violence stepped up against potential "interlocuterus valables", whose independent representation of the Muslim communities may be utilised by the French to secure a reformist environment with the French maintaining their hold on Algeria.
With an increase in FLN operations in the Algerian countryside, the Pieds-Noirs, Algerians of European (largely Italian, followed by French) descent began to sell their holdings which had been confiscated from Muslims earlier in the colonisation process and sought refuge in cities such as Algiers and Oran. This influx of hardliners into the cities (where their political demands could be more clearly heard) galvanised support for the French military in urban Algeria. Both the Pieds-Noirs and the urban French demanded a strong response. 'Colon' vigilante units began to carry out 'ratonnades' (rat-hunts) [97] against suspected FLN Algerian Arabs and Berbers in the cities. The complicity of the French authorities in the ratonnades alienated many moderate Muslim Algerians, who increasingly flocked to the FLN.
By 1955, Governor-General Jacques Soustelle was convinced that military action alone was insufficient for suppressing the Algerian national liberation movement. Soustelle wrote up an eponymous plan for improving the social, economic and political situation of Muslim Algerians, in the hope that a compromise solution would undermine support for the FLN and retain Algeria for France. Due to the ineffectiveness of the political process in the Fourth Republic, however, it was impossibel to implement many of Soustelle's initiatives. Furthermore, Soustelle abandoned his reformist strategy for harsher measures after the FLN began to move into urbanised areas, targeting for the first time civilians. The commander of the Constantine wilaya (operating region for an FLN 'army') directed attacks on towns and suburbs, where European civilians were massacred. Their bodies were often mutilated. Amongst the victims were women, children and the elderly, as well as able-bodied men. The brutality of the attacks shocked Soustelle. His harsh response, however, simply functioned to further alienate Algerians, who continued to flock to the FLN.
In 1956, Governor-General Lacoste (a socialist), attempted to abolish the Algerian Assembly. The Assembly, which had been composed half of Pieds-Noirs and half of Muslim and Jewish Algerians, disproportionately represented settler interests. Lacoste saw the Pieds-Noirs as problematic, given their unwavering commitment to the marginalisation of Muslim Algerians. Lacoste granted police extra powers and intensified military operations. Due to the interference of deputies in charge of the Algerian départements, this measure wasn't actually enforced until the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958. By 1956, 400,000 French troops were based in Algeria. French troops continued to develop upon American helicopter doctrine used in the Chinese Expedition, including the use of helicopters as mobile weapons platforms.
In order to weaken FLN influence in the rural areas, the French Army established the Section Administrative Spécialisée (SAS). SAS officers, the képis bleus (blue caps) recruited and trained Muslim loyalists called harkis. The harkis employed by the French eventually number 180,000, significantly more than the number of actual FLN fellaghas. Armed with shotguns, harkis were primarily used in conventional formations, but were also included into specialised anti-insurgency units as scouts and guides. The French also recruited 'turned' FLN operatives, most of whom were coerced into working for the French by torture or threats against their families. As the Battle of Algiers raged in 1956-1957 (FLN operatives committed bombings and shootings throughout the city), FLN infighting increased exponentially. Although most guerrilla campaigns involve some level of infighting between rival commanders, turned FLN began to spread false rumours and plant evidence of foul play. The resulting conflict between FLN groups allowed the French to sit back whilst the FLN slaughtered each other. The French DST (domestic intelligence) also established the Organisation of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a counter-terrorist group tasked with false-flag attacks to quash any hopes of political compromise. It was not all one-sided, however. The FLN managed to infiltrate the French through a 1000-strong harki unit, 'Force K'. Although the ruse was uncovered by the French, 600 members of Force K managed to escape with French weapons and supplies to Tunisia, where they joined other FLN forces.
In late 1957, General Raoul Salan established the system of quadrillage, dividing French Algeria into districts occupied by a standing garrison. This system sharply reduced FLN activities, but tied down large numbers of French troops and was financially costly. The French also established a heavily-patrolled barrier system along the Algerian borders to minimise infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. They were largely successful, especially in preventing FLN forces in Tunisia from crossing into Algeria. Several attempts to break out failed miserably, with heavy losses for the FLN. The FLN further suffered from the French military's application of collective responsibility. Whilst ethically-undesirable, the harsh measures against populations suspected of harbouring or supporting FLN did much to cut support for the FLN amongst rural villagers. The French also introduced the system of regroupement (villagisation), relocating 2 million Algerians from their homes. By the end of 1958, there was a shift towards a policy of search and destroy, rather than quadrillage, as the FLN began to wither away.
Recurrent cabinet crises back home focused attention on the inherent instability of the Fourth Republic. The army and the Pieds-Noirs increasingly came to believe that the security of Algeria was being undermined by party politics which hamstrung the military's ability to respond to the evolving situation in Algeria. Many of the generals were particularly concerned, feeling that another Indochina was on the cards. These generals were infuriated at the prospect of French honour being once again sacrificed for political expediency. Jacques Soustelle returned to France to gather support for the return of Charles de Gaulle to power. De Gaulle was seen by many in the French military establishment as the only politician with enough backbone to maintain their presence in Algeria. When Pierre Pfimlin, a member of the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) and Minister of Economy and Finance was approved as Prime Minister in May 1958, the generals put their plan into action.
On the night of 13th May, an army junta led by General Jacques Massu seized power in Algiers. General Salan assumed leadership of a 'Committee of Public Safety' formed to replace the civil authroity. Salan pressed demands that President René Coty allow de Gaulle to head a government of national unity invested with special powers to prevent withdrawal from Algeria. On May 17th, de Gaulle answers the call, stating that he is ready to "assume the powers of the Republic". A week later, paratroopers based in Algeria bloodlessly seized Corsica (Operation Corse) and prepare for "Operation Resurrection", the seizure of Paris by airborne troops in the event that the National Assembly rejected de Gaulle's accession, or if the Communists made a move to take power. Support for de Gaulle was quite high, although Jean-Paul Sartre, France's premier philosopher (and noted atheist) expressed dissatisfaction: "I would rather vote for God [than de Gaulle]". On the 29th, de Gaulle accepted Coty's offer of the Prime Minister-ship on the condition that a new constitution would be introduced, investing the President with significantly heightened powers and increasing presidential periods to seven years. De Gaulle further conditioned that he would be the first President under the new constitution, which established the Fifth Republic. All of the French colonies were offered a choice between the new constitution and immediate independence. With the exception of Guinea, which declared independence, all of France's colonies adopted the new constitution, which also dissolved the French Union and replaced it with the French Community.
De Gaulle raised the hopes of the military and Pieds-Noirs, proclaiming "Vive l'Algerie française" in a visit to Mostaganem. Hoping to win over Muslims, de Gaulle proposed social, political and economic reforms. The new constitution had made Algeria associated with, but not an integral part of France (as it was previously). In response, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) headed by Abbas (still in a French prison) and based in Tunis. The GPRA was quickly recognised by Morocco, Tunisia, China, Pakistan (which provided diplomatic passports to Algerian nationalist leaders), the UAR and several African and Asian countries. Notably, the Soviet Union failed to recognise the GPRA, despite support for the Algerian cause amongst the French Communist Party. Whilst the French put out feelers for a ceasefire and elections on self-determination, the FLN refused to accept a ceasefire and elections.
Whilst the French military was closer than ever to victory in 1958-1959, having crushed the FLN in many interests and inflicting irreversible losses, the FCP and several other French domestic political forces were pushing public opinion away from a continuation of the war. On September 16th, 1959, de Gaulle changed position, stating in a televised speech that self-determination was the preferable course for Algeria. Convinced that de Gaulle had betrayed them, European volunteers (Unites Territoriales) in Algiers led by student leaders Pierre Lagaillarde and Jean-Jacques Susini as well as cafe owner Joseph Ortiz and lawyer Jean-Baptiste Biaggi staged an insurrection on Jan 24 1960, known as "the week of barricades" (la semaine des barricades), directed by Col. Jean Garde of the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare division of French intelligence. The Fifth Bureau had been organised by Jean Ousset, a French representative of the Opus Dei syndicate of the Catholic Church. De Gaulle made a televised address calling on the army to remain loyal and stating that the Algerians will have the free choice of their destiny. Contrary to the expectations of the insurrectionists, the army did not support them (although they were civil in their treatment of the barricadists). On February 1st, Lagaillarde surrendered to General Challe. Many 'ultras' (hardline French and Pieds-Noirs) were imprisoned. Lagaillarde was paroled and fled to Spain, where he and Raoul Salan formed the Organisation de l'armée secrète (OAS), a paramilitary force that proved problematic for the French military, who couldn't regulate their behaviour. In response to the uprising, de Gaulle reshuffled the French cabinet, expelling Soustelle as the Minister of Information. This decision would prove fateful. De Gaulle introduced a referendum on self-determination in Algeria on January 8, 1961, where 75% of voters approved allowing the Algerians to vote for or against self-determination. In Algeria, 69.51% of voters supported self-determination.
"De Gaulle has proven disappointing". Jouhard muttered, barely audible, sitting in a cloud of cigarette smoke. Challe spoke up "he was in a hurry to endorse us when we put him in the President's office. Now he wants to throw it all away!". Salan looked unusually haggard, his eyes faded, in contrast with Challe's empassioned glare. "We have been fighting here for too long to give up now. We have done too much for it to be all for nothing. The path is clear. There is only one thing we can do." "I've still got contacts amongst the tank commanders at Rambouillet. We can be assured of their support" Zeller quipped. The four men sat silently for a moment. The only sound was a vehicle backfiring somewhere outside the small apartment. They had decided on a place nondescript, somewhere unusual for men of such a position to be in. The peeling wallpaper seemed awfully fitting for the aging Zeller, Challe thought. It was more a depressing thought than an amusing one. The silence was shattered as the storm door flung open with a crash. General Massu swaggered in. He was 53 years old, but he had the manner of a man in his early thirties, perhaps younger. He was brash and macho, to the point where it was a little irritating. But he was a capable soldier, if occasionally cruel in victory. "We are doing this, huh?" The older men nodded. It was time. "Prepare Operation Resurrection".
Outraged by the decision to allow the Algerians self-determination, April 1961 saw a military putsch against de Gaulle's government. The so-called 'putsch des généraux' led by Maurice Challe (55, former Commander-in Chief of Algeria), Edmond Jouhaud (56, former Inspector-General of the Air Force), Andre Zeller (63, former Chief-of-Staff of the Army) and Raoul Salan (61, former Commander-in-Chief of Algeria) was also supported by General Jacques Massu, the most fanatical of French military commanders. On 22 April, the putschists seized Algiers. Commandant Helie de Saint Marc's forces, the 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment, seized Algiers' strategic points in three hours. The putschists announced that they rejected the legitimacy of the government, who they suggested had not fulfilled its mandate to protect the integrity of France. They claimed to be taking control to reinstate the Republican order. In Paris, de Gaulle was watching a theatrical performance at the Comédie-Française when he was informed of the coup by Jacques Foccart. Maurice Papon, head of the Parisian police (and director of the national police force) established a crisis cell in a room of the theatre.
On the afternoon of 21st April, the generals seized control of Algiers, Oran and Constantine [98]. Putschist forces, led by Col. Antoine Argoud, seized Parisian airfields and fanned out into the city. Whilst de Gaulle made frenzied calls for solidarity over television, armoured forces based at Rambouillet drove towards the city centre, rendezvousing with putschist commando forces. The majority of key strategic installations were captured by the 23rd, although a fierce firefight broke out as Sûreté Nationale (National Police) forces defending the Comédie-Française attempted to repel putschist paratroopers. Despite their brave stand, the police forces were outgunned by the putschists, who were reinforced by armoured vehicles which covered their advance into the building. De Gaulle was arrested inside the building, and although it is said that he spat at General Massu, who had come to oversee the seizure of the city. It is also rumoured that de Gaulle struck one of the parachutists, who tried to forcibly arrest him. De Gaulle walked out of the building with free hands. Nevertheless his escort of armed paratroopers suggested he was anything but free. The putsch had taken control of the city. Massive demonstrations by civilians, orchestrated by the Communist Party, were put down forcibly, in an incident that became known as 'Red Monday'. Communist activists had attempted to incite the crowd with had gathered under the Arc du Triomphe to violence, providing the military forces which surrounded them with a pretext to fire upon the protestors. Several hundred were caught in the crossfire, with 83 killed.
[95] Actually, 'President of the French Council of Ministers', but I have chosen to use the term Prime Minister because it is shorter and clearer in function to many English-speakers unfamiliar with French politics (like myself).
[96] Whilst historically, the FLN gained the upper hand and virtually-crushed the MNA, the Cafe Wars did continue until Algeria's independence. ITTL, with the failure of the Algerian independence movement, both devolve into organised-crime networks.
[97] 'Ratons' (rats) was a common slur for Algerian Muslims in French Algeria.
[98] Historically, the commanders at Oran and Constantine refused to join the coup. ITTL, that is not the case (different commanders due to butterflies).
BELOW: Jean Martin as General Massu in the film 'The Tale of Two Cities: The Battles for Paris and Algiers'.
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